The DOI matches its Crossref record; 80 of the 80 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do CEO Stock Options Prevent or Promote Fraudulent Financial Reporting?
Abstract
We contrast the conventional view that CEO stock options aid corporate governance by reducing moral hazard with the proposal that CEO stock options may subvert sound corporate governance. Views were tested in 65 matched pairs of public U.S. firms that either had or had not been discovered misreporting financial results. Our results support both the traditional perspective and our unprincipled agent view: in our sample, large CEO stock option grants were sometimes associated with a lower incidence of fraudulent reporting and sometimes with a greater incidence, depending upon whether CEO duality was present and whether directors also held stock options.
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Cites
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Cited by
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
Crises and Crisis Management: Integration, Interpretation, and Research Development
Bundy, J., Pfarrer, M. D., Short, C. E., & Coombs, W. T. (2017) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206316680030 · Cited by 1,331
The long‐term benefits of organizational resilience through sustainable business practices
Ortiz‐de‐Mandojana, N., & Bansal, P. (2016) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2410 · Cited by 1,260
Corporate governance and environmental performance: is there really a link?
Walls, J. L., Berrone, P., & Phan, P. H. (2012) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.1952 · Cited by 1,160
Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M. (2007) · The Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/078559806 · Cited by 843
Metadata
- Authors
- O'Connor, J. P., Priem, R. L., Coombs, J. E., & Gilley, K. M.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2006-06
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 483-500
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W1974338830
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 80
- FWCI
- 47.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- O'Connor, J. P., Priem, R. L., Coombs, J. E., & Gilley, K. M. (2006). Do CEO Stock Options Prevent or Promote Fraudulent Financial Reporting? Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2006.21794666
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.