Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 215

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Competition Between Two-Sided Platforms Under Demand and Supply Congestion Effects

Open access
Bernstein, Fernando, DeCroix, Gregory A., Keskin, N. Bora·2021·Manufacturing & Service Operations Management

Abstract

Problem definition : This paper explores the impact of competition between platforms in the sharing economy. Examples include the cases of Uber and Lyft in the context of ride-sharing platforms. In particular, we consider competition between two platforms that offer a common service (e.g., rides) through a set of independent service providers (e.g., drivers) to a market of customers. Each platform sets a price that is charged to customers for obtaining the service provided by a driver. A portion of that price is paid to the driver who delivers the service. Both customers’ and drivers’ utilities are sensitive to the payment terms set by the platform and are also sensitive to congestion in the system (given by the relative number of customers and drivers in the market). We consider two possible settings. The first one, termed “single-homing,” assumes that drivers work through a single platform. In the second setting, termed “multihoming” (or “multiapping,” as it is known in practice), drivers deliver their service through both platforms. Academic/practical relevance : This is one of the first papers to study competition and multihoming in the presence of congestion effects typically observed in the sharing economy. We leverage the model to study some practical questions that have received significant press attention (and stirred some controversies) in the ride-sharing industry. The first involves the issue of surge pricing. The second involves the increasingly common practice of drivers choosing to operate on multiple platforms (multihoming). Methodology : We formulate our problem as a pricing game between two platforms and employ the concept of a Nash equilibrium to analyze equilibrium outcomes in various settings. Results : In both the single-homing and multihoming settings, we study the equilibrium prices that emerge from the competitive interaction between the platforms and explore the supply and demand outcomes that can arise at equilibrium. We build on these equilibrium results to study the impact of surge pricing in response to a surge in demand and to examine the incentives at play when drivers engage in multihoming. Managerial implications : We find that raising prices in response to a surge in demand makes drivers and customers better off than if platforms were constrained to charge the same prices that would arise under normal demand levels. We also compare drivers’ and customers’ performance when all drivers either single-home or multihome. We find that although individual drivers may have an incentive to multihome, all players are worse off when all drivers multihome. We conclude by proposing an incentive mechanism to discourage multihoming.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1287/msom.2020.0866

Cites

4 of 4 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 4 references

Cited by

See all 215

Metadata

Authors
Bernstein, F., DeCroix, G. A., & Keskin, N. B.
Venue
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Published
2021-09
Volume
23
Issue
5
Pages
1043-1061
ISSN
  • 1523-4614 (ISSN-L)
  • 1526-5498
OpenAlex
W3122607769
Cited by
215
References
4
FWCI
21.86
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Competition Between Two-Sided Platforms Under Demand and Supply Congestion Effects. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1287/msom.2020.0866
The paper
Bernstein, F., DeCroix, G. A., & Keskin, N. B. (2021). Competition Between Two-Sided Platforms Under Demand and Supply Congestion Effects. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0866

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.