The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political Promotion, CEO Incentives, and the Relationship Between Pay and Performance
Abstract
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that managers’ career concerns can serve as an important source of implicit economic incentives. We examine how incentives for political promotion are related to compensation policy and firm performance in Chinese state-owned enterprises. We find that the likelihood that the CEO receives a political promotion is positively related to firm performance. We also find that CEOs with a higher likelihood of political promotion have lower pay levels and lower pay–performance sensitivity. Overall, the evidence suggests that competition in the political job market helps mitigate weak monetary incentives for CEOs in China. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2966 . This paper was accepted by Lauren Cohen, finance.
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Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2009) · doi:10.1515/9781400829828 · Cited by 9,467
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (1971) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.2307/3003160 · Cited by 8,098
Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2008) · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j72 · Cited by 5,051
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335 · cited 1×
“Other studies such as Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006) use ROA and ROE in regressions to estimate payperformance sensitivity.”
BackgroundManagerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Cited by
Corporate Governance in China: A Survey
Jiang, F., & Kim, K. A. (2020) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfaa012 · Cited by 815
The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review
Roychowdhury, S., Shroff, N., & Verdi, R. S. (2019) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.101246 · Cited by 749
Material Sustainability Information and Stock Price Informativeness
Grewal, J., Hauptmann, C., & Serafeim, G. (2021) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-020-04451-2 · Cited by 384
Withdrawn: Real effects of disclosure regulation on voluntary disclosers
Grewal, J. (2021) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101390 · Cited by 13
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cao, X., Lemmon, M., Pan, X., Qian, M., & Tian, G.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2019-07
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 2947-2965
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W3124749863
- Cited by
- 280
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 51.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Cao, X., Lemmon, M., Pan, X., Qian, M., & Tian, G. (2019). Political Promotion, CEO Incentives, and the Relationship Between Pay and Performance. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2966
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