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SGX-Shield: Enabling Address Space Layout Randomization for SGX Programs
Abstract
Author(s): Jaebaek Seo, Byoungyoung Lee, Seongmin Kim, Ming-Wei Shih, Insik Shin, Dongsu Han, Taesoo Kim Download: Paper (PDF) Date: 27 Feb 2017 Document Type: Reports Additional Documents: Slides Video Associated Event: NDSS Symposium 2017 Abstract: Traditional execution environments deploy Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) to defend against memory corruption attacks. However, Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), a new … Continued
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Cites
SCONE: secure Linux containers with Intel SGX
(2016) · Operating Systems Design and Implementation · doi:10.5555/3026877.3026930 · Cited by 582
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Self-citationLeaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX
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Metadata
- Authors
- Seo, J., Lee, B., Kim, S., Shih, M.-W., Shin, I., Han, D., & Kim, T.
- Venue
- Proceedings 2017 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
- Publisher
- Internet Society
- Published
- 2017
- OpenAlex
- W2613229705
- Cited by
- 171
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 13.59
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Seo, J., Lee, B., Kim, S., Shih, M.-W., Shin, I., Han, D., & Kim, T. (2017). SGX-Shield: Enabling Address Space Layout Randomization for SGX Programs. Proceedings 2017 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2017.23037
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