The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Compensation and Peer Effects in Competing Sales Teams
Abstract
This paper examines how compensation systems impact peer effects and competition in collocated sales teams. We use department store sales data to show that compensation systems influence worker incentives to help and compete with peers within the same firm, which in turn changes the capability of the firm to compete with rivals. Compensation also affects how salespeople impact peers at collocated competing firms, thereby impacting market competition. Moreover, compensation influences how salespeople strategically discount prices in response to peers. Our results suggest that heterogeneity in worker ability enhances firm performance under team-based compensation while hurting individual-based firms and that peer interactions are critical considerations in designing sales force incentive plans and broader firm strategy. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.
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Cites
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On the mechanics of economic development
Lucas, R. E. (1988) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(88)90168-7 · Cited by 24,085
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
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Americans Do IT Better: US Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle
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Azoulay, P., Zivin, J. S. G., & Wang, J. (2010) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.2.549 · Cited by 720
Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments
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Cited by
Cornelissen, T., Dustmann, C., & Schönberg, U. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20141300 · Cited by 265
Doing Well by Making Well: The Impact of Corporate Wellness Programs on Employee Productivity
Gubler, T., Larkin, I., & Pierce, L. (2018) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2883 · Cited by 222
Self-citationZhao, E. Y., Thatcher, S. M. B., & Jehn, K. A. (2019) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/annals.2016.0153 · Cited by 45
How Costly is Turnover? Evidence from Retail
Kuhn, P., & Yu, L. (2019) · doi:10.3386/w26179 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Chan, T. Y., Li, J., & Pierce, L.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2014-08
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1965-1984
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W3126073288
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 25.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.