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Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines
Abstract
This book focuses on local bossism, a common political phenomenon where local power brokers achieve monopolistic control over an area's coercive and economic resources. Examples of bossism include Old Corruption in eighteenth-century England, urban political machines in the United States, caciques in Latin America, the Mafia in Southern Italy, and today's gangster politicians in such countries as India, Russia, and Thailand. For many years, the entrenchment of numerous provincial warlords and political clans has made the Philippines a striking case of local bossism. Yet writings on Filipino political culture and patron-client relations have ignored the role of coercion in shaping electoral competition and social relations. Portrayals of a "weak state" captured by a landed oligarchy have similarly neglected the enduring institutional legacies of American colonial rule and the importance of state resources for the accumulation of wealth and power in the Philippines. The author, by contrast, argues that the roots of bossism in the Philippines lie in the inauguration of formal democratic institutions at a relatively early stage of capitalist development. Poverty and insecurity leave many voters vulnerable to clientelist, coercive, and financial pressure, and the state's central role in capital accumulation provides the basis for local bosses' economic empires and political machines. These contradictions have encouraged bossism in the Philippines, as well as in other countries. The book elaborates these arguments through case studies of bosses in two Philippine provinces, Cavite and Cebu. The contrast between single-generation gangster politicians in Cavite and enduring commercial dynasties in Cebu reveals variation in the forms of bossism that reflect variations in the local political economies of the two provinces. Comparisons between bosses over successive historical periods highlight the gradual transformation of bossism through capitalist development. In sum, Capital, Coercion, and Crime provides a comparative historical analysis of bossism, drawing conclusions of great interest not only to scholars of Southeast Asia but to students of comparative politics as well.
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In the citing paper
“For Sidel, the emergence of bosses is essentially dependent on a specific sequencing, that is, the imposition of formal electoral democratic institutions upon an underdeveloped state apparatus at an early phase of capitalist development (Sidel 1999: 13).”
From Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand (2008) · cites this paper as Sidel 1999: 13
In the citing paper
“Elected officials have gained executive control over local state agencies.”
From Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand (2008) · cites this paper as Sidel 1999
In the citing paper
“The local elites dominated multi-member constituencies and were thus able to take control of factions, parties, and ministries in Bangkok in fluid coalition governments (Sidel 1999: 150f.).”
From Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand (2008) · cites this paper as Sidel 1999: 150f.
In the citing paper
“From the beginning, strong local elites have captured political parties as power bases.”
From Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand (2008) · cites this paper as Sidel 1999
Citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders
Staniland, P. (2012) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592712000655 · Cited by 576
Allen, K. M. (2006) · Disasters · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9523.2006.00308.x · Cited by 530
“…between local people and government institutions is an unequal one, which can in practice be characterised by the cooption of local community leaders and/or exclusive and often deep-rooted, clientelistic relations (see, for example, Sidel, 1999, on the emergence of ‘Bossism’ in the Philippines).”
BackgroundThe City and the Bottom Line: Urban Megaprojects and the Privatization of Planning in Southeast Asia
Shatkin, G. (2007) · Environment and Planning A Economy and Space · doi:10.1068/a38439 · Cited by 360
“The causes and consequences of this situation have been debated exhaustively by foreign and Filipino social scientists (Abinales, 1998; Boyce, 1993; Hutchcroft, 1998; Rocamora, 1994; Sidel, 1999).”
BackgroundPolitics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and Duterte's Rise to Power
Curato, N. (2016) · Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs · doi:10.1177/186810341603500305 · Cited by 296
Hutchcroft, P. D., & Rocamora, J. (2003) · Journal of East Asian Studies · doi:10.1017/s1598240800001363 · Cited by 252
Metadata
- Authors
- Sidel, J. T.
- Corresponding author
- Sidel, John T.
- Venue
- Stanford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Stanford University Press
- Published
- 1999-12-01
- OpenAlex
- W4207053434
- Cited by
- 399
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 17 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 6
- FWCI
- 6.21
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Stanford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
- Social Sciences › Anthropology › Philippine History and Culture
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Politics and Society in Latin America
- Keywords
- political corruption, political machines, clientelism, coercion, electoral competition, political dynasties, weak states, Cavite, Cebu, Philippines, capitalist development
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