Cooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Conventional evolutionary game theory predicts that natural selection favours the selfish and strong even though cooperative interactions thrive at all levels of organization in living systems. Recent investigations demonstrated that a limiting factor for the evolution of cooperative interactions is the way in which they are organized, cooperators becoming evolutionarily competitive whenever individuals are constrained to interact with few others along the edges of networks with low average connectivity. Despite this insight, the conundrum of cooperation remains since recent empirical data shows that real networks exhibit typically high average connectivity and associated single-to-broad-scale heterogeneity. Here, a computational model is constructed in which individuals are able to self-organize both their strategy and their social ties throughout evolution, based exclusively on their self-interest. We show that the entangled evolution of individual strategy and network structure constitutes a key mechanism for the sustainability of cooperation in social networks. For a given average connectivity of the population, there is a critical value for the ratio W between the time scales associated with the evolution of strategy and of structure above which cooperators wipe out defectors. Moreover, the emerging social networks exhibit an overall heterogeneity that accounts very well for the diversity of patterns recently found in acquired data on social networks. Finally, heterogeneity is found to become maximal when W reaches its critical value. These results show that simple topological dynamics reflecting the individual capacity for self-organization of social ties can produce realistic networks of high average connectivity with associated single-to-broad-scale heterogeneity. On the other hand, they show that cooperation cannot evolve as a result of "social viscosity" alone in heterogeneous networks with high average connectivity, requiring the additional mechanism of topological co-evolution to ensure the survival of cooperative behaviour.
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“Endogenous network transitions often produce predictable results for the evolution of cooperation [17-29].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [18]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M., & Lenaerts, T.
- Affiliations
- Université Libre de Bruxelles (BE)
- Harvard University (US)
- Vrije Universiteit Brussel (BE)
- Corresponding author
- Lenaerts, Tom
- Venue
- PLoS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2006-10-20
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- e140
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- OpenAlex
- W1980096296
- Cited by
- 556
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 39 · 2012: 33
- FWCI
- 105.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- PLoS Computational Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Dépôt institutionnel de l'Université libre de Bruxelles (Université Libre de Bruxelles) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- European Commission
- Vlaamse regering
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Network Analysis Techniques
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, social networks, network co-evolution, network heterogeneity, strategy evolution
- MeSH terms
- Computer Simulation, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Behavior
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