Deep Rationality: The Evolutionary Economics of Decision Making
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
What is a "rational" decision? Economists traditionally viewed rationality as maximizing expected satisfaction. This view has been useful in modeling basic microeconomic concepts, but falls short in accounting for many everyday human decisions. It leaves unanswered why some things reliably make people more satisfied than others, and why people frequently act to make others happy at a cost to themselves. Drawing on an evolutionary perspective, we propose that people make decisions according to a set of principles that may not appear to make sense at the superficial level, but that demonstrate rationality at a deeper evolutionary level. By this, we mean that people use adaptive domain-specific decision-rules that, on average, would have resulted in fitness benefits. Using this framework, we re-examine several economic principles. We suggest that traditional psychological functions governing risk aversion, discounting of future benefits, and budget allocations to multiple goods, for example, vary in predictable ways as a function of the underlying motive of the decision-maker and individual differences linked to evolved life-history strategies. A deep rationality framework not only helps explain why people make the decisions they do, but also inspires multiple directions for future research.
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Cited by
Going green to be seen: status, reputation, and conspicuous conservation
Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., & Van den Bergh, B. (2010) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0017346 · Cited by 2,174
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Self-citationGriskevicius, V., Ackerman, J. M., Cantú, S. M., Delton, A. W., Robertson, T. E., Simpson, J. A., Thompson, M. E., & Tybur, J. M. (2013) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797612451471 · Cited by 594
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Self-citationHuman threat management systems: Self-protection and disease avoidance
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kenrick, D. T., Griskevicius, V., Sundie, J. M., Li, N. P., Li, Y. J., & Neuberg, S. L.
- Venue
- Social Cognition
- Publisher
- Guilford Publications
- Published
- 2009-10
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 764-785
- ISSN
- 0278-016X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2124226641
- Cited by
- 142
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 4.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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