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Cited by 359

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

A Bargaining Theory of Distribution Channels

Iyer, Ganesh, Villas-Boas, J. Miguel · 2003 · Journal of Marketing Research

Abstract

A critical factor in channel relationships between manufacturers and retailers is the relative bargaining power of both parties. In this article, the authors develop a framework to examine bargaining between channel members and demonstrate that the bargaining process actually affects the degree of coordination and that two-part tariffs will not be part of the market contract even in a simple one manufacturer-one retailer channel. To establish the institutional and theoretical bases for these results, the authors relax the conventional assumption that the product being exchanged is completely specifiable in a contract. They show that the institution of bargaining has force, and it affects channel coordination when the complexity of nonspecifiability of the product exchange is present. The authors find that greater retailer power promotes channel coordination. Thus, there are conditions in which the presence of a powerful retailer might actually be beneficial to all channel members. The authors recover the standard double-marginalization take-it-or-leave-it offer outcome as a particular case of the bargaining process. They also examine the implications of relative bargaining powers for whether the product is delivered “early” (i.e., before demand is realized) or “late” (i.e., delivered to the retailer only if there is demand). The authors present the implications for returns policies as well as of renegotiation costs and retail competition.

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Metadata

Authors
Iyer, G., & Villas-Boas, J. M.
Venue
Journal of Marketing Research
Published
2003-02
Volume
40
Issue
1
Pages
80-100
ISSN
  • 0022-2437 (ISSN-L)
  • 1547-7193
OpenAlex
W1987048591
Cited by
359
References
38
FWCI
19.42
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Bargaining Theory of Distribution Channels. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1509/jmkr.40.1.80.19134
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Iyer, G., & Villas-Boas, J. M. (2003). A Bargaining Theory of Distribution Channels. Journal of Marketing Research. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.40.1.80.19134

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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