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Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions
Abstract
This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility.
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Citations
Cited by
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?
Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N. (1996) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033427 · Cited by 1,540
Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research
LIEBERMAN, E. S. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051762 · Cited by 1,515
(2004) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491207 · Cited by 461
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data
Bapat, N. A., & Clifton Morgan, T. (2009) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x · Cited by 230
The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure
Allen, S. H. (2005) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050620590950097 · Cited by 147
Metadata
- Authors
- Martin, L. L.
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 1992-12-31
- OpenAlex
- W4298360447
- Cited by
- 335
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 20.07
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Martin, L. L. (1992). Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions. Princeton University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691227825
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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