Cooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties
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Abstract
Conventional evolutionary game theory predicts that natural selection favours the selfish and strong even though cooperative interactions thrive at all levels of organization in living systems. Recent investigations demonstrated that a limiting factor for the evolution of cooperative interactions is the way in which they are organized, cooperators becoming evolutionarily competitive whenever individuals are constrained to interact with few others along the edges of networks with low average connectivity. Despite this insight, the conundrum of cooperation remains since recent empirical data shows that real networks exhibit typically high average connectivity and associated single-to-broad-scale heterogeneity. Here, a computational model is constructed in which individuals are able to self-organize both their strategy and their social ties throughout evolution, based exclusively on their self-interest. We show that the entangled evolution of individual strategy and network structure constitutes a key mechanism for the sustainability of cooperation in social networks. For a given average connectivity of the population, there is a critical value for the ratio W between the time scales associated with the evolution of strategy and of structure above which cooperators wipe out defectors. Moreover, the emerging social networks exhibit an overall heterogeneity that accounts very well for the diversity of patterns recently found in acquired data on social networks. Finally, heterogeneity is found to become maximal when W reaches its critical value. These results show that simple topological dynamics reflecting the individual capacity for self-organization of social ties can produce realistic networks of high average connectivity with associated single-to-broad-scale heterogeneity. On the other hand, they show that cooperation cannot evolve as a result of "social viscosity" alone in heterogeneous networks with high average connectivity, requiring the additional mechanism of topological co-evolution to ensure the survival of cooperative behaviour.
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“Endogenous network transitions often produce predictable results for the evolution of cooperation [17-29].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [18]
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Gavrilets, S., Duéñez‐Guzmán, E. A., & Vose, M. D. (2008) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003293 · Cited by 72
“[54] Santos FC, Pacheco JM, Lenaerts T (2006) Cooperation pr evails when individuals adjust their social ties.”
BackgroundModels of coalition or alliance formation
Mesterton‐Gibbons, M., Gavrilets, S., Gravner, J., & Akçay, E. (2011) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.12.031 · Cited by 74
“A similar approach is the focus of several recent game-theoretic papers (Pemantle and Skyrms, 2004a,b; Pacheco et al., 2006, 2008; Santos et al., 2006; Hruschka and Heinrich, 2006), and some results have been obtained analytically.”
MethodExpectation-driven migration promotes cooperation by group interactions
Wu, T., Fu, F., Zhang, Y., & Wang, L. (2012) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.85.066104 · Cited by 72
Population Structure Induces a Symmetry Breaking Favoring the Emergence of Cooperation
Pacheco, J. M., Pinheiro, F. L., & Santos, F. C. (2009) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000596 · Cited by 68
Self-citationCooperative scale-free networks despite the presence of defector hubs
Poncela-Casasnovas, J., Gómez‐Gardeñes, J., Florı́a, L. M., Moreno, Y., & Sánchez, Á. (2009) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/88/38003 · Cited by 63
Li, W., Zhang, X., & Hu, G. (2007) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.76.045102 · Cited by 66
A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation
Skyrms, B., & Pemantle, R. (2009) · Understanding complex systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-01284-6_11 · Cited by 67
How Can E-Commerce Businesses Implement Discount Strategies through Social Media?
Lv, J., Wang, Z., Huang, Y., Wang, T., & Wang, Y. (2020) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su12187459 · Cited by 90
“w (as Equation (5)) is the ratio between time scale of strategy updating τe and time scale of partnership adjustment τp [68].”
BackgroundOffspring social network structure predicts fitness in families
Royle, N. J., Pike, T. W., Heeb, P., Richner, H., & Kölliker, M. (2012) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.1701 · Cited by 74
“9 weighted, is a simple, robust metric that is widely utilized [1,2] and is a potentially important determinant of the evolution of cooperation [3,4].”
BackgroundPromotion of cooperation through co-evolution of networks and strategy in a 2 2 game
Tanimoto, J. (2008) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2008.11.023 · Cited by 64
Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review
Takács, K., Gross, J., Testori, M., Letina, S., Kenny, A. R., Power, E. A., & Wittek, R. P. M. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0297 · Cited by 61
Promotion of cooperation induced by the interplay between structure and game dynamics
Fu, F., Chen, X., Liu, L., & Wang, L. (2007) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2007.04.099 · Cited by 63
Effects of strategy-migration direction and noise in the evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma
Wu, Z.-X., & Holme, P. (2009) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.80.026108 · Cited by 60
An Institutional Mechanism for Assortment in an Ecology of Games
Smaldino, P. E., & Lubell, M. N. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023019 · Cited by 59
“Even in a recent network model where links were not fixed [12], the number of links in the network was preserved, imposing an artificial exogenous constraint on the system.”
Peer pressure: Enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment
Yang, H.-X., Wu, Z.-X., Rong, Z., & Lai, Y. (2015) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.91.022121 · Cited by 65
Froese, T., Gershenson, C., & Manzanilla, L. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109966 · Cited by 65
“Agents adjust their relationships at a slower rate than updating their behavior; such a separation between slower and faster dynamical scales is a general condition for self-organization [73,74].”
BackgroundInformation, Irrationality and the Evolution of Trust
Manapat, M. L., Nowak, M. A., & Rand, D. G. (2012) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.018 · Cited by 73
Cooperation and community structure in social networks
Luthi, L., Pestelacci, E., & Tomassini, M. (2007) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2007.09.046 · Cited by 59
Global Migration Can Lead to Stronger Spatial Selection than Local Migration
Fu, F., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Journal of Statistical Physics · doi:10.1007/s10955-012-0631-6 · Cited by 59
“Noteworthy, other topics explored include, but are not limited to, learning in games [65, 66], the heterogeneity in population structure [67–70], and coevolutionary games [71–78].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M., & Lenaerts, T.
- Affiliations
- Université Libre de Bruxelles (BE)
- Harvard University (US)
- Vrije Universiteit Brussel (BE)
- Corresponding author
- Lenaerts, Tom
- Venue
- PLoS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2006-10-20
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- e140
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- OpenAlex
- W1980096296
- Cited by
- 556
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 39 · 2012: 33
- FWCI
- 105.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- PLoS Computational Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Dépôt institutionnel de l'Université libre de Bruxelles (Université Libre de Bruxelles) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- European Commission
- Vlaamse regering
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Network Analysis Techniques
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, social networks, network co-evolution, network heterogeneity, strategy evolution
- MeSH terms
- Computer Simulation, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Behavior
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.