The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets
Open accessAbstract
The cost of enforcing contracts is a key determinant of market performance.We document this point with reference to the credit market.We start by presenting a model of opportunistic debtors and inefficient courts.According to the model, improvements in judicial efficiency reduce credit rationing and increase lending, while have an ambiguous effect on interest rates, depending on banking competition and on the type of judicial reform.These predictions are supported by panel data on Italian provinces and by cross-country evidence.In Italian provinces with longer trials or large backlogs of pending trials, credit is less widely available than elsewhere.International evidence also shows that the depth of mortgage markets is inversely related to costs of mortgage foreclosure and other proxies for judicial inefficiency.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
Legal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118445 · Cited by 3,294
(1985) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,432
Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets
Besanko, D., & Thakor, A. V. (1987) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2526573 · Cited by 964
Saving, Growth, and Liquidity Constraints
Jappelli, T., & Pagano, M. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118429 · Cited by 799
Self-citationThe Effects of Banking Mergers on Loan Contracts
Sapienza, P. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00424 · Cited by 623
The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information
Bester, H. (1987) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(87)90005-5 · Cited by 546
Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks
Manove, M., Padilla, A. J., & Pagano, M. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696390 · Cited by 504
Self-citationAsymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements
Chan, Y.-S., & Kanatas, G. (1985) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/1992508 · Cited by 473
Cited by
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.2.285 · Cited by 3,220
The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041464498 · Cited by 3,107
A more complete conceptual framework for SME finance
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (2006) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.05.008 · Cited by 1,992
Culture, openness, and finance
Stulz, R. M., & Williamson, R. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00173-9 · Cited by 1,702
Bank ownership and efficiency in China: What will happen in the world’s largest nation?
Berger, A. N., Hasan, I., & Zhou, M. (2009) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.05.016 · Cited by 1,068
Metadata
- Authors
- Jappelli, T., Pagano, M., & Bianco, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 2005
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 223-244
- ISSN
- 0022-2879 (ISSN-L)
- 1538-4616
- OpenAlex
- W3125036286
- Cited by
- 547
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 68.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1353/mcb.2005.0021
- The paper
- Jappelli, T., Pagano, M., & Bianco, M. (2005). Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. https://doi.org/10.1353/mcb.2005.0021
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.