The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of “Independent” Directors
Open accessAbstract
We provide evidence that firms appoint independent directors who are overly sympathetic to management, while still technically independent according to regulatory definitions. We explore a subset of independent directors for whom we have detailed, microlevel data on their views regarding the firm prior to being appointed to the board: sell-side analysts who are subsequently appointed to the boards of companies they previously covered. We find that boards appoint overly optimistic analysts who are also poor relative performers. The magnitude of the optimistic bias is large: 82.0% of appointed recommendations are strong buy/buy recommendations, compared with 56.9% for all other analyst recommendations. We also show that appointed analysts' optimism is stronger at precisely those times when firms' benefits are larger. Last, we find that appointing firms are more likely to have management on the board nominating committee, appear to be poorly governed, and increase earnings management and chief executive officer compensation following these board appointments. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance.
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Cites
On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance
Carhart, M. M. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x · Cited by 17,283
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Theoretical Comparisons of Forms of Exchange
Molm, L. D. (2003) · Sociological Theory · doi:10.1111/1467-9558.00171 · Cited by 431
Cited by
The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,358
Costs and benefits of friendly boards during mergers and acquisitions
Schmidt, B. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.02.007 · Cited by 289
CEOs' hometown connections and access to trade credit: Evidence from China
Kong, D., Pan, Y., Tian, G. G., & Zhang, P. (2020) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101574 · Cited by 283
Determinants of Working Capital Investment: A Study of Malaysian PublicListed Firms
Wasiuzzaman, S., & Arumugam, V. C. (2013) · Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal · doi:10.14453/aabfj.v7i2.5 · Cited by 95
Metadata
- Authors
- Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., & Malloy, C. J.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2012-06
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1039-1058
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2168332984
- Cited by
- 205
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 10.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.