The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Managerial Incentives and Investment in R&D in Large Multiproduct Firms
Abstract
Incentives for division managers in large firms affect their risk orientation and thus their decisions to invest in R&D. This paper reviews theory and hypothesizes that division managers' incentive compensation that is based on financial performance is negatively related to risk taking as measured by R&D intensity. Results of a study of 184 major U.S. firms suggest that incentives based on short-term (annual) division financial performance are negatively related to total firm R&D intensity after controlling for industry R&D intensity, firm diversification, size and group structure. Furthermore, the results suggest that an emphasis on long-term financial incentives may mitigate the negative relationship between these incentives and R&D intensity, but does not promote risk taking. The results suggest the importance of emphasizing strategic controls [evaluating division managers based on operational understanding of strategies proposed (strategic criteria)] as opposed to the use of financial controls [evaluating division managers based on financial performance (often annual ROI)]. However, the use of financial controls becomes more common as firms diversify. Diversification increases the span of control of corporate executives and the diversity among divisions. In highly diversified firms, corporate executives are no longer able to fully understand the operations of the multiple and diverse divisions. Thus, they must not only decentralize operating authority to divisions, but they also cannot use strategic criteria to evaluate division managers. As a result, they begin to emphasize financial controls. The shift toward risk aversion caused by the use of incentives based on short-term financial outcomes can have important implications for long-term firm performance. The results of this study have implications for long-term competitiveness, especially for firms in R&D intensive industries where R&D expenditures may affect a firm's competitive position.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The theory of the growth of the firm
Penrose, E. (1996) · Long Range Planning · doi:10.1016/s0024-6301(96)90295-2 · Cited by 13,770
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.
O'Brien, D. P., & Williamson, O. E. (1976) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2230812 · Cited by 13,381
Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of Industrial Enterprise.
Erickson, C., & Chandler, A. D. (1963) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550822 · Cited by 3,393
Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking
March, J. G., & Shapira, Z. (1987) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.33.11.1404 · Cited by 3,183
Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers
Amihud, Y., & Lev, B. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003575 · Cited by 2,772
Information Processing as an Integrating Concept in Organizational Design
Tushman, M. L., & Nadler, D. A. (1978) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/257550 · Cited by 2,561
Strategy, structure, and economic performance
Rumelt, R. P. (1974) · Cited by 2,379
From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Strategy
Porter, M. E. (1989) · Readings in Strategic Management · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-20317-8_17 · Cited by 2,092
Control: Organizational and Economic Approaches
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1985) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.31.2.134 · Cited by 2,021
Diversification strategy, profit performance and the entropy measure
Palepu, K. (1985) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250060305 · Cited by 1,572
Cited by
Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational learning
Lane, P. J., & Lubatkin, M. (1998) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199805)19:5<461::aid-smj953>3.0.co;2-l · Cited by 4,648
Hitt, M. A., Hoskisson, R. E., & Kim, H. (1997) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256948 · Cited by 2,855
Self-citationAhuja, G., & Morris Lampert, C. (2001) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.176 · Cited by 2,501
Strategy Research in Emerging Economies: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom*
Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., Hoskisson, R. E., & Peng, M. W. (2005) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2005.00487.x · Cited by 1,843
Self-citationA Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking
Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259103 · Cited by 1,591
Metadata
- Authors
- Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., & Hill, C. W. L.
- Venue
- Organization Science
- Published
- 1993-05
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 325-341
- ISSN
- 1047-7039 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5455
- OpenAlex
- W2089405301
- Cited by
- 332
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 29.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Managerial Incentives and Investment in R&D in Large Multiproduct Firms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1287/orsc.4.2.325
- The paper
- Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., & Hill, C. W. L. (1993). Managerial Incentives and Investment in R&D in Large Multiproduct Firms. Organization Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.4.2.325
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.