The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contract Preferences and Performance for the Loss-Averse Supplier: Buyback vs. Revenue Sharing
Abstract
Prior theory claims that buyback and revenue-sharing contracts achieve equivalent channel-coordinating solutions when applied in a dyadic supplier–retailer setting. This suggests that a supplier should be indifferent between the two contracts. However, the sequence and magnitude of costs and revenues (i.e., losses and gains) vary significantly between the contracts, suggesting the supplier’s preference of contract type, and associated contract parameter values, may vary with the level of loss aversion. We investigate this phenomenon through two studies. The first is a preliminary study investigating whether human suppliers are indeed indifferent between these two contracts. Using a controlled laboratory experiment, with human subjects taking on the role of the supplier having to choose between contracts, we find that contract preferences change with the ratio of overage and underage costs for the channel (i.e., the newsvendor critical ratio). In particular, a buyback contract is preferred for products with low critical ratio, whereas revenue sharing is preferred for products with high critical ratio. We show these results are consistent with the behavioral tendency of loss aversion and are more significant for subjects who exhibit higher loss aversion tendencies in an out of context task. In the second (main) study, we examine differences in the performance of buyback and revenue-sharing contracts when suppliers have the authority to set contract parameters. We find that the contract frame influences the way parameters are set and the critical ratio again plays an important role. More specifically, revenue-sharing contracts are more profitable for the supplier than buyback contracts in a high critical ratio environment when accounting for the supplier’s parameter-specification behavior. Also, there is little difference in performance between the two contracts in a low critical ratio environment. These results can help inform supply managers on what types of contracts to use in different critical ratio settings. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2182 . This paper was accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations management.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261737 · Cited by 3,194
Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle
Benartzi, S., & Thaler, R. H. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118511 · Cited by 2,487
Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market
Genesove, D., & Mayer, C. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355301753265561 · Cited by 1,628
Modeling Loss Aversion and Reference Dependence Effects on Brand Choice
Hardie, B. G. S., Johnson, E. J., & Fader, P. S. (1993) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.12.4.378 · Cited by 903
An Experimental Test of Loss Aversion
Schmidt, U., & Traub, S. (2002) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1023/a:1020923921649 · Cited by 233
Metadata
- Authors
- Zhang, Y., Donohue, K., & Cui, T. H.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2016-06
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1734-1754
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W1948163541
- Cited by
- 161
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 37.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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