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Cited by 219American Constitutional Law and PoliticsInternational Relations and Foreign PolicyDefense, Military, and Policy Studies

While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers

Howell, William G., Pevehouse, Jon·2007·Princeton University Press eBooks
DOI 10.1515/9781400840830
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Abstract

Nearly five hundred times in the past century, American presidents have deployed the nation's military abroad, on missions ranging from embassy evacuations to full-scale wars. The question of whether Congress has effectively limited the president's power to do so has generally met with a resounding "no." In While Dangers Gather , William Howell and Jon Pevehouse reach a very different conclusion. The authors--one an American politics scholar, the other an international relations scholar--provide the most comprehensive and compelling evidence to date on Congress's influence on presidential war powers. Their findings have profound implications for contemporary debates about war, presidential power, and Congress's constitutional obligations. While devoting special attention to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, this book systematically analyzes the last half-century of U.S. military policy. Among its conclusions: Presidents are systematically less likely to exercise military force when their partisan opponents retain control of Congress. The partisan composition of Congress, however, matters most for proposed deployments that are larger in size and directed at less strategically important locales. Moreover, congressional influence is often achieved not through bold legislative action but through public posturing--engaging the media, raising public concerns, and stirring domestic and international doubt about the United States' resolve to see a fight through to the end.

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Crossref · 10.1515/9781400840830

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  • Even in unilateral action, presidents are often constrained by Congress and the courts, affecting how and whether they use their unilateral powers.

    “The thrust of this literature is that, although presidents may exercise power through unilateral action, they cannot do everything they want and are often constrained-affecting how they use their unilateral powers, and indeed, whether they use them at all (Chiou & Rothenberg, 2017;Howell & Pevehouse, 2007;Kriner, 2010;Rudalevige, 2021;Staudt, 2011).”

    From The strongman presidency and the two logics of presidential power (2023) · cites this paper as Howell & Pevehouse, 2007

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Authors
Howell, W. G., & Pevehouse, J.
ORCID
Venue
Princeton University Press eBooks
Publisher
Princeton University Press
Published
2007-01-01
DOI
10.1515/9781400840830
OpenAlex
W2251396759
Cited by
219
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 12
FWCI
16.00
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Princeton University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › American Constitutional Law and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Defense, Military, and Policy Studies
Keywords
presidential war powers, congressional influence, separation of powers, 2003 invasion of Iraq, military deployment, executive-legislative relations, presidential power

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