The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Managerial Ability and Credit Risk Assessment
Open accessAbstract
Research on the credit rating process has primarily focused on how rating agencies incorporate firm characteristics into their rating opinions. We contribute to this literature by examining the impact of managerial ability on the credit rating process. Given debt market participants’ interest in assessing default risk, we begin by documenting that higher managerial ability is associated with lower variability in future earnings and stock returns. We then show that higher managerial ability is associated with higher credit ratings (i.e., lower assessments of credit risk). To provide more direct identification of the impact of managerial ability, we examine chief executive officer (CEO) replacements and document that ratings increase (decrease) when CEOs are replaced with more (less) able CEOs. Finally, we show that managerial ability also has capital market implications by documenting that managerial ability is associated with bond offering credit spreads. Collectively, our evidence suggests that managerial ability is an important factor that bond market participants impound into their assessments of firm credit risk. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting.
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Citations
Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · cited 1×
“…on whether increased institutional ownership reduces credit risk as a result of increased market discipline or whether large holdings by sophisticated investors lead to increased conflicts of interest between lenders and shareholders (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006).”
ON THE PRICING OF CORPORATE DEBT: THE RISK STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES*
Merton, R. C. (1974) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03058.x · Cited by 10,581
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The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors
Dechow, P. M., & Dichev, I. D. (2002) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.35 · Cited by 5,152
Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303322552775 · Cited by 3,894
The market pricing of accruals quality
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., & Schipper, K. (2005) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.06.003 · Cited by 3,087
The capitalization, amortization, and value-relevance of R&D
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Quantifying Managerial Ability: A New Measure and Validity Tests
Demerjian, P., Lev, B., & McVay, S. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1487 · Cited by 1,887
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The effects of corporate governance on firms’ credit ratings
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., Collins, D. W., & LaFond, R. (2006) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.02.003 · Cited by 1,319
Cited by
The impact of narrative disclosure readability on bond ratings and the cost of debt
Bonsall, S. B., & Miller, B. P. (2017) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-017-9388-0 · Cited by 500
Self-citationThe Role of Managerial Ability in Corporate Tax Avoidance
Koester, A., Shevlin, T., & Wangerin, D. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2510 · Cited by 434
CEO Ability and Corporate Social Responsibility
Yuan, Y., Tian, G., Lu, L. Y., & Yu, Y. (2019) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-017-3622-3 · Cited by 275
Metadata
- Authors
- Bonsall, S. B., Holzman, E. R., & Miller, B. P.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2017-05
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1425-1449
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W3124191372
- Cited by
- 316
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 21.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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