The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contracts, Extracontractual Incentives, and Ex Post Behavior in Franchise Channel Relationships
Abstract
Grounded in agency theory, this study examines how franchisors' ex ante contracts and extracontractual incentives influence their ex post monitoring and enforcement efforts and how combinations of the ex post governance mechanisms drive franchisee behavior. Integrating three archival data sources and a survey of 206 franchisees across eight automotive brands, the authors find that franchisor reliance on contractual completeness appears to result in reduced ex post behavior monitoring and enforcement efforts, while contractual one-sidedness is associated with higher levels of behavior monitoring but reduced enforcement. Extracontractual incentives, when offered to the franchisee, are associated with increases in monitoring and enforcement. In isolation, franchisor monitoring and enforcement efforts are ineffective in eliciting desired franchisee behaviors. However, different combinations of franchisor monitoring and enforcement efforts affect franchisee compliance and opportunism, sometimes with counterproductive results. The study provides an initial baseline of understanding on how ex ante governance characteristics and combinations of ex post governance mechanisms function to facilitate or deter franchisee compliance and opportunism.
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Citations
Cites
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653 · cited 1×
“In addition to the incentives built into formal contracts, the principal may also offer extracontractual incentives to its agents for additional efforts on behalf of its brand (Klein and Leffler 1981).”
BackgroundBergen, M., Dutta, S., & Walker, O. C. (1992) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1177/002224299205600301 · Cited by 1,105
Blair, R. D., & Lafontaine, F. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511753879 · Cited by 364
Gong, Y., Shenkar, O., Luo, Y., & Nyaw, M. (2007) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.626 · Cited by 192
Cited by
Cao, Z., & Lumineau, F. (2015) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2014.09.009 · Cited by 937
International franchising: A literature review and research agenda
Rosado-Serrano, A., Paul, J., & Dikova, D. (2018) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.12.049 · Cited by 401
Metadata
- Authors
- Kashyap, V., Antia, K. D., & Frazier, G. L.
- Venue
- Journal of Marketing Research
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2012-04
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 260-276
- ISSN
- 0022-2437 (ISSN-L)
- 1547-7193
- OpenAlex
- W2000252620
- Cited by
- 210
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 27.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Kashyap, V., Antia, K. D., & Frazier, G. L. (2012). Contracts, Extracontractual Incentives, and Ex Post Behavior in Franchise Channel Relationships. Journal of Marketing Research. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmr.09.0337
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.