Human Inferences about Sequences: A Minimal Transition Probability Model
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The brain constantly infers the causes of the inputs it receives and uses these inferences to generate statistical expectations about future observations. Experimental evidence for these expectations and their violations include explicit reports, sequential effects on reaction times, and mismatch or surprise signals recorded in electrophysiology and functional MRI. Here, we explore the hypothesis that the brain acts as a near-optimal inference device that constantly attempts to infer the time-varying matrix of transition probabilities between the stimuli it receives, even when those stimuli are in fact fully unpredictable. This parsimonious Bayesian model, with a single free parameter, accounts for a broad range of findings on surprise signals, sequential effects and the perception of randomness. Notably, it explains the pervasive asymmetry between repetitions and alternations encountered in those studies. Our analysis suggests that a neural machinery for inferring transition probabilities lies at the core of human sequence knowledge.
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Cites
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“Comparison between expectations and actual data allows the brain to constantly update its estimates–a computational mode termed “active inference” [45,46].”
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“Because the P300 wave seems to reflect the violation of expectations, rather than the expectations themselves, we quantified whether a given observation fulfills or deviates from expectations with the mathematical notion of surprise [51,52].”
BackgroundProbability Theory: The Logic of Science
Jaynes, E. T. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511790423 · Cited by 4,045
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“also been put forward by the predictive coding [7,53] and the active inference [46,54] frameworks, and applied, for instance, to motor control [55,56] or reinforcement learning [57].”
MethodLearning the value of information in an uncertain world
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“also been put forward by the predictive coding [7,53] and the active inference [46,54] frameworks, and applied, for instance, to motor control [55,56] or reinforcement learning [57].”
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“However, the dynamic belief model may not be less plausible given that neuronal populations have been proposed to represent and compute with full probability distributions [33,41].”
Background
Cited by
Great Expectations: Is there Evidence for Predictive Coding in Auditory Cortex?
Heilbron, M., & Chait, M. (2018) · Neuroscience · doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061 · Cited by 428
Gerstner, W., Lehmann, M., Liakoni, V., Corneil, D., & Brea, J. (2018) · Frontiers in Neural Circuits · doi:10.3389/fncir.2018.00053 · Cited by 290
Large-scale cortical networks for hierarchical prediction and prediction error in the primate brain
Chao, Z. C., Takaura, K., Wang, L., Fujii, N., & Dehaene, S. (2018) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2018.10.004 · Cited by 238
Self-citationBalancing new against old information: the role of puzzlement surprise in learning
Faraji, M., Preuschoff, K., & Gerstner, W. (2018) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01025 · Cited by 68
“It also means that the learning rate never falls to zero, so that recent data samples are more important than old ones, even during a stationary fully stochastic sequence, consistent with behavioral experiments (Squires et al., 1976; Meyniel et al., 2016).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialMills, C., Zamani, A., White, R., & Christoff, K. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2019.0692 · Cited by 27
Metadata
- Authors
- Meyniel, F., Maheu, M., & Dehaene, S.
- Venue
- PLOS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2016-12-28
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- e1005260
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- OpenAlex
- W2949118384
- Cited by
- 142
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 4.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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