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Gatekeepers and Referrals in Services
Open accessAbstract
This paper examines services in which customers encounter a gatekeeper who makes an initial diagnosis of the customer's problem and then may refer the customer to a specialist. The gatekeeper may also attempt to solve the problem, but the probability of treatment success decreases as the problem's complexity increases. Given the costs of treatment by the gatekeeper and the specialist, we find the firm's optimal referral rate from a particular gatekeeper to the specialists. We then consider the principal–agent problem that arises when the gatekeeper, but not the firm, observes the gatekeeper's treatment ability as well as the complexity of each customer's problem. We examine the relative benefits of compensation systems designed to overcome the effects of this information asymmetry and show that bonuses based solely on referral rates do not always ensure first–best system performance and that an appropriate bonus based on customer volume may be necessary as well. We also consider the value of such output–based contracts when gatekeepers are heterogeneous in ability, so that two gatekeeper types face different probabilities of treatment success when given the same problem. We show that the firm may achieve first–best performance by either offering two contracts that separate the gatekeeper types or by offering a single contract that coordinates the treatment decisions of both gatekeepers.
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Cites
Markov decision processes: Discrete stochastic dynamic programming
Hazeghi, K., & Puterman, M. L. (1995) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2291177 · Cited by 8,037
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Cited by
Telephone Call Centers: Tutorial, Review, and Research Prospects
Gans, N., Koole, G., & Mandelbaum, A. (2003) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.5.2.79.16071 · Cited by 1,360
The Modern Call Center: A Multi‐Disciplinary Perspective on Operations Management Research
Aksin, Z., Armony, M., & Mehrotra, V. (2007) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00288.x · Cited by 746
Game Theory and Information Economics
Dai, T. (2018) · Handbook of Healthcare Analytics · doi:10.1002/9781119300977.ch15 · Cited by 401
Toward a theory of network gatekeeping: A framework for exploring information control
Barzilai‐Nahon, K. (2008) · Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology · doi:10.1002/asi.20857 · Cited by 350
Metadata
- Authors
- Shumsky, R. A., & Pinker, E. J.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2003-07
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 839-856
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W3122206852
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 7.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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