The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and Corporate Illegality
Abstract
Research on corporate illegality spans several distinct literatures and defies ready integration. This article helps to overcome those problems. Analysis of data from 80 U.S. industrial organizations indicates that lower industry profitability is associated with higher frequencies of detected serious violations of federal environmental laws. Organizational profitability, industry concentration, organization size, structural complexity, organizational decentralization, and ethical climate join this variable in statistical interactions also associated with detected instances of serious environmental violations. However, none of those variables are found to be associated with the incidence of detected nonserious violations. These results provide qualified support for a model of corporate illegality in which illegal behaviors are attributable to the interactive effects of motive, opportunity, and choice. They suggest that illegal corporate activities resist simple explanation, and that future research on corporate illegality should concentrate on further development of multivariable models.
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Cites
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Cited by
Harris, J., & Bromiley, P. (2007) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1060.0241 · Cited by 770
Cycyota, C. S., & Harrison, D. A. (2006) · Organizational Research Methods · doi:10.1177/1094428105280770 · Cited by 583
Mishina, Y., Dykes, B. J., Block, E. S., & Pollock, T. G. (2010) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2010.52814578 · Cited by 578
The Antecedents and Consequences of Top Management Fraud
Zahra, S. A., Priem, R. L., & Rasheed, A. A. (2005) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206305279598 · Cited by 552
Ekeledo, I., & Sivakumar, K. (2004) · International Marketing Review · doi:10.1108/02651330410522943 · Cited by 326
The Dark Side of Authority: Antecedents, Mechanisms, and Outcomes of Organizational Corruption
Aguilera, R. V., & Vadera, A. K. (2008) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-007-9358-8 · Cited by 316
Does the External Monitoring Effect of Financial Analysts Deter Corporate Fraud in China?
Chen, J., Cumming, D., Hou, W., & Lee, E. (2016) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2393-3 · Cited by 309
Do CEO Stock Options Prevent or Promote Fraudulent Financial Reporting?
O'Connor, J. P., Priem, R. L., Coombs, J. E., & Gilley, K. M. (2006) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2006.21794666 · Cited by 285
Repairing Trust in Organizations and Institutions: Toward a Conceptual Framework
Bachmann, R., Gillespie, N., & Priem, R. (2015) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840615599334 · Cited by 274
Trust, Decision Rights Delegation, and Performance—The Case of Franchising
Herz, M., Hutzinger, C., Seferagic, H., & Windsperger, J. (2016) · Journal of Small Business Management · doi:10.1111/jsbm.12227 · Cited by 35
“The respondents within these franchise systems were selected based on their expertise and relevance to the subject under investigation (McKendall and Wagner 1997) and included only senior managers, who are mainly responsible for franchise expansion.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- McKendall, M. A., & Wagner, J. A.
- Venue
- Organization Science
- Published
- 1997-12
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 624-647
- ISSN
- 1047-7039 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5455
- OpenAlex
- W2001430592
- Cited by
- 228
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 3.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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