The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Bargaining Theory of Distribution Channels
Abstract
A critical factor in channel relationships between manufacturers and retailers is the relative bargaining power of both parties. In this article, the authors develop a framework to examine bargaining between channel members and demonstrate that the bargaining process actually affects the degree of coordination and that two-part tariffs will not be part of the market contract even in a simple one manufacturer-one retailer channel. To establish the institutional and theoretical bases for these results, the authors relax the conventional assumption that the product being exchanged is completely specifiable in a contract. They show that the institution of bargaining has force, and it affects channel coordination when the complexity of nonspecifiability of the product exchange is present. The authors find that greater retailer power promotes channel coordination. Thus, there are conditions in which the presence of a powerful retailer might actually be beneficial to all channel members. The authors recover the standard double-marginalization take-it-or-leave-it offer outcome as a particular case of the bargaining process. They also examine the implications of relative bargaining powers for whether the product is delivered “early” (i.e., before demand is realized) or “late” (i.e., delivered to the retailer only if there is demand). The authors present the implications for returns policies as well as of renegotiation costs and retail competition.
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Cites
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Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
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Cited by
Agency Selling or Reselling? Channel Structures in Electronic Retailing
Abhishek, V., Jerath, K., & Zhang, Z. J. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2230 · Cited by 1,082
Strategic Customer Behavior, Commitment, and Supply Chain Performance
Su, X., & Zhang, F. (2008) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0886 · Cited by 522
Firm Strategies in the “Mid Tail” of Platform-Based Retailing
Jiang, B., Jerath, K., & Srinivasan, K. (2011) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1110.0656 · Cited by 443
Influence of customer participation on creating and sharing of new product value
Fang, E., Palmatier, R. W., & Evans, K. R. (2008) · Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science · doi:10.1007/s11747-007-0082-9 · Cited by 414
Ho, T.-H., & Zhang, J. (2008) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1070.0788 · Cited by 331
Metadata
- Authors
- Iyer, G., & Villas-Boas, J. M.
- Venue
- Journal of Marketing Research
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2003-02
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 80-100
- ISSN
- 0022-2437 (ISSN-L)
- 1547-7193
- OpenAlex
- W1987048591
- Cited by
- 359
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 19.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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