Cited by 58Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsClinical Reasoning and Diagnostic SkillsBayesian Modeling and Causal Inference

Judgments under uncertainty: representativeness or potential surprise?

Fisk, John E.·2002·British Journal of Psychology

Abstract

Tversky and Kahneman's (1983) account of conjunctive probability judgment in terms of the representativeness heuristic is questioned. Instead, potential surprise (Shackle, 1969) is proposed as an important mechanism underlying subjective probability judgment. Study 1 reveals that, consistent with Shackle's theory, probabilities assigned to conjunctions are predominantly determined by the magnitude of the smaller component event probability. Also consistent with Shackle, Study 2 shows that for disjunctions, this role is performed by the larger component. Study 3 again contrasts the relative roles played by the component events in determining the value assigned to the conjunction. The results of the study are consistent with two reasoning processes: one analytically based, in which due account is taken of both component events, the other heuristic in nature and consistent with Shackle's theory of potential surprise. The implications of these results for a range of different types of judgment, e.g. with regard to person perception, stereotyping, categorization, and typicality, are evaluated.

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Crossref · 10.1348/000712602761381330

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  • In these cases, participants are left to combine non-normalized sampled probability estimates for each hypothesis manually, and perhaps choose just one or combine them inappropriately.

    “participants are left to combine the non-normalized sampled probability estimates for each hypothesis 'manually', and perhaps choose just one of the probabilities or perhaps combine them inappropriately [52][53][54].”

    From Bayesian Brains without Probabilities (2016) · cites this paper as [53]

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Authors
Fisk, J. E.
Affiliations
Liverpool John Moores University (GB)
Corresponding author
Fisk, John E.
Venue
British Journal of Psychology
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2002-11
Volume
93
Issue
4
Pages
431-449
ISSN
  • 0007-1269 (ISSN-L)
  • 2044-8295
OpenAlex
W2002824357
Cited by
57
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 1
FWCI
1.08
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • British Journal of Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
Keywords
probability judgment, representativeness heuristic, subjective probability, judgment under uncertainty, person perception, stereotyping, categorization, typicality
MeSH terms
Adult, Humans, Judgment, Problem Solving, Psychological Theory, Surveys and Questionnaires, Random Allocation, Regression Analysis

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