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Emotional Valence and the Free-Energy Principle

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Joffily, Mateus, Coricelli, Giorgio · 2013 · PLoS Computational Biology

Abstract

The free-energy principle has recently been proposed as a unified Bayesian account of perception, learning and action. Despite the inextricable link between emotion and cognition, emotion has not yet been formulated under this framework. A core concept that permeates many perspectives on emotion is valence, which broadly refers to the positive and negative character of emotion or some of its aspects. In the present paper, we propose a definition of emotional valence in terms of the negative rate of change of free-energy over time. If the second time-derivative of free-energy is taken into account, the dynamics of basic forms of emotion such as happiness, unhappiness, hope, fear, disappointment and relief can be explained. In this formulation, an important function of emotional valence turns out to regulate the learning rate of the causes of sensory inputs. When sensations increasingly violate the agent's expectations, valence is negative and increases the learning rate. Conversely, when sensations increasingly fulfil the agent's expectations, valence is positive and decreases the learning rate. This dynamic interaction between emotional valence and learning rate highlights the crucial role played by emotions in biological agents' adaptation to unexpected changes in their world.

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Figures

Figure 1 Basic forms of emotion and the dynamics of free-energy. (top and bottom rows) Two hypothetical dynamics of free-energy and their corresponding basic forms of emotion. (left column) Free-energy plotted as a function of time. (middle column) The same free-energy and its first time-derivative (valence) as a function of time. (right column) The first and second time-derivatives of the same trajectory of free-energy as a function of time. Notice that the basic forms of emotion are mapped to specific quadrants in the first and second time-derivative spaces independently of the free-energy trajectory. The black arrows indicate the direction of increasing time. The background colours identify the basic forms of emotion elicited at each time point: happiness (dark blue), unhappiness (dark red), hope (light blue), fear (light red), relief (transition from dark red to light blue), disappointment (transition from dark blue to light red) and surprise (grey).
Figure 1 Basic forms of emotion and the dynamics of free-energy. (top and bottom rows) Two hypothetical dynamics of free-energy and their corresponding basic forms of emotion. (left column) Free-energy plotted as a function of time. (middle column) The same free-energy and its first time-derivative (valence) as a function of time. (right column) The first and second time-derivatives of the same trajectory of free-energy as a function of time. Notice that the basic forms of emotion are mapped to specific quadrants in the first and second time-derivative spaces independently of the free-energy trajectory. The black arrows indicate the direction of increasing time. The background colours identify the basic forms of emotion elicited at each time point: happiness (dark blue), unhappiness (dark red), hope (light blue), fear (light red), relief (transition from dark red to light blue), disappointment (transition from dark blue to light red) and surprise (grey).CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 Dynamic perceptual model: , and . A simulation of 320 trials. The first (low volatility), second (high volatility) and third (low volatility) stages are separated by vertical dashed lines. (top) The agent's posterior expectation that (red line) after sensory input (green dots), is plotted over the true probability that (black line), which is unknown to the agent. (bottom left) The time course of the posterior variance of over trials. The size of the black circles is proportional to the surprise of sensory input at trial . (bottom right) The change in the posterior variance of from trial to trial as a function of the surprise of sensory input at trial .
Figure 2 Dynamic perceptual model: , and . A simulation of 320 trials. The first (low volatility), second (high volatility) and third (low volatility) stages are separated by vertical dashed lines. (top) The agent's posterior expectation that (red line) after sensory input (green dots), is plotted over the true probability that (black line), which is unknown to the agent. (bottom left) The time course of the posterior variance of over trials. The size of the black circles is proportional to the surprise of sensory input at trial . (bottom right) The change in the posterior variance of from trial to trial as a function of the surprise of sensory input at trial .CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3 Static perceptual model: and . The agent is exposed to the same sequence of sensory inputs described in the reference scenario (see Figure 2 for legends). (top) The posterior expectation of converges to 0.5, which is the true probability of across the three (low and high volatility) stages. The agent is unaware of unexpected changes in the environment. (bottom left) The posterior variance (estimation uncertainty) of asymptotically converges to zero across trials . Negative (red circle) and positive (blue circle) valences are indicated when elicited over the trial. The size of the circles is proportional to the surprise of the sensory input at trial . (bottom right) The change in the posterior variance of from trial to trial as a function of negative (red circle) and positive (blue circle) valences.
Figure 3 Static perceptual model: and . The agent is exposed to the same sequence of sensory inputs described in the reference scenario (see Figure 2 for legends). (top) The posterior expectation of converges to 0.5, which is the true probability of across the three (low and high volatility) stages. The agent is unaware of unexpected changes in the environment. (bottom left) The posterior variance (estimation uncertainty) of asymptotically converges to zero across trials . Negative (red circle) and positive (blue circle) valences are indicated when elicited over the trial. The size of the circles is proportional to the surprise of the sensory input at trial . (bottom right) The change in the posterior variance of from trial to trial as a function of negative (red circle) and positive (blue circle) valences.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 4 Static perceptual model with valence: and . The agent is exposed to the same sequence of sensory inputs described in the reference scenario (see Figure 2 for legends). Now, the agent becomes reactive to unexpected changes in the environment. (top) The posterior expectation of fluctuates around the true probability of at each stage in a manner similar to the dynamic perceptual model (see Figure 2). (bottom left) The posterior variance (estimation uncertainty) maintains a constant baseline during the first and third (low volatility) stages mainly defined by the mood, but starts to show a tendency to fluctuate more freely during the second (high volatility) stage. (bottom right) The change in the posterior variance of from trial to trial as a function of negative (red circle) and positive (blue circle) valences is quite similar to the standard static model (see Figure 3), except for a small offset defined by the mood.
Figure 4 Static perceptual model with valence: and . The agent is exposed to the same sequence of sensory inputs described in the reference scenario (see Figure 2 for legends). Now, the agent becomes reactive to unexpected changes in the environment. (top) The posterior expectation of fluctuates around the true probability of at each stage in a manner similar to the dynamic perceptual model (see Figure 2). (bottom left) The posterior variance (estimation uncertainty) maintains a constant baseline during the first and third (low volatility) stages mainly defined by the mood, but starts to show a tendency to fluctuate more freely during the second (high volatility) stage. (bottom right) The change in the posterior variance of from trial to trial as a function of negative (red circle) and positive (blue circle) valences is quite similar to the standard static model (see Figure 3), except for a small offset defined by the mood.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 5 Static perceptual model with valence: and . The agent is exposed to the same sequence of sensory inputs described in the reference scenario (see Figure 2 for legends). Now, the agent becomes extremely reactive to unexpected changes in the environment. (top) The posterior expectation of changes more quickly and is closer to the true probability of at each stage. (bottom left) The posterior variance (estimation uncertainty) maintains a constant baseline during the first and third (low volatility) stages mainly defined by the mood, but it fluctuates more widely during the second (high volatility) stage. This clarifies the distinction between the low and high volatility stages. Negative (red circle) and positive (blue circle) valences are clearly associated with increases and decreases in uncertainty, respectively, and they become more intense during the second (high volatility) stage. (bottom right) The posterior variance of from trial to trial increases after negative valence but decreases after positive valence.
Figure 5 Static perceptual model with valence: and . The agent is exposed to the same sequence of sensory inputs described in the reference scenario (see Figure 2 for legends). Now, the agent becomes extremely reactive to unexpected changes in the environment. (top) The posterior expectation of changes more quickly and is closer to the true probability of at each stage. (bottom left) The posterior variance (estimation uncertainty) maintains a constant baseline during the first and third (low volatility) stages mainly defined by the mood, but it fluctuates more widely during the second (high volatility) stage. This clarifies the distinction between the low and high volatility stages. Negative (red circle) and positive (blue circle) valences are clearly associated with increases and decreases in uncertainty, respectively, and they become more intense during the second (high volatility) stage. (bottom right) The posterior variance of from trial to trial increases after negative valence but decreases after positive valence.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 6 Boxplots of the mean posterior variance of state after the elicitation of factive (happiness or unhappiness) and epistemic (fear or hope) emotions and before the observation of the next sensory input. (left) Mean posterior variance during the low volatility stages of the reference scenario. (right) Mean posterior variance during the high volatility stages of the reference scenario. The mean was computed for each of 100 simulations of the reference scenario. In both the low and high volatility stages, the mean was on average higher for the epistemic (low volatility: M = 0.68, SD = 0.03; high volatility: M = 1.07, SD = 0.19) than the factive (low volatility: M = 0.58, SD = 0.02; high volatility: M = 0.69, SD = 0.06) emotions and it was also on average higher during the high (M = 0.88, SD = 0.24) than the low volatility (M = 0.63, SD = 0.06) stages.
Figure 6 Boxplots of the mean posterior variance of state after the elicitation of factive (happiness or unhappiness) and epistemic (fear or hope) emotions and before the observation of the next sensory input. (left) Mean posterior variance during the low volatility stages of the reference scenario. (right) Mean posterior variance during the high volatility stages of the reference scenario. The mean was computed for each of 100 simulations of the reference scenario. In both the low and high volatility stages, the mean was on average higher for the epistemic (low volatility: M = 0.68, SD = 0.03; high volatility: M = 1.07, SD = 0.19) than the factive (low volatility: M = 0.58, SD = 0.02; high volatility: M = 0.69, SD = 0.06) emotions and it was also on average higher during the high (M = 0.88, SD = 0.24) than the low volatility (M = 0.63, SD = 0.06) stages.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. G Colombetti, 2005, Appraising valence, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12, 103
  2. Higgins ET (2007) Value. In: Kruglanski AW, Higgins ET, editors, Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. 2nd edition. New York: The Guilford Press. pp. 454–472.

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Metadata

Authors
Joffily, M., & Coricelli, G.
Affiliations
  • Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
  • University of Southern California (US)
Corresponding author
Joffily, Mateus
Venue
PLoS Computational Biology
Published
2013-06-13
Volume
9
Issue
6
Pages
e1003094
ISSN
  • 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
  • 1553-7358
OpenAlex
W2002907081
Cited by
322
References
66
Citations by year
2026: 21 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 32 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 38 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 1
FWCI
4.19
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • PLoS Computational Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Institutional Research Information System (Università degli Studi di Trento) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-11-EMCO-0010)
  • Provincia Autonoma di Trento
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Psychiatry, Mental Health, Neuroscience
Keywords
emotional valence, free energy principle, Bayesian inference, emotions, learning rate, expectancy violation, happiness, fear, disappointment, relief, hope, perception, agent adaptation
MeSH terms
Bayes Theorem, Emotions, Humans, Models, Theoretical, Uncertainty

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Joffily, M., & Coricelli, G. (2013). Emotional Valence and the Free-Energy Principle. PLoS Computational Biology. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003094

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