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You are Known by the Directors You Keep: Reputable Directors as a Signaling Mechanism for Young Firms
Abstract
In this paper, we develop an analytical model of outside directors' signaling role—a role that is especially important for entrepreneurial firms. We formally demonstrate that in the face of a market failure in which stakeholders refuse to align themselves with new firms, high-quality new ventures may be able to credibly signal their type by appointing reputable directors to their boards. However, this option is not universally feasible. Both directors' reputations and the quality of their information determine the effectiveness of this strategy. In contrast to earlier adverse selection models, we demonstrate that when the middlemen (directors) have incomplete information on firm quality, bad and good firms can coexist in equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the quality of the directors' information determines the mix of good and bad firms in the population of surviving firms. Avenues for future research and normative implications for practitioners are discussed.
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Citations
Cited by
Miller, T., & Del Carmen Triana, M. (2009) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00839.x · Cited by 1,416
Organizational Reputation: A Review
Lange, D., Lee, P. M., & Dai, Y. (2011) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206310390963 · Cited by 960
Limitations to interorganizational knowledge acquisition: the paradox of corporate venture capital
Dushnitsky, G., & Shaver, J. M. (2009) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.781 · Cited by 408
Westphal, J. D., & Stern, I. (2007) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2007.24634434 · Cited by 356
Contextual Factors Surrounding Reputation Damage With Potential Implications for Reputation Repair
Rhee, M., & Valdez, M. E. (2009) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2009.35713324 · Cited by 295
Metadata
- Authors
- Deutsch, Y., & Ross, T. W.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2003-08
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1003-1017
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2014147324
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 8.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: You are Known by the Directors You Keep: Reputable Directors as a Signaling Mechanism for Young Firms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1287/mnsc.49.8.1003.16399
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- Deutsch, Y., & Ross, T. W. (2003). You are Known by the Directors You Keep: Reputable Directors as a Signaling Mechanism for Young Firms. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.8.1003.16399
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