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A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
Abstract
The paper extends Nash's theory of two-person bargaining games with fixed threats to bargaining situations with incomplete information. After defining such bargaining situations, a formal bargaining model (bargaining game) will be proposed for them. This bargaining game, regarded as noncooperative game, will be analyzed in terms of a certain class of equilibrium points with special stability properties, to be called “strict” equilibrium points. Finally an axiomatic theory will be developed in order to select a unique solution from the set X of payoff vectors corresponding to such strict equilibrium points (as well as to probability mixtures of the latter). It will be shown that the solution satisfying the axioms proposed in this paper is the point where a certain generalized Nash product is maximized over this set X.
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Citations
Cites
Nash, J. F. (1950) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907266 · Cited by 7,840
Cited by
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0270 · Cited by 2,127
Self-citationIncentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Myerson, R. B. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912346 · Cited by 1,983
BOUNDED RATIONALITY, AMBIGUITY, AND THE ENGINEERING OF CHOICE
March, J. G. (1988) · Decision Making · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511598951.004 · Cited by 1,688
Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies
Aumann, R. J. (1974) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8 · Cited by 1,630
Metadata
- Authors
- Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 1972-01
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 5-part-2
- Pages
- 80-106
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2103138133
- Cited by
- 580
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 5.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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