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Self-Deception Unmasked
Abstract
Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false. Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike.
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Citations
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Self-Enhancement: Food for Thought
Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2008) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00068.x · Cited by 880
“…in detail into the criteria for personal identity (Gallagher & Shear, 1999; Parfit, 1984) and into the paradoxes of self-deception (Elster, 1986; Mele, 2001)—has had comparatively little to say about why the self, for all its notorious elusiveness, demands to be so positively evaluated (but…”
The evolution and psychology of self-deception
von Hippel, W., & Trivers, R. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10001354 · Cited by 736
A domain-independent framework for modeling emotion
Gratch, J., & Marsella, S. (2004) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2004.02.002 · Cited by 725
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Coltheart, M. (2007) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/17470210701338071 · Cited by 280
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Spear, A. D. (2023) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2019.1610051 · Cited by 97
X. Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception
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Self-citationCollaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation
Szanto, T. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.02002 · Cited by 12
“Consider now the similar case of DA, sometimes also called “incontinent belief” (Mele, 2001).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Mele, A. R.
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2000-12-31
- OpenAlex
- W1557336084
- Cited by
- 661
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 36.49
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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