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Cited by 50Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationGame Theory and ApplicationsExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

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Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints

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Park, Peter S., Nowak, Martin A., Hilbe, Christian·2022·Nature Communications
DOI 10.1038/s41467-022-28336-2PMC PMC8825791
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Abstract

In repeated social interactions, individuals often employ reciprocal strategies to maintain cooperation. To explore the emergence of reciprocity, many theoretical models assume synchronized decision making. In each round, individuals decide simultaneously whether to cooperate or not. Yet many manifestations of reciprocity in nature are asynchronous. Individuals provide help at one time and receive help at another. Here, we explore such alternating games in which players take turns. We mathematically characterize all Nash equilibria among memory-one strategies. Moreover, we use evolutionary simulations to explore various model extensions, exploring the effect of discounted games, irregular alternation patterns, and higher memory. In all cases, we observe that mutual cooperation still evolves for a wide range of parameter values. However, compared to simultaneous games, alternating games require different strategies to maintain cooperation in noisy environments. Moreover, none of the respective strategies are evolutionarily stable.

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  • This correlation aids the evolution of cooperative behaviors.

    “which in turn, aids the evolution of cooperative behaviors [Park et al. , 2022].”

    From Enhancing Cooperation through Selective Interaction and Long-term Experiences in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (2024) · cites this paper as Park et al., 2022

    The Introduction (page unavailable) says cooperation can evolve through repeated interactions, and the Discussion (page unavailable) says reciprocity can maintain cooperation. Neither passage identifies the correlation referred to as “this correlation” or shows that it aids cooperation’s evolution, so the specific causal claim is unsupported. (LLM, conf=0.78)

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Metadata

Authors
Park, P. S., Nowak, M. A., & Hilbe, C.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology (DE)
Corresponding author
Hilbe, Christian
ORCID
Venue
Nature Communications
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2022-02-08
Volume
13
Issue
1
Pages
737-737
ISSN
2041-1723 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1038/s41467-022-28336-2
PMC
PMC8825791
OpenAlex
W4210886181
Cited by
50
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 3
FWCI
14.75
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Nature Communications (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (DGE1745303)
  • European Research Council Starting Grant E-DIRECT
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
cooperation, Nash equilibrium, evolution of cooperation, evolutionary stability, discounted games, noisy environments
MeSH terms
Cooperative Behavior, Decision Making, Game Theory, Humans, Memory, Models, Psychological

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