A Mixture of “Cheats” and “Co-Operators” Can Enable Maximal Group Benefit
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Is a group best off if everyone co-operates? Theory often considers this to be so (e.g. the "conspiracy of doves"), this understanding underpinning social and economic policy. We observe, however, that after competition between "cheat" and "co-operator" strains of yeast, population fitness is maximized under co-existence. To address whether this might just be a peculiarity of our experimental system or a result with broader applicability, we assemble, benchmark, dissect, and test a systems model. This reveals the conditions necessary to recover the unexpected result. These are 3-fold: (a) that resources are used inefficiently when they are abundant, (b) that the amount of co-operation needed cannot be accurately assessed, and (c) the population is structured, such that co-operators receive more of the resource than the cheats. Relaxing any of the assumptions can lead to population fitness being maximized when cheats are absent, which we experimentally demonstrate. These three conditions will often be relevant, and hence in order to understand the trajectory of social interactions, understanding the dynamics of the efficiency of resource utilization and accuracy of information will be necessary.
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Cites
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Coding-Sequence Determinants of Gene Expression in Escherichia coli
Kudla, G., Murray, A. W., Tollervey, D., & Plotkin, J. B. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1170160 · Cited by 1,458 · cited 1×
“made [31,32].”
Cooperation and competition in pathogenic bacteria
Griffin, A. S., West, S. A., & Buckling, A. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02744 · Cited by 1,104
Cited by
Ecology and evolution of metabolic cross-feeding interactions in bacteria
D'Souza, G., Shitut, S., Preussger, D., Yousif, G., Waschina, S., & Kost, C. (2018) · Natural Product Reports · doi:10.1039/c8np00009c · Cited by 563
Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate
Guala, F. (2012) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11000069 · Cited by 522
Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment
Archetti, M., & Scheuring, I. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.06.018 · Cited by 296
Patiency is not a virtue: the design of intelligent systems and systems of ethics
Bryson, J. J. (2018) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-018-9448-6 · Cited by 285
Black Queen evolution: the role of leakiness in structuring microbial communities
Morris, J. J. (2015) · Trends in Genetics · doi:10.1016/j.tig.2015.05.004 · Cited by 207
Metadata
- Authors
- MacLean, R. C., Fuentes-Hernandez, A., Greig, D., Hurst, L. D., & Gudelj, I.
- Venue
- PLoS Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2010-09-14
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- e1000486
- ISSN
- 1544-9173 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-7885
- OpenAlex
- W2150879418
- Cited by
- 120
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 27.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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