The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in R&D: Agency Problems and the Allocation of Engineering Talent, Ideas, and Effort by Firm Size
Abstract
The comparative efficiency and success of small firms in R&D remains largely unexplained. This paper empirically examines scale diseconomies in offering employment contracts as an explanation for diseconomies of scale in R&D. The paper argues that small firms more efficiently resolve the severe agency problems of hidden information and hidden behavior in R&D. Small firms more efficiently offer contracts that reward performance than large firms, and consequently, small firms attract and retain engineers with higher ability and skill. Further, small firms through these more performance-contingent contracts induce higher levels of effort than large firms. The study tests and generally confirms these hypotheses using data collected from 912 current and former engineering employees of two large high-technology companies.
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The Microfoundations Movement in Strategy and Organization Theory
Felin, T., Foss, N. J., & Ployhart, R. E. (2015) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/19416520.2015.1007651 · Cited by 1,253
Microfoundations of Routines and Capabilities: Individuals, Processes, and Structure
Felin, T., Foss, N. J., Heimeriks, K. H., & Madsen, T. L. (2012) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2012.01052.x · Cited by 1,100
Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. (1998) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199809)19:9<853::aid-smj977>3.0.co;2-b · Cited by 1,034
Self-citationStrategic organization: a field in search of micro-foundations
Felin, T., & Foss, N. J. (2005) · Strategic Organization · doi:10.1177/1476127005055796 · Cited by 943
Felin, T., & Hesterly, W. S. (2007) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2007.23464020 · Cited by 870
Metadata
- Authors
- Zenger, T. R.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 1994-06
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 708-729
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2005606269
- Cited by
- 316
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 8.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in R&D: Agency Problems and the Allocation of Engineering Talent, Ideas, and Effort by Firm Size. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1287/mnsc.40.6.708
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- Zenger, T. R. (1994). Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in R&D: Agency Problems and the Allocation of Engineering Talent, Ideas, and Effort by Firm Size. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.6.708
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.