The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Price Skimming by a Monopolist Facing Rational Consumers
Abstract
This paper considers the intertemporal pricing problem for a monopolist marketing a new product. The key feature differentiating this paper from the extant management science literature on intertemporal pricing is the assumption that consumers are intertemporal utility maximizers. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium pricing policy is characterized and shown to involve intertemporal price discrimination. We compare this policy to the optimal policy for a monopolist facing myopic consumers and find that for any given state, prices are always lower with rational consumers than with myopic consumers. For plausible parameter values the assumption of consumer rationality can be shown to lead to large differences in optimal prices. Moreover, if a monopolist facing rational consumers implements the optimal myopic consumer pricing policy, profits can be significantly less than if the monopolist follows the equilibrium pricing policy for rational consumers.
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Citations
Cites
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Elmaghraby, W., & Keskinocak, P. (2003) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.49.10.1287.17315 · Cited by 1,285
An Overview of Pricing Models for Revenue Management
Bitran, G., & Caldentey, R. (2003) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.5.3.203.16031 · Cited by 793
Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers
Aviv, Y., & Pazgal, A. (2008) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1070.0183 · Cited by 686
Intertemporal Pricing with Strategic Customer Behavior
Su, X. (2007) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1060.0667 · Cited by 613
Purchasing, Pricing, and Quick Response in the Presence of Strategic Consumers
Cachon, G. P., & Swinney, R. (2009) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0948 · Cited by 610
Metadata
- Authors
- Besanko, D., & Winston, W. L.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 1990-05
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 555-567
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2025617529
- Cited by
- 431
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 6.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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