Cited by 5Wittgensteinian philosophy and applicationsPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceLogic and Philosophy of Science

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Wittgenstein Today

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Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle·2016·Wittgenstein-Studien

Abstract

In this paper,¹ I briefly take stock of Wittgenstein’s contribution to philosophy and some other disciplines. Surveying some of the ways in which he emphasizes the primacy of action, together with the superfluity - in basic cases - of propositions and cognition, in his account of mind, language and action, I suggest that, far from being a maverick philosopher, Wittgenstein’s pioneering ’enactivism’ puts him in the mainstream of philosophy today. I mention the importance of his thought for the philosophy of mind and epistemology, as also for psychology and the cognitive sciences, and conclude that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is still spearheading the fight against physicalism and reductionism.

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Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Bennett, M. R. & Hacker, P.M.S.: Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Oxford 2003.
  2. Hutto, D. D.: Contentless Perceiving: the very idea, in: Wittgenstein and Perception, ed. M. Campbell, Oxford 2013.
  3. -& Myin, E.: Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content, Cambridge, MA 2013.
  4. -: Universal Grammar: Wittgenstein versus Chomsky. Memorial Lecture for the Laurence Goldstein Memorial Conference. Kent University at Canterbury 13 -14 May 2015.
  5. Tomasello, M.: Communication before language. Plenary Lecture for the 36 th International Wittgenstein Symposium on Mind, Language and Action, Kirchberg am Wechsel 2013.
  6. Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E.: The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, Cambridge, MA 1991.

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Metadata

Authors
Moyal-Sharrock, D.
Affiliations
Hertfordshire
Venue
Wittgenstein-Studien
Published
2016-02-01
Volume
7
Issue
1
Pages
1-14
ISSN
  • 1868-7431 (ISSN-L)
  • 1868-7458
OpenAlex
W4241570192
Cited by
5
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2018: 1
FWCI
2.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Wittgenstein-Studien (publishedVersion)
  • University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) (acceptedVersion)
  • University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
Keywords
Wittgenstein, enactivism, language and mind, cognition, philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophy of psychology, cognitive science, anti-physicalism, anti-reductionism

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