Evolution of All-or-None Strategies in Repeated Public Goods Dilemmas
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Many problems of cooperation involve repeated interactions among the same groups of individuals. When collective action is at stake, groups often engage in Public Goods Games (PGG), where individuals contribute (or not) to a common pool, subsequently sharing the resources. Such scenarios of repeated group interactions materialize situations in which direct reciprocation to groups may be at work. Here we study direct group reciprocity considering the complete set of reactive strategies, where individuals behave conditionally on what they observed in the previous round. We study both analytically and by computer simulations the evolutionary dynamics encompassing this extensive strategy space, witnessing the emergence of a surprisingly simple strategy that we call All-Or-None (AoN). AoN consists in cooperating only after a round of unanimous group behavior (cooperation or defection), and proves robust in the presence of errors, thus fostering cooperation in a wide range of group sizes. The principles encapsulated in this strategy share a level of complexity reminiscent of that found already in 2-person games under direct and indirect reciprocity, reducing, in fact, to the well-known Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy in the limit of the repeated 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma.
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Cites
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616 · cited 1×
“In the absence of additional mechanisms, such as the presence of thresholds [4,5], risk [6], an embedding network of interactions [7–12], institutions [13–15], punishment or voluntary participation [16–19], evolutionary game theory predicts a population fated to fall into a tragedy of the commons [20].”
BackgroundA strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
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Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons
Sigmund, K., De Silva, H., Traulsen, A., & Hauert, C. (2010) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature09203 · Cited by 580 · cited 1×
“In the absence of additional mechanisms, such as the presence of thresholds [4,5], risk [6], an embedding network of interactions [7–12], institutions [13–15], punishment or voluntary participation [16–19], evolutionary game theory predicts a population fated to fall into a tragedy of the commons [20].”
BackgroundSigmund, K. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400832255 · Cited by 570 · cited 3×
“We consider a repeated PGG with an undetermined number of rounds, such that at the end of each round, another round will take place with probability w [3], leading to an average number of rounds — m — given by m = (12 w).”
BackgroundA bottom-up institutional approach to cooperative governance of risky commons
Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2013) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/nclimate1927 · Cited by 183
Cited by
Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x · Cited by 277
Social norm complexity and past reputations in the evolution of cooperation
Santos, F. P., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature25763 · Cited by 259
Self-citationSocial goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies
McAvoy, A., Allen, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0881-2 · Cited by 94
Signalling boosts the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions
Martinez-Vaquero, L. A., Santos, F. C., & Trianni, V. (2020) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2020.0635 · Cited by 11
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Metadata
- Authors
- Pinheiro, F. L., Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M.
- Venue
- PLoS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2014-11-13
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- e1003945
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- OpenAlex
- W2075978398
- Cited by
- 56
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 14.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Pinheiro, F. L., Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2014). Evolution of All-or-None Strategies in Repeated Public Goods Dilemmas. PLoS Computational Biology. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003945
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