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Cited by 17Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesPsychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentEthics in Business and Education

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 82 of the 83 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Moral licensing, instrumental apology and insincerity aversion: Taking Immanuel Kant to the lab

Open access

Abstract

Moral licensing, equivalently called "self-licensing", is the instrumental use of a Good Act to cover up a Bad Act. This paper's thesis is that "instrumental apology" i.e., bad-faith apology, is a case of moral licensing. A decision maker may issue an apology (Good Act) after committing a Bad Act, but if the decision maker uses the apology instrumentally, he or she is using the apology to justify the Bad Act. Hence, the apology is insincere. Sincerity is the fine line between a good-faith apology or, more generally, a Good Act, on one hand, and an instrumental apology or, more generally, moral licensing, on the other. In this light, moral licensing should be separated from genuine apology that attains moral equilibrium, which is called in the literature moral "self-regulation' and "conscience accounting." According to Kantian ethics, not just the consequences of an act matter, but also the sincerity with which the act was conducted. This pits Kant against the utilitarian view, which downplays intentions and focuses on consequences. We take Kant to the lab. Participants play a modified ultimatum game, where proposers in some treatments have the option of issuing apology messages and responders have both costly and costless options for rewarding or punishing proposers. We introduce different treatments of the apology message to allow responders to form doubts about the sincerity of the apology messages. Our results support the Kantian position: responders, once they become suspicious of the sincerity of the proposers' apology, exhibit "insincerity aversion" and punish proposers.

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Crossref · 10.1371/journal.pone.0206878

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Figures

Fig 1 The structure of the experiment.
Fig 1 The structure of the experiment.CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig 2 Estimated likelihood of apology based on Model 2 in Table 3.
Fig 2 Estimated likelihood of apology based on Model 2 in Table 3.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Metadata

Authors
Khalil, E. L., & Feltovich, N.
Affiliations
Monash University (AU)
Corresponding author
  • Khalil, Elias L.
  • Feltovich, Nick
Venue
PLOS ONE
Published
2018-11-08
Volume
13
Issue
11
Pages
e0206878
ISSN
1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2899638763
Cited by
17
References
83
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 1
FWCI
1.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Monash University Research Portal (Monash University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Monash University (grant #1758024)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
Keywords
moral licensing, Kantian ethics, sincerity, moral self-regulation, ultimatum game, punishment, utilitarianism
MeSH terms
Affect, Decision Making, Emotions, Female, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Male, Morals, Social Behavior, Ethical Theory

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