Scientific Representation and the Semantic View of Theories
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Models represent their target systems in one way or another. But what does it mean for a model to represent something beyond itself? This paper details different aspects of this problem and argues that the semantic view of theories does not provide us with an adequate response to any of these.
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Citations
Cites
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science
Cartwright, N. (1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139167093 · Cited by 2,433
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
Russell, B., & Potter, M. (2022) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003308881 · Cited by 1,918
Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth
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Frege: philosophy of mathematics
(1992) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.29-4441 · Cited by 695
Models as mediating instruments
Morrison, M., & Morgan, M. S. (1999) · Models as Mediators · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511660108.003 · Cited by 559
Balzer, W., Moulines, C. U., & Sneed, J. D. (1987) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-3765-9 · Cited by 533
Cited by
Mittelstadt, B., Russell, C., & Wachter, S. (2019) · Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3287560.3287574 · Cited by 794
“Rather, the reviewed empirical evidence indicates that humans psychologically prefer contrastive explanations (Miller, 2017, p.18)(Rehder, 2003, 2006).”
BackgroundScientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective
van Fraassen, B. C. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278220.001.0001 · Cited by 754
Modelling and representing: An artefactual approach to model-based representation
Knuuttila, T. (2011) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.11.034 · Cited by 332
Frigg, R. (2010) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9505-0 · Cited by 292
Self-citationEverything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask
Frigg, R., & Votsis, I. (2011) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-011-0025-7 · Cited by 206
“Frigg (2006) argues that a given object can be ascribed a number of non-isomorphic structures. This is meant to undermine ESR because to be a realist about a structure seems to presuppose that there is a unique structure we believe to be instantiated in the world. Indeed, this seems to be a problem for all realists. O…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationStepp, N., & Turvey, M. T. (2010) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2009.03.003 · Cited by 202
“For other discussions of models (see Eykhoff, 1974; Forster, 2000; Morgan, 2001; Webb, 2001; Suárez, 2003; Seidewitz, 2003; Frigg, 2006).”
An Inferential Account of Model Explanation
Fang, W. (2019) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-018-9958-9 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- FRIGG, R.
- Venue
- THEORIA
- Publisher
- EHU Press
- Published
- 2006-01-06
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 49-65
- ISSN
- 0495-4548 (ISSN-L)
- 2171-679X
- OpenAlex
- W2147443826
- Cited by
- 276
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 76.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.