A Discounting Framework for Choice With Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards.
Open accessAbstract
When choosing between delayed or uncertain outcomes, individuals discount the value of such outcomes on the basis of the expected time to or the likelihood of their occurrence. In an integrative review of the expanding experimental literature on discounting, the authors show that although the same form of hyperbola-like function describes discounting of both delayed and probabilistic outcomes, a variety of recent findings are inconsistent with a single-process account. The authors also review studies that compare discounting in different populations and discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the findings. The present effort illustrates the value of studying choice involving both delayed and probabilistic outcomes within a general discounting framework that uses similar experimental procedures and a common analytical approach.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This integrative review argues that both delayed and probabilistic rewards are well described by the same hyperbola-like discounting function, but that a single-process account is undermined by dissociations such as opposite amount effects. It reviews group differences and practical implications while calling for models that handle combined delayed, probabilistic, positive, and negative outcomes.
Key findings
- A hyperbola-like function (Equation 3) fit temporal discounting better than exponential or simple hyperbola functions; for group median delayed $10,000 rewards, Equation 3 had R² = .977, versus .815 for the exponential and .937 for the hyperbola.
- Probability discounting was also better described by a hyperbola-like function (Equation 5) than a simple hyperbola (Equation 4); in Green et al. (1999a) Experiment 1, 87% of 68 participants had exponent estimates below 1.0, replicated in Experiment 2 with 77% of 30 participants.
- Amount had opposite effects on temporal and probability discounting: smaller delayed rewards were discounted more steeply, whereas smaller probabilistic rewards were discounted less steeply; Myerson et al. (2003) found amount had no significant effect on the temporal exponent, but the probability exponent increased significantly with amount, while temporal k decreased with amount and probability h did not change significantly.
- Dissociations inconsistent with a single-process account included inflation affecting temporal but not probability discounting, Chinese participants discounting delayed rewards more steeply than Japanese while Japanese discounted probabilistic rewards more steeply than Chinese, and substance abusers showing steeper delayed monetary discounting than controls.
Methods
- Design: Integrative review of experimental literature on temporal and probability discounting, using parallel experimental procedures and a common analytical approach.
- Data/sample: Reviewed studies with humans and nonhuman animals, including hypothetical and real monetary rewards, nonmonetary commodities, different age and cultural groups, substance abusers, gamblers, and psychometric measures; the authors also reanalyzed data from other laboratories.
- Main analysis: Compared fits of exponential, simple hyperbola, and hyperbola-like discounting functions using R² and full-versus-reduced model comparisons, and discussed area-under-the-curve as a single index of discounting.
Limitations
- Stated: Age-related parameter findings must be interpreted cautiously because of small sample sizes and lack of independence in estimates of k and s; correlational studies generally need larger samples, and the reliability of behavioral discounting measures needs assessment.
- Stated: A two-parameter function complicates use of a single discounting measure because differences may reflect either the rate parameter or the exponent, and discounting rate parameters are highly skewed; estimates of the two parameters are not independent.
- Evident: As an integrative review, many conclusions depend on reanalyses of published group medians and cross-study comparisons rather than a single prospective design; some explanations for amount effects on weighting functions are described by the authors as post hoc.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 177 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingnone given§ Abstract
The same form of hyperbola-like function describes discounting of both delayed and probabilistic outcomes.
“although the same form of hyperbola-like function describes discounting of both delayed and probabilistic outcomes, a variety of recent findings are inconsistent with a single-process account.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The subjective value of a reward is increasingly discounted from its nominal amount as the delay until or the odds against receiving the reward increase, and individuals choose the reward with the higher discounted subjective value.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
The finding that temporal discounting is better described by a hyperbola than by an exponential has been replicated in study after study.
“The finding that temporal discounting is better described by a hyperbola than by an exponential has been replicated in study after study (e.g., Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; Kirby, 1997; Kirby & Maraković, 1995; Kirby & Santiesteban, 2003; Rachlin et al., 1991; Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Kirby, 1997
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Kirby & Maraković, 1995
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
Studies of both human and nonhuman subjects have obtained evidence of preference reversals with procedures other than the one used by Green et al. (1981) and Green, Fristoe, and Myerson (1994).
“studies of both human and nonhuman subjects have obtained evidence of preference reversals with other types of procedures (Ainslie & Haendel, 1983; Ainslie & Herrnstein, 1981; Green & Estle, 2003; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; Mazur, 1987; Rachlin & Green, 1972; Rodriguez & Logue, 1988).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Ainslie & Haendel, 1983
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Ainslie & Herrnstein, 1981
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Green & Estle, 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
Adding an exponent produced a statistically significant increase in the proportion of variance accounted for in the group median data depicted in Figure 6.
“With respect to the group median data depicted in Figure 6, Myerson and Green (1995) reported that adding an exponent produced a statistically significant increase in the proportion of variance accounted for.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Myerson and Green (1995)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingown data§ Abstract
Equation 3 provided the best fit to the data in Figure 6 (R2 = .977).
“It can be seen that Equation 3 (solid curve) provided the best fit to the data in Figure 6 (R2 = .977).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Findingown data§ Abstract
At the group level, a hyperbola-like function provides significantly better fits to discounting data than the simple hyperbola.
“Although the size of the increase in the proportion of explained variance may vary, at the group level a hyperbola-like function provides significantly better fits to discounting data than the simple hyperbola.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingcitation§ Abstract
The finding that adding an exponent significantly increases variance accounted for has been replicated in further studies from our laboratory and in reanalyses of data from other laboratories.
“This finding has subsequently been replicated in further studies from our laboratory (Green et al., 1999a; Ostaszewski, Green, & Myerson, 1998) as well as in reanalyses of data from other laboratories described in subsequent sections (Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997; Murphy, Vuchinich, & Simpson, 2001; Raineri & Rachlin, 1993).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Green et al., 1999a
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Ostaszewski, Green, & Myerson, 1998
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
The hyperbola-like discounting function accurately described the group median data for delayed hypothetical $1,000 rewards in children, young adults, and older adults (all R2s > .990).
“The hyperbola-like discounting function accurately described the group median data in each case (all R2s > .990).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al. (1999b)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
At the individual level, the median proportion of variance accounted for was greater than .910 in all three age groups.
“At the individual level, the median the proportion of variance accounted for was greater than .910 in all three groups.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al. (1999b)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
In Green, Fristoe, and Myerson (1994), as the delay added to both alternatives was increased while the interval between the smaller, sooner and larger, later rewards was held constant, the percentage of participants who reversed their preference and chose the later, larger reward increased.
“as the delay added to the two alternatives was increased while the interval between the two alternatives (smaller, sooner to larger, later) was held constant (e.g., at 1 year), the percentage of participants who reversed their preference and chose the later, $50 reward increased, as predicted by the discounting account.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green, Fristoe, and Myerson (1994)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
Adding an exponent significantly improved the fit to temporal discounting data from individual young adults in the majority of cases.
“Myerson and Green (1995) showed that adding an exponent significantly improved the fit to temporal discounting data from individual young adults in the majority of cases (i.e., Equation 3 fit significantly better than Equation 2).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Myerson and Green (1995)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
In Kirby and Maraković (1995, Experiment 1), hyperbolic functions (Equation 2) fit the data better than exponential functions (Equation 1) for at least 19 of their 21 participants at each of the delayed amounts studied.
“As has been observed with hypothetical rewards, hyperbolic functions (Equation 2) fit the data better than exponential functions (Equation 1). This was true for at least 19 of their 21 participants at each of the delayed amounts studied.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kirby and Maraković (1995, Experiment 1)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
Neither equation provided an adequate description of the data from the 2 participants tested with real rewards first.
“Moreover, perhaps as a result of the lack of discounting by these 2 participants, neither equation provided an adequate description of their data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Johnson and Bickel (2002)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
The results of studies that have used real rewards also are consistent with discounting.
“It should be noted, however, that the results of those studies that have used real rewards (e.g., Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003; Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Kirby, 1997; Kirby & Maraković, 1995, 1996; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003; Rodriguez & Logue, 1988) also are consistent with discounting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Johnson & Bickel, 2002
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Kirby, 1997
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
For the 1-year economy car condition in Raineri and Rachlin (1993), Equation 3 provided a significantly better fit (R2 = .971) than Equation 1 (R2 = .474) or Equation 2 (R2 = .742).
“Again, Equation 3 (R2 = .971) provided a significantly better fit to the data than either Equation 1 (R2 = .474) or Equation 2 (R2 = .742).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Raineri and Rachlin (1993)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
Raineri and Rachlin (1993) have shown that choice involving commodities other than money (i.e., vacations and cars) also can be analyzed in terms of discounting.
“Raineri and Rachlin (1993) have shown that choice involving commodities other than money (i.e., vacations and cars) also can be analyzed in terms of discounting.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Raineri and Rachlin (1993)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
For the 1-year vacation condition in Raineri and Rachlin (1993), Equation 3 provided a significantly better fit (R2 = .977) than Equation 1 (R2 = .607) or Equation 2 (R2 = .754).
“Although Raineri and Rachlin (1993) fit the data using an equation derived to model continuous consumption of an extended reward, it is clear from Figure 8 that the data are very well described by a hyperbola-like discounting function (Equation 3; solid curve; R2 = .977). As was the case with discounting of delayed monetary rewards, Equation 3 provided a significantly better fit to the data than”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Raineri and Rachlin (1993)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
Kirby (1997) also found that Equation 2 accounted for more of the variance than Equation 1 in data obtained with a real-reward procedure similar to that used in Kirby and Maraković (1995, Experiment 1).
“Kirby (1997) also compared the fits of Equations 1 and 2 to data obtained with a procedure using real reward similar to that used in Kirby and Maraković (1995 , Experiment 1) and again found that Equation 2 accounted for more of the variance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kirby (1997)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingown data§ Abstract
All of the discounting functions shown in Figure 13 are hyperbola-like, based on the authors' fits of Equation 3 to data provided by the original studies.
“all of the discounting functions shown in Figure 13 are hyperbola-like (i.e., based on our fits of Equation 3 to data provided by the authors of the original studies)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ Abstract
A hyperbola-like function fit the data significantly better than either an exponential decay function or a hyperbola (Equations 1 and 2).
“a hyperbola-like function fit the data significantly better than either an exponential decay function or a hyperbola (Equations 1 and 2, respectively).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ Abstract
Discounting of delayed gains and losses did not differ significantly when the amount was large (e.g., $20,000).
“However, discounting of delayed gains and losses did not differ significantly when the amount was large (e.g., $20,000).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingcitation§ Abstract
Delayed gains were discounted more steeply than delayed losses when the delayed amount was relatively small (e.g., $200).
“Delayed gains were discounted more steeply than delayed losses when the delayed amount was relatively small (e.g., $200), consistent with the findings of Thaler (1981) and of Murphy et al. (2001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Thaler (1981)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Murphy et al. (2001)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation§ Abstract
Estle et al. (2003) found that probabilistic monetary outcomes showed the opposite pattern from that observed with delayed outcomes.
“It is interesting, then, that Estle et al. (2003) found that probabilistic monetary outcomes showed the opposite pattern from that observed with delayed outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Estle et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
An exponential discounting function does not, by itself, predict preference reversals.
“One of the common criticisms of Equation 1 is that it does not, by itself, predict preference reversals.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
Equation 1 does predict preference reversals if the discounting rate for a larger amount is assumed to be lower than the discounting rate for a smaller amount.
“As Green and Myerson (1993) noted, however, Equation 1 does predict preference reversals if the discounting rate for a larger amount is assumed to be lower than the discounting rate for a smaller amount.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green and Myerson (1993)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
The assumption of direct proportionality between value and rate of reward is probably too simple.
“The assumption of direct proportionality between value and rate of reward, however, is probably too simple.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Stevens (1957) demonstrated that for a variety of stimulus dimensions, the relationship between perceived magnitude and physical magnitude can be described by a power function.
“Stevens (1957) demonstrated that for a variety of stimulus dimensions, the relationship between the perceived magnitude of a stimulus and the physical magnitude of the stimulus can be described by a power function.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Stevens (1957)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
If one assumes that value is directly proportional to rate of reward, then discounting will have the form of Equation 2.
“As Myerson and Green (1995) showed, if one assumes that value is directly proportional to rate of reward (Rachlin, 1971), then discounting will have the form of Equation 2.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Myerson and Green (1995)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Rachlin, 1971
Not checked in the free run.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Value is directly proportional to rate of reward.
- Interpretationnone given§ Abstract
A variety of recent findings are inconsistent with a single-process account of temporal and probability discounting.
“although the same form of hyperbola-like function describes discounting of both delayed and probabilistic outcomes, a variety of recent findings are inconsistent with a single-process account.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
These findings demonstrate that the hyperbola-like discounting function (Equation 3) is extremely general in that it describes temporal discounting in individuals from childhood to old age.
“These findings demonstrate that the hyperbola-like discounting function (Equation 3) is extremely general in that it describes temporal discounting in individuals from childhood to old age.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Power functions have been shown repeatedly to provide a good description of the relation between perceived and physical magnitudes.
“Power functions have been shown repeatedly to provide a good description of the relation between perceived and physical magnitudes, although there may be systematic deviations with small stimulus magnitudes, and in some cases, the parameters of the power function may depend on how the physical magnitude is measured (Luce & Krumhansl, 1988).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Luce & Krumhansl, 1988
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data§ Abstract
In terms of both the ability to capture accurately the pattern of the relation between subjective value and delay and the amount of variance accounted for at both group and individual levels, the hyperbola-like discounting model provides a better description than both exponential and simple hyperbola models.
“Thus, in terms of both the ability of the model to capture accurately the pattern of the relation between subjective value and delay as well as the amount of variance accounted for both at the group level and at the individual level, the hyperbola-like discounting model provides a better description than both exponential and simple hyperbola models.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Until Johnson and Bickel (2002), no experiment directly compared the temporal discounting of real and hypothetical rewards using an experimental design in which the same individuals were studied in both real and hypothetical reward conditions.
“Until a recent study by Johnson and Bickel (2002), however, no experiment directly compared the temporal discounting of real and hypothetical rewards using an experimental design in which the same individuals were studied in both real and hypothetical reward conditions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Johnson and Bickel (2002)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
Despite similarity in the mathematical form of the temporal and probability discounting functions, the finding that amount of reward differentially affects their parameters suggests that separate processes may underlie the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards.
“Thus, despite the similarity in the mathematical form of the temporal and probability discounting functions, the finding that amount of reward differentially affects the parameters of these functions suggests that separate processes may underlie the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
The range of delays examined in laboratory experiments seems appropriate for the study of temporal discounting.
“Thus, the range of delays that have been examined in laboratory experiments seems appropriate for the study of temporal discounting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
In Green et al.'s Experiment 2, 77% of the 30 participants had estimated values of s less than 1.0.
“This finding was replicated in Green et al.’s (1999a) Experiment 2, in which 77% of the 30 participants had estimated values of s less than 1.0.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al. (1999a)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
There is now a substantial body of evidence that smaller delayed rewards are discounted more steeply than larger delayed rewards.
“There is now a substantial body of evidence, however, that smaller delayed rewards are discounted more steeply than larger delayed rewards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premiseown data§ Abstract
The subjective value of the hypothetical $500 reward deviates systematically from its expected value.
“As may be seen in Figure 11, the subjective value of the hypothetical $500 reward deviates systematically from its expected value (i.e., the product of probability and amount, indicated by the dashed curve).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning§ Abstract
Preference reversals involving probabilistic rewards represent a violation of the independence axiom of expected utility theory.
“Such preference reversals represent a violation of the independence axiom of expected utility theory.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
Taken together, these results suggest that Equation 3 provides a fairly general description of the decrease in subjective value with increases in delay.
“Taken together, these results suggest that Equation 3 provides a fairly general description of the decrease in subjective value with increases in delay.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Recently evidence has been accumulating that despite similarity in the mathematical form of the discounting functions, a number of variables have different effects on temporal and probability discounting.
“Recently, however, evidence has been accumulating that despite the similarity in the mathematical form of the discounting functions, a number of variables have different effects on temporal and probability discounting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data§ Abstract
The same form of function that describes discounting with hypothetical rewards also describes discounting with real rewards.
“Thus, the same form of function that describes discounting with hypothetical rewards also describes discounting with real rewards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning§ Abstract
Individuals often make decisions about very delayed events in the world outside the laboratory.
“Clearly, however, individuals often do make decisions about very delayed events in the world outside the laboratory.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
The two studies of animals to examine the effect of amount on discounting curves both reported the absence of a magnitude effect.
“In contrast to the general consensus regarding the effect of amount on human temporal discounting, the two studies of animals to examine the effect of amount on discounting curves both reported the absence of a magnitude effect”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Green, Myerson, Holt, Slevin, & Estle, 2004
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Richards, Mitchell, de Wit, & Seiden, 1997
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
In Green et al. (1999a) Experiment 1, the hyperbola-like function (Equation 5) fit the data better than the hyperbola (Equation 4).
“As may be seen, the hyperbola-like function (Equation 5; solid curve) fit the data better than the hyperbola (Equation 4; dashed-dotted curve).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al. (1999a)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
The opposite effects of amount on temporal and probability discounting pose problems for approaches that decompose the discounting function into value and weighting functions and localize the effect of amount in the value function.
“The opposite effects of amount on temporal and probability discounting pose problems for approaches that decompose the discounting function into value and weighting functions and then localize, either explicitly or implicitly, the effect of amount in the value function.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The same value function applies in both temporal and probability discounting.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
When different procedures and analytical techniques are used, apparent differences between temporal and probability discounting could be due to procedural and analytic approaches rather than true differences in underlying processes.
“When different procedures and analytical techniques are used, as is typically the case, any apparent differences observed between temporal and probability discounting could be due to the procedural and analytic approaches rather than to true differences in the underlying processes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
At present the data support the idea that the discounting of real and hypothetical rewards is at least qualitatively similar.
“Thus, at present the data support the idea that the discounting of real and hypothetical rewards is at least qualitatively similar”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Frederick et al., 2002
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
The rate of discounting hypothetical monetary rewards discriminates substance abusers from non-substance abusers.
“a number of recent studies have demonstrated that the rate of discounting hypothetical monetary rewards discriminates substance abusers from non-substance abusers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data§ Abstract
The systematic changes in the parameters with age suggest that across this age range, differences in temporal discounting are primarily quantitative in nature and do not reflect qualitative changes of the sort that might reflect developmental stages.
“these systematic (and meaningful) changes in the parameters with age suggest that across this age range, differences in temporal discounting are primarily quantitative in nature and do not reflect qualitative changes of the sort that might reflect developmental stages.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Recent studies demonstrated empirically that risk aversion, as revealed by steeper probability discounting, increases with the amounts involved, contrary to the prediction of increasing proportional sensitivity.
“Indeed, in recent studies we have demonstrated empirically that risk aversion, as revealed by steeper probability discounting, increases with the amounts involved (Du et al., 2002; Green et al., 1999a; Myerson et al., 2003), contrary to the prediction of increasing proportional sensitivity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Du et al., 2002
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Green et al., 1999a
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Myerson et al., 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisenone given§ Abstract
Prospect theory is not directly generalizable to intertemporal choice.
“Although prospect theory accounts for many important findings of choice under uncertainty (e.g., risk seeking and loss aversion), it is not directly generalizable to intertemporal choice (i.e., choice involving delayed outcomes).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisenone given§ Abstract
Recent evidence suggests that a hyperbola-like mathematical function describes the discounting of probabilistic rewards.
“Recent evidence suggests that, indeed, this is the case.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Humans discount smaller probabilistic rewards less steeply than larger probabilistic rewards.
“That is, humans discount smaller probabilistic rewards less steeply than larger probabilistic rewards (Christensen et al., 1998; Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002; Green et al., 1999a; Myerson et al., 2003).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Christensen et al., 1998
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Green et al., 1999a
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Madden et al. (2003) found no significant difference in the extent to which participants discounted real and hypothetical monetary rewards.
“there was no significant difference in the extent to which participants discounted the real and hypothetical rewards”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Madden et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Rachlin et al. (1991) showed that a hyperbola described the discounting of probabilistic rewards more accurately than an exponential function.
“Rachlin et al. (1991) showed that a hyperbola (Equation 4) described the discounting of probabilistic rewards more accurately than an exponential function.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rachlin et al. (1991)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
These results strongly suggest that the form of the probability discounting function, like the form of the temporal discounting function, is hyperbola-like.
“These results strongly suggest that the form of the probability discounting function, like the form of the temporal discounting function, is hyperbola-like (i.e., similar to a hyperbola but with the denominator raised to a power).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Green et al. (1996) found that for both lower and higher income older adult groups, their discounting data were well described by a hyperbola (Equation 2).
“Green et al. (1996) observed that for both groups, their data were well described by a hyperbola (Equation 2)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al. (1996) source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Vuchinich and Simpson (1998) found that heavy social drinkers and problem drinkers showed greater temporal discounting of hypothetical monetary rewards than light social drinkers.
“Vuchinich and Simpson (1998) studied college students and found that both heavy social drinkers (Experiment 1) and problem drinkers (Experiment 2) showed greater temporal discounting of hypothetical monetary rewards than light social drinkers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Vuchinich and Simpson (1998)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Alessi and Petry (2003) showed that within a group of pathological gamblers, SOGS scores were significantly related to discounting rate.
“Alessi and Petry (2003) have recently shown that within a group of pathological gamblers, SOGS scores were significantly related to discounting rate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Alessi and Petry (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
Green et al.'s (1996) results run counter to what would be expected on the basis of the effect of amount of reward on rate of discounting.
“yet Green et al.’s (1996) results run counter to what would be expected on the basis of the effect of amount of reward on rate of discounting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al. (1996) source
Not checked in the free run.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The same nominal amount of money would be worth more to a low-income individual than to a high-income individual.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Among heroin addicts, those who discounted money more steeply tended to discount heroin rewards more steeply.
“Moreover, those addicts who discounted money more steeply tended to discount heroin rewards more steeply.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Madden et al. (1997)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
In Ostaszewski's studies, there were no differences in rates of temporal discounting between high and low sensation seekers.
“There were no differences, however, in rates of temporal discounting between the high and low sensation seekers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ostaszewski (1996, 1997)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Madden et al. (1997) found greater discounting of hypothetical monetary rewards by opioid-dependent patients than by non-drug-using controls.
“Madden et al. (1997) studied opioid-dependent patients and found greater discounting of hypothetical monetary rewards by the substance abusers than by non-drug-using controls.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Madden et al. (1997)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
Green et al.'s (1996) results suggest that low-income individuals discount a given amount more steeply than high-income individuals, even when education is equivalent.
“Yet Green et al.’s (1996) results suggest that the opposite is the case, even when the level of education is equivalent in both groups.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al. (1996) source
Not checked in the free run.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The same nominal amount of money would be worth more to a low-income individual than to a high-income individual.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Bickel et al. (1999) reported that discounting rates of ex-smokers did not differ significantly from those who had never smoked.
“they also reported that the discounting rates of ex-smokers did not differ significantly from those who had never smoked.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bickel et al. (1999)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Kirby, Petry, and Bickel (1999) replicated the finding of greater discounting of delayed monetary rewards by substance abusers than controls using rewards participants had a chance of actually receiving.
“Kirby, Petry, and Bickel (1999) replicated this finding using delayed monetary rewards that participants had a chance of actually receiving.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kirby, Petry, and Bickel (1999)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Among upper income adults, no age difference in discounting was observed between a younger group (mean age 33 years) and older groups (mean age 71 years).
“A younger group (mean age = 33 years) of upper income adults was also tested, and no age difference was observed between the two upper income groups.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al. (1996) source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Kollins (2003) found that the age at which college students report having first smoked a cigarette is negatively correlated with the rate at which they discount delayed hypothetical monetary rewards.
“Kollins (2003) found that the age at which college students report having first smoked a cigarette is negatively correlated with the rate at which they discount delayed hypothetical monetary rewards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kollins (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
In adults, income comes to play a larger role than age in discounting.
“suggests that in adults, income comes to play a larger role than age in discounting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
In Ostaszewski's studies, extravert and high impulsive groups showed steeper discounting of hypothetical delayed rewards than introvert and low impulsive groups.
“In both studies, the extravert and high impulsive groups showed steeper discounting of hypothetical delayed rewards than did the introvert and low impulsive groups.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ostaszewski (1996, 1997)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
The relative stability of discounting in adults between ages 30 and 70 parallels previous findings of stability of personality traits over this age range.
“The relative stability of discounting in adults between the ages of 30 and 70 parallels previous findings of the stability of personality traits over this age range (Costa & McCrea, 1989 )”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Costa & McCrea, 1989
Not checked in the free run.
- Premiseown data§ Abstract
All three groups showed opposite effects of amount on the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards.
“In addition, all three groups showed opposite effects of amount on the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Du et al., 2002
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Ostaszewski (1997) found that high sensation seekers showed less steep probability discounting (less risk averse) than low sensation seekers.
“whereas high sensation seekers showed less steep discounting (i.e., they were less risk averse) than low sensation seekers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ostaszewski (1997) source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
Taken together, these findings suggest that despite cultural differences in discounting rates, there are significant commonalities among different cultures with respect to the processes underlying evaluation of delayed and probabilistic rewards.
“Taken together, these findings suggest that, despite the cultural differences in discounting rates, there are significant commonalities among the different cultures with respect to the processes underlying evaluation of delayed and probabilistic rewards (Du et al., 2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Du et al., 2002
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, and Brady (2003) reported that individuals dependent on crack/cocaine discounted delayed cocaine rewards more steeply than they discounted hypothetical monetary rewards.
“Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, and Brady (2003) reported that individuals dependent on crack/cocaine discounted delayed cocaine rewards more steeply than they discounted hypothetical monetary rewards.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, and Brady (2003) source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
One implication of Logue and Anderson's findings is that experience teaches educational administrators not to trust promises of future funds.
“One implication of these findings is that experience teaches educational administrators (among others) not to trust promises of future funds.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
These results pose problems for single-process theories of discounting.
“These results, like those discussed in the previous section, pose problems for single-process theories of discounting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
A more general implication is that the discounting behavior characteristic of a particular group may reflect what one learns as a member of that group about real-world contingencies.
“Another, more general implication is that the discounting behavior characteristic of a particular group may reflect what one learns as a member of that group about real-world contingencies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Lower income older adults discounted delayed rewards much more steeply than higher income older adults.
“the lower income older adults discounted delayed rewards much more steeply than the higher income older groups.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al. (1996) source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Logue and Anderson (2001) found that individuals with administrative experience were more likely to report considering long-term consequences when describing their decision making in hypothetical scenarios.
“Those with administrative experience were more likely to report considering long-term consequences when describing their decision making in hypothetical scenarios.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Logue and Anderson (2001)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
Studies of substance abusers are consistent in reporting that such individuals discount delayed monetary rewards more steeply than do controls.
“Studies of substance abusers are consistent in reporting that such individuals discount delayed monetary rewards more steeply than do controls.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Research measuring performance on discounting tasks has found that cigarette smokers tend to discount delayed rewards more steeply than nonsmokers.
“research measuring performance on discounting tasks has found that cigarette smokers tend to discount delayed rewards more steeply than nonsmokers”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Baker et al,, 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Bickel et al., 1999
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Mitchell, 1999
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Logue and Anderson (2001) found that experienced administrators discounted the value of future budgetary amounts significantly more steeply than those without experience.
“Yet, these same experienced administrators discounted the value of future budgetary amounts significantly more steeply than those without experience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Logue and Anderson (2001)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Odum, Madden, Badger, and Bickel (2000) reported that people addicted to heroin discounted delayed heroin more steeply than delayed money.
“Odum, Madden, Badger, and Bickel (2000) also reported that people addicted to heroin discounted delayed heroin more steeply than delayed money”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Odum, Madden, Badger, and Bickel (2000)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
Holt et al. (2003) found that gamblers did not discount delayed rewards more steeply than nongamblers, as would be expected if impulsivity were a general trait that includes both an inability to delay gratification and a tendency to take risks.
“It is important to note that gamblers did not discount delayed rewards more steeply than nongamblers, as would be expected if impulsivity were a general trait that includes both an inability to delay gratification and a tendency to take risks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Holt et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Reynolds et al. (2004) failed to find significant correlations between personality tests of impulsivity and sensation seeking and probability and temporal discounting measures (logarithms of k and h) in smokers and nonsmokers.
“Reynolds et al. (2004) tested smokers and nonsmokers and failed to find significant correlations between personality tests of impulsivity (Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985) and sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 1971), on the one hand, and probability and temporal discounting measures (again, logarithms of k and h) on the other hand.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Reynolds et al. (2004)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Zuckerman, 1971
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisenone given§ Abstract
Different psychometric measures were used in the various studies, making comparisons difficult.
“In addition, different psychometric measures were used in the various studies (although there was some overlap), making comparisons difficult.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
These findings suggest that separate traits underlie the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards.
“Rather, they suggest that separate traits underlie the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Weak to moderate positive correlations between temporal and probability discounting have been reported by Myerson et al. (2003), Mitchell (1999), Richards et al. (1999), and Reynolds et al. (2004).
“Weak to moderate (but not necessarily significant) positive correlations between temporal and probability discounting have been reported not only by Myerson et al. (2003) but also by Mitchell (1999), Richards et al. (1999), and Reynolds et al. (2004).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Myerson et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Mitchell (1999)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Richards et al. (1999)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Myerson et al. (2003) found positive correlations between area-under-the-curve measures of temporal and probability discounting in two large samples (both Ns > 100).
“The correlations between the two types of discounting were positive in two large samples (both Ns > 100).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Myerson et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Murphy et al. (2001) found that the hyperbolic discounting function (Equation 2) described the discounting of delayed losses better than the exponential (Equation 1) at both the group and individual levels.
“they found that the hyperbolic discounting function (Equation 2) described the discounting of delayed losses better than the exponential (Equation 1) at both the group and individual levels.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Murphy et al. (2001)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
More than three fourths of participants in Murphy et al. (2001) showed steeper discounting of delayed rewards than of delayed costs.
“More than three fourths of the participants showed steeper discounting of delayed rewards than of delayed costs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Murphy et al. (2001)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Madden et al. (1997) found that participants with drug addictions scored higher than matched controls on the Impulsivity subscale of the EPQ.
“Madden et al. (1997) assessed participants using the Impulsivity subscale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978) and found that participants with drug addictions scored higher than matched controls.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Madden et al. (1997)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Petry (2001a) found that nonalcoholics discounted both hypothetical money and alcohol less steeply than alcoholics.
“She found that although nonalcoholics discounted both hypothetical money and alcohol less steeply than alcoholics”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petry (2001a)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Vuchinich and Simpson (1998) found only weak and sometimes inconsistent correlations between psychometric measures and k-parameter values in two experiments comparing groups that differed in alcohol consumption.
“In two experiments comparing groups that differed in their alcohol consumption, Vuchinich and Simpson (1998) found only weak and sometimes inconsistent correlations between psychometric measures and k-parameter values.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Vuchinich and Simpson (1998)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Giordano et al. (2002) found that mild opiate deprivation increased the degree to which opioid-dependent individuals discounted both types of reward.
“and also found that mild opiate deprivation increased the degree to which they discounted both types of reward.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Giordano et al. (2002)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
Those who tend to show less self-control may, as a result, engage in behavior involving rewards that, by their nature, tend to undermine self-control, thereby exacerbating the problem.
“those who tend to show less self-control may, as a result, engage in behavior involving rewards that, by their nature, tend to undermine self-control, thereby exacerbating the problem.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Mitchell (1999) found that the proportion of significant correlations between these personality measures and logarithms of k and h was close to that expected by chance.
“However, the proportion of significant correlations between these measures and the logarithms of k (for hypothetical delayed rewards) and h (for hypothetical probabilistic rewards) was close to that which would be expected by chance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mitchell (1999)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data§ Abstract
The association between immediacy and certainty is the opposite of what might be expected if both types of discounting reflected an underlying trait of impulsivity.
“An important thing to note is that the association between immediacy and certainty is the opposite of what might be expected if both types of discounting reflected an underlying trait of impulsivity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
There was a tendency for individuals who placed a greater value on immediacy of reward to place a greater value on certainty of reward.
“Thus, there was a tendency for individuals who placed a greater value on immediacy of reward to place a greater value on certainty (i.e., probability) of reward.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Individuals who discounted delayed rewards steeply tended to discount probabilistic rewards steeply.
“Individuals who discounted the delayed rewards steeply tended to discount the probabilistic rewards steeply.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Myerson et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
The hyperbolic function provided much poorer fits to Murphy et al.'s (2001) losses data than to their gains data (mean individual R2s = .359 vs. .718; group median R2s = .584 and .874).
“the hyperbolic function provided much poorer fits to Murphy et al. ’s (2001) losses data than to their gains data (mean individual R2s = .359 vs. .718, respectively, and for fits to group median data, R2s = .584 and .874, respectively).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Murphy et al. ’s (2001)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Holt et al. (2003) found that hyperbola-like functions provided equally good descriptions of discounting in gambling and nongambling college students.
“Hyperbola-like functions provided equally good descriptions of discounting in both groups.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Holt et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Myerson et al. (2003) reanalyzed data from Green et al.'s (1999a) Experiment 1 and obtained a positive correlation between temporal and probability discounting.
“Myerson et al. (2003) reanalyzed data from Green et al.’s (1999a) Experiment 1, in which 68 participants performed both temporal and probability discounting tasks, and again they obtained a positive correlation between the two types of discounting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Myerson et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Green et al.’s (1999a)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
In participants with addictions, the correlation between impulsivity and the k parameter for heroin rewards was .40.
“In participants with addictions, moreover, the correlation between impulsivity and the k parameter for heroin rewards was .40.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Madden et al. (1997)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Giordano et al. (2002) replicated the finding that hypothetical heroin rewards were discounted more steeply than money by opioid-dependent individuals.
“Giordano et al. (2002) replicated the finding that hypothetical heroin rewards were discounted more steeply than money by opioid-dependent individuals”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Giordano et al. (2002)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Petry (2002) observed a significant correlation between scores on the EPQ Impulsivity scale and discounting rates in substance abusers.
“Petry (2002) also observed a significant correlation between scores on the EPQ Impulsivity scale and discounting rates in substance abusers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petry (2002)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
Kirby et al. (1999) obtained weak but significant positive correlations between the logarithm of k and measures of impulsivity from the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale and the Impulsiveness and Adventuresomeness subscales of the 1-5 Questionnaire.
“Kirby et al. (1999) obtained weak but significant positive correlations between the logarithm of k and measures of impulsivity from the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Barratt, 1985) and the Impulsiveness and Adventuresomeness subscales of the 1–5 Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Kirby et al. (1999)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Barratt, 1985
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
Taken together, these findings are inconsistent with a conception of impulsivity that links an inability to delay gratification with a tendency to gamble and take risks.
“Taken together, these findings are inconsistent with a conception of impulsivity that links an inability to delay gratification with a tendency to gamble and take risks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
The key distinction may be between immediately consumable and nonconsumable rewards rather than between rewards that have the potential for abuse and those that do not.
“Thus, the key distinction may be between immediately consumable and nonconsumable rewards rather than between rewards that have the potential for abuse and those that do not”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Petry (2001a) reported that alcoholics discounted hypothetical monetary rewards less steeply than hypothetical alcohol rewards of equivalent monetary value.
“Petry (2001a) reported that alcoholics discounted hypothetical monetary rewards (e.g., $100) less steeply than hypothetical alcohol rewards of equivalent monetary value (e.g., 15 bottles of an alcoholic beverage).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petry (2001a)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
These results are consistent with the idea that substances that potentially may be abused are inherently subject to steeper discounting.
“These results are consistent with the idea that substances that potentially may be abused are inherently subject to steeper discounting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
The finding that Equation 3 provided the best fit to the discounting of delayed drug rewards extends the generality of the hyperbola-like discounting function to different groups and to kinds of rewards quite different from those considered previously.
“The finding that Equation 3 provided the best fit to the discounting of delayed drug rewards extends the generality of the hyperbola-like discounting function not only to different groups but also to kinds of rewards quite different from those considered previously.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Conclusion
With respect to human decision making, one cannot assume that the whole will turn out to be what would be expected on the basis of the sum of its parts.
“The broad implication of these anomalies is that with respect to human decision making, one cannot assume that the whole will turn out to be what would be expected on the basis of the sum of its parts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Conclusion
Recent results fail to support a single impulsivity trait associated with both an inability to delay gratification and a tendency to gamble and take risks.
“That is, recent results fail to support a single impulsivity trait associated with both an inability to delay gratification and a tendency to gamble and take risks (Holt et al., 2003; Myerson et al., 2003), thus indicating a need for researchers to examine the roles of both temporal and probability discounting as predictors of problem behaviors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Holt et al., 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Myerson et al., 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Conclusion
The observed relations between amount and exponent are not consistent with the theoretical framework proposed by Prelec and Loewenstein (1991).
“The observed relations between amount and exponent also are not consistent with the theoretical framework proposed by Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) because, as noted earlier, their mathematical approach leads necessarily to the prediction that whatever pattern is observed in one domain will also be observed in the other domain.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Prelec and Loewenstein (1991)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
This interaction between the sign (gain vs. loss) and magnitude of the delayed outcome was observed with both hypothetical monetary and hypothetical cigarette outcomes.
“This interaction between the sign (gain vs. loss) and magnitude of the delayed outcome was observed with both hypothetical monetary and hypothetical cigarette outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Baker et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract
The results for probabilistic outcomes are generally consistent with prospect theory.
“The results for probabilistic outcomes are generally consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Kahneman & Tversky, 1979
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Tversky & Kahneman, 1981
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Abstract
The few studies that focused on negative and positive outcomes in isolation suggest that negative outcomes are discounted less steeply than positive outcomes.
“After all, the few studies that focused on negative and positive outcomes in isolation (e.g., that compared choice between immediate and delayed losses with immediate and delayed gains; Estle et al., 2003; Murphy et al., 2001; Thaler, 1981) suggest that negative outcomes are discounted less steeply than positive outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Estle et al., 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Murphy et al., 2001
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Thaler, 1981
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Conclusion
The form of the discounting function may explain two findings that represent anomalies from the perspective of microeconomic decision theory.
“The form of the discounting function may explain two findings that represent anomalies from the perspective of microeconomic decision theory.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
This pattern is the opposite of that obtained with delayed outcomes, where statistically equivalent discounting of gains and losses was observed with large amounts and a gain-loss asymmetry was observed when the amounts were small.
“It is important to note that this pattern is the opposite of that obtained with delayed outcomes, where statistically equivalent discounting of gains and losses was observed with large amounts and a gain-loss asymmetry was observed when the amounts were small.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Abstract
Prospect theory would predict that a probabilistic gain would be discounted more steeply than a loss of the same amount because the value function is steeper for losses than for gains.
“prospect theory would predict that a probabilistic gain would be discounted more steeply than a loss of the same amount because the value function is steeper for losses than for gains.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Kahneman & Tversky, 1979
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Tversky & Kahneman, 1981
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationnone given§ Conclusion
The discounting of both delayed and probabilistic rewards is well described by the same form of mathematical function (a hyperbola or a hyperbola-like function).
“We have reviewed the results of numerous studies in order to show that the discounting of both delayed and probabilistic rewards is well described by the same form of mathematical function (a hyperbola or a hyperbola-like function).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Conclusion
There is now good reason to consider probability discounting as a predictor as well.
“Although previous research has focused almost exclusively on group differences in temporal discounting, there is now good reason to consider probability discounting as a predictor as well.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Abstract
The prediction that gain-loss asymmetry increases with amount in both domains is inconsistent with Estle et al.'s (2003) finding.
“However, this prediction is inconsistent with Estle et al. ’s (2003) finding that the difference between discounting rates for gains and losses depends on the amounts involved and does so in opposite ways for the two types of discounting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Estle et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Conclusion
Recent studies have revealed differences between temporal and probability discounting that raise questions as to the validity of a single-process account.
“Recent studies, however, have revealed differences between temporal and probability discounting that raise questions as to the validity of a single-process account.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Inflation appears to affect how steeply delayed rewards are discounted but does not affect the discounting of probabilistic rewards.
- Rests on an assumption: Amount of reward has opposite effects on the rates of temporal and probability discounting.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Conclusion
The observed pattern of results highlights the problems with theoretical approaches that view temporal and probability discounting as reflecting the same underlying process.
“Rather, the observed pattern of results once again highlights the problems with theoretical approaches that view temporal and probability discounting as reflecting the same underlying process.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Conclusion
According to a psychophysical scaling interpretation like that proposed by Myerson and Green, the degree of nonlinearity is a fundamental property of the variable (i.e., delay and probability) being scaled.
“According to a psychophysical scaling interpretation like that proposed by Myerson and Green, the degree of nonlinearity is a fundamental property of the variable (i.e., delay and probability) being scaled (Stevens, 1957).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Stevens, 1957
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ Conclusion
The study of discounting (and the field of behavioral economics more generally) is rife with anomalies.
“Although it is possible that behavior in situations with such combined outcomes may be explained simply in terms of what is known about the constituents, the study of discounting (and the field of behavioral economics more generally) is rife with anomalies (e.g., Loewenstein & Thaler, 1989; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; Thaler, 1991).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Loewenstein & Thaler, 1989
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Thaler, 1991
Not checked in the free run.
- May combine two claims. 68
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 28
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ AbstractEquation 3 provided significantly better fits to individual discounting data from a majority of children (12-year-olds) as well as to individual data from a substantial proportion of older adults.
“In addition, Green, Myerson, and Ostaszewski (1999b) showed that Equation 3 provided significantly better fits to individual discounting data from a majority of children (12-year-olds) as well as to individual data from a substantial proportion of older adults.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green, Myerson, and Ostaszewski (1999b)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ AbstractIn Green et al. (1981), pigeons offered a choice further in advance of the outcome period strongly preferred the larger, later reward, whereas when the choice was offered shortly before the outcome period, each pigeon reversed preference and strongly preferred the smaller, sooner reward.
“when the choice was offered further in advance of the outcome period, analogous to Time 1 in Figures 1 and 2, each pigeon strongly preferred the larger, later reward. When the choice was offered shortly before the outcome period, analogous to Time 2, each pigeon showed a reversal in preference, now strongly preferring the smaller, sooner reward.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al. (1981)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ AbstractIn Figure 6, the hyperbola (Equation 2) provided a much better fit than the exponential, although it also tended to systematically overpredict subjective values at briefer delays and underpredict subjective values at longer delays.
“The hyperbola (Equation 2; dashed-and-dotted curve) provided a much better fit, although it, too, tended to systematically overpredict the subjective values at briefer delays and underpredict the subjective values at longer delays.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ AbstractWith age, there was a developmental decrease in how steeply delayed rewards were discounted, as indicated by decreases in the value of the k parameter, as well as a systematic increase in the value of the s parameter.
“With age, there was a developmental decrease in how steeply delayed rewards were discounted, as indicated by decreases in the value of the k parameter with age, as well as a systematic increase in the value of the s parameter with age, suggesting developmental changes in the way that time and amount are scaled.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al. (1999b)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ AbstractBoth the exponential and simple hyperbola systematically overpredict subjective values at briefer delays and underpredict subjective values at longer delays, whereas the fits of Equation 3 reveal no such systematic bias.
“In this regard, it should be noted that both the exponential and simple hyperbola systematically overpredict subjective values at briefer delays and underpredict subjective values at longer delays. In contrast, the fits of Equation 3 reveal no such systematic bias (see Figure 6 for an example).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data§ AbstractIn Figure 6, the exponential (Equation 1) provided the poorest fit, systematically overpredicting subjective values at briefer delays and underpredicting subjective values at longer delays.
“As may be seen, the exponential (Equation 1; dashed curve) provided the poorest fit, systematically overpredicting the subjective values at briefer delays and under-predicting the subjective values at longer delays.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data§ AbstractIn Figure 6, the exponential accounts for 81.5% of the variance, whereas the hyperbola accounts for 93.7%.
“In Figure 6, for example, the exponential (Equation 1) accounts for 81.5% of the variance, whereas the hyperbola (Equation 2) accounts for 93.7% (for another particularly striking example, see Rachlin et al., 1991, Figure 7).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingnone given§ AbstractThe results of studies with both humans and nonhuman animals clearly violate the stationarity assumption and are consistent with the discounting account.
“The results of studies with both humans and nonhuman animals clearly violate the stationarity assumption and are consistent with the discounting account.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The subjective value of a reward is increasingly discounted from its nominal amount as the delay until or the odds against receiving the reward increase, and individuals choose the reward with the higher discounted subjective value.
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ AbstractIn the two studies to compare fits of the three discounting functions to individual data, the hyperbola-like discounting function provided statistically adequate fits to the data from all participants, whereas both the exponential and the hyperbola failed to describe some of the individual data.
“In the two studies to compare fits of the three discounting functions to individual data, the hyperbola-like discounting function provided statistically adequate fits to the data from all the participants, whereas both the exponential and the hyperbola failed to describe some of the individual data (Myerson & Green, 1995; Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Myerson & Green, 1995
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ AbstractThe 2 participants who were tested with the real rewards first showed very little discounting of either real or hypothetical rewards, suggesting the possibility of an order effect, although the sample size was too small to evaluate this statistically.
“The 2 participants who were tested with the real rewards first, however, showed very little discounting of either real or hypothetical rewards, suggesting the possibility of an order effect (although the sample size was too small to evaluate this statistically).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Johnson and Bickel (2002)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ AbstractFor the 4 participants who were tested with hypothetical rewards before real rewards, a hyperbolic discounting function (Equation 2) generally provided good fits, although 1 participant's data were better fit by the exponential function (Equation 1).
“For the 4 participants who were tested with hypothetical rewards before real rewards, a hyperbolic discounting function (Equation 2) generally provided good fits (although 1 participant’s data were better fit by the exponential function, Equation 1).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Johnson and Bickel (2002)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ AbstractJohnson and Bickel (2002) reported that for 5 of the 6 participants, there were no systematic differences in discount rate between the real reward and hypothetical reward conditions, although 1 participant did show reliably steeper discounting of the real rewards.
“Johnson and Bickel (2002) reported that for 5 of the 6 participants, there were no systematic differences in discount rate between the real reward and hypothetical reward conditions, although 1 participant did show reliably steeper discounting of the real rewards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Johnson and Bickel (2002)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ AbstractOur analysis of group median data for both real and hypothetical reward data revealed that the hyperbola-like discounting function accounted for more than 93% of the variance and provided a significantly better fit than a simple hyperbola.
“Our analysis of the group median data for both the real and hypothetical reward data revealed that the hyperbola-like discounting function (solid curve in Figure 9) accounted for more than 93% of the variance and provided a significantly better fit than a simple hyperbola (dashed curve).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data§ AbstractThe same form of two-parameter hyperbola-like function that describes the discounting of delayed and probabilistic gains (Equations 3 and 5) described the discounting of probabilistic losses, as well as delayed losses.
“The same form of two-parameter hyperbola-like function that describes the discounting of delayed and probabilistic gains (Equations 3 and 5) described the discounting of probabilistic losses, as well as delayed losses.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data§ AbstractWhen the authors fit Equation 3 to the Murphy et al. data, it provided excellent descriptions of both the losses (R2 = .968) and the gains (R2 = .994), significantly better than the simple hyperbola, most notably for losses.
“when we fit Equation 3 to the Murphy et al. data, it provided excellent descriptions of both the losses (R2 = .968) and the gains (R2 = .994), significantly better, in fact, than the simple hyperbola, most notably with respect to the data for losses.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data§ AbstractFor delayed heroin rewards by participants with heroin addiction, Equation 3 accounted for R2 = .866, compared with .336 for Equation 1 and .771 for Equation 2.
“In the case of the discounting of delayed heroin rewards by participants with heroin addiction, for example, the proportion of variance accounted for (R2) by the fit of Equation 3 was .866, compared with .336 and .771 for the fits of Equations 1 and 2, respectively.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ AbstractThere was a gain-loss asymmetry (probabilistic gains discounted more steeply than losses of equal amounts) when the probabilistic amounts were large, but statistically equivalent discounting of gains and losses was observed when the amounts were small.
“There was a gain-loss asymmetry (i.e., probabilistic gains were discounted more steeply than losses of equal amounts) when the probabilistic amounts were large, but statistically equivalent discounting of gains and losses was observed when the amounts were small.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductcitation§ AbstractThese results must be interpreted cautiously because of the small sample sizes and the lack of independence in the estimates of the k and s parameters.
“Although these results must be interpreted cautiously because of the small sample sizes and the lack of independence in the estimates of the k and s parameters (Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001), these systematic (and meaningful) changes in the parameters with age suggest that across this age range, differences in temporal discounting are primarily quantitative in nature and do not reflect”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ AbstractThe parameter s may represent the nonlinear scaling of amount and/or time and is generally equal to or less than 1.0.
“The parameter s may represent the nonlinear scaling of amount and/or time and is generally equal to or less than 1.0 (Myerson & Green, 1995).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Myerson & Green, 1995
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationcitation§ AbstractIf Equations 2 or 3 provide the best description, such findings are consistent with the view that choices between rewards available at different times are really choices between different rates of reward.
“Alternatively, if Equations 2 or 3 were to provide the best description, such findings would be consistent with the view that choices between rewards available at different times are really choices between different rates of reward.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ AbstractBoth Equations 2 and 3 are consistent with the view that choices between rewards available at different times are really choices between different rates of reward.
“Thus, both Equations 2 and 3 are consistent with the view that choices between rewards available at different times are really choices between different rates of reward.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ AbstractEconomists and researchers in decision analysis typically assume that temporal discounting is exponential.
“Economists and researchers in decision analysis typically assume that temporal discounting is exponential (i.e., subjective value decreases by a constant percentage per unit time).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ AbstractA major alternative proposal is that the temporal discounting function is a hyperbola.
“One major alternative proposal is that the discounting function is a hyperbola (e.g., Mazur, 1987):”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mazur, 1987
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ AbstractAccording to the discounting account, preference reversals occur because the subjective value of the larger, later reward decreases more slowly as its receipt becomes more delayed than does the subjective value of the smaller, sooner reward.
“According to the discounting account represented in Figure 1, preference reversals occur because the subjective value of the larger, later reward decreases more slowly as its receipt becomes more delayed than does the subjective value of the smaller, sooner reward.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The subjective value of a reward is increasingly discounted from its nominal amount as the delay until or the odds against receiving the reward increase, and individuals choose the reward with the higher discounted subjective value.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ AbstractIt follows mathematically that the amount of an immediate reward judged equal in value to a delayed reward is given by Ad/(1 + D/m)^(q/r), which is equivalent to Equation 3.
“It follows mathematically that the amount of an immediate reward that is judged equal in value to a delayed reward is given by the expression Ad/(1 + D/m)q/r. This is equivalent to Equation 3 with k = 1/m and s = qlr (Myerson & Green, 1995).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Myerson & Green, 1995
Not checked in the free run.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The perceived rate equals the perceived amount divided by the perceived delay, where the perceived magnitude of each variable (amount and delay) is a power function of the actual magnitude.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ AbstractA hyperbola-like discounting function in which the denominator of the hyperbola is raised to a power, s, has been proposed.
“A hyperbola-like discounting function in which the denominator of the hyperbola is raised to a power, s, has also been proposed (Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994):”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ AbstractThe finding that the same hyperbola-like function describes temporal discounting in all individual participants suggests that individual differences in discounting are primarily quantitative and may reflect variations on fundamentally similar choice processes.
“The finding that the same hyperbola-like function, Equation 3, describes temporal discounting in all individual participants is theoretically significant because it suggests that individual differences in discounting are primarily quantitative and may reflect variations on fundamentally similar choice processes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ AbstractRachlin et al. (1991) proposed that the value of probabilistic rewards may be described by a hyperbola discounting function of the same form as that used for delayed rewards.
“Rachlin et al. (1991) proposed that the value of probabilistic rewards may be described by a discounting function of the same form (i.e., a hyperbola) as that which they used to describe delayed rewards:”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rachlin et al. (1991)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ AbstractThus, a hyperbola-like discounting function describes the discounting of different commodities as well as discounting of monetary rewards by different age groups.
“Thus, a hyperbola-like discounting function describes the discounting of different commodities as well as discounting of monetary rewards by different age groups.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ AbstractThis finding is predicted by prospect theory and by the hyperbola-like form of the probability discounting function when the exponent is less than 1.0.
“This finding, which is predicted by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), is also predicted by the hyperbola-like form of the probability discounting function when the exponent is less than 1.0.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kahneman & Tversky, 1979
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractMyerson et al. (2003) found that amount of reward had no significant effect on the exponent of the temporal discounting function in either of two relatively large samples, but the exponent of the probability discounting function increased significantly with amount in both samples.
“Amount of reward had no significant effect on the exponent of the temporal discounting function in either of two relatively large samples (both Ns > 100). In contrast, the exponent of the probability discounting function increased significantly with the amount of reward in both samples.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Myerson et al., 2003
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractOstaszewski et al. (1998) showed that including an exponent in the discounting function significantly improved the fit, with Equation 5 accounting for significantly more variance than Equation 4.
“Ostaszewski et al. (1998) evaluated Equations 4 and 5, and they showed that including an exponent in the discounting function significantly improved the fit (i.e., Equation 5 accounted for significantly more of the variance than Equation 4).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ostaszewski et al. (1998)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ AbstractOstaszewski et al. (1998) suggested that the discounting of probabilistic rewards may be better described by a hyperbola-like form analogous to Equation 3.
“Alternatively, Ostaszewski et al. (1998) suggested that the discounting of probabilistic rewards may be better described by a hyperbola-like form analogous to that for delayed rewards (i.e., Equation 3):”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ostaszewski et al. (1998)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractWhen Equation 5 was fit to individual data from the 68 participants in Experiment 1, the estimated value of s was less than 1.0 in 87% of cases, significantly more than expected by chance if the exponent were 1.0.
“When Equation 5 was fit to the individual data from the 68 participants in Experiment 1, the estimated value of 5 was less than 1.0 in 87% of the cases, significantly more than would be expected by chance if the exponent were actually 1.0”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al. (1999a)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ AbstractPreference reversals with probabilistic rewards might be explained by assuming that the subjective value of the smaller, less risky reward decreases more than the subjective value of the larger, more risky reward if the probabilities of winning decrease.
“Similarly, preference reversals with probabilistic rewards might be explained by assuming that the subjective value of the smaller, less risky reward decreases more than the subjective value of the larger, more risky reward if the probabilities of winning decrease.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractBehavior is risk averse when the odds against receiving a reward are low (probability high) but not when the odds against are high (probability low).
“Second, the nature of the deviation is such that behavior is risk averse when the odds against receiving a reward are low (i.e., when the probability of reward is high) but not when the odds against are high (i.e., when the probability of reward is low).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ AbstractPreference reversals with delayed rewards occur because the subjective value of the smaller, sooner reward increases more than the subjective value of the larger, later reward as delays to both are decreased equally.
“Recall that it was argued previously that preference reversals with delayed rewards occur because the subjective value of the smaller, sooner reward increases more than the subjective value of the larger, later reward as the delays to both are decreased equally.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ AbstractThe finding that the same form of mathematical function describes both temporal and probability discounting raises the possibility, but does not prove, that they both reflect a single discounting process.
“The finding that the same form of mathematical function describes both temporal and probability discounting raises the possibility (although it does not prove) that they both reflect a single discounting process”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Green & Myerson, 1996
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Rachlin et al., 1986, 1994
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Stevenson, 1986
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractGreen et al. (1999a) showed that as amount increased from $200 to $100,000, probabilistic rewards were discounted more and more steeply, whereas for delayed rewards, the degree of discounting decreased from $200 to $10,000, with little systematic change when amount increased further.
“Green et al. (1999a) also examined discounting of three other hypothetical reward amounts and showed that as amount increased from $200 to $100,000, probabilistic rewards were discounted more and more steeply, whereas for delayed rewards, the degree of discounting decreased from $200 to $10,000, with little systematic change when amount was increased further.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al. (1999a)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ AbstractOstaszewski et al.'s findings are inconsistent with both forms of single-process accounts.
“Thus, Ostaszewski et al.’s (1998) findings are inconsistent with both forms of single-process accounts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ostaszewski et al.’s (1998)
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ AbstractReynolds et al. (2004) reported that how steeply an individual discounted delayed rewards was a significantly better predictor of whether he or she was a smoker than how steeply the individual discounted probabilistic rewards.
“Reynolds et al. (2004) reported that how steeply an individual discounted delayed rewards was a significantly better predictor of whether he or she was a smoker than how steeply the individual discounted probabilistic rewards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reynolds et al. (2004)
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ AbstractThese problems may be avoided by localizing magnitude effects not in the value function but in the weighting functions for probabilistic and delayed outcomes and by assuming that amount affects these weighting functions in different ways.
“These problems may be avoided by localizing magnitude effects, not in the value function, but rather in the weighting functions for probabilistic and delayed outcomes and by assuming that amount affects these weighting functions in different ways.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Individuals making choices involving delayed rewards are actually evaluating rates of reward.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractOstaszewski (1997) found that with hypothetical probabilistic rewards, rate of discounting did not differ between extraverts and introverts or between high and low impulsive groups.
“with hypothetical probabilistic rewards, the rate of discounting did not differ between extraverts and introverts or between high and low impulsive groups”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ostaszewski (1997)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractOstaszewski et al. (1998) showed that inflation affects temporal discounting but does not affect probability discounting.
“For example, Ostaszewski et al. (1998) showed that inflation affects temporal discounting but does not affect probability discounting.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ostaszewski et al. (1998)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ AbstractThese results suggest that temporal and probability discounting are dissociable by cultural processes, contrary to the predictions of single-process theories.
“These results suggest that temporal and probability discounting are dissociable by cultural processes, contrary to the predictions of single-process theories.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premiseown data§ AbstractDespite cultural differences, Equations 3 and 5 provided accurate descriptions of the discounting of all three groups, with median proportion of variance accounted for by fits to individual data greater than .930 on both tasks.
“It also is noteworthy that despite the cultural differences, Equations 3 and 5 provided accurate descriptions of the discounting of all three groups: For each group, the median proportion of variance accounted for by fits to individual data was greater than .930 on both tasks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Du et al., 2002
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractBickel et al. (1999) found that current cigarette smokers, who discounted delayed monetary rewards more steeply than nonsmokers, tended to discount hypothetical amounts of cigarettes even more steeply than money.
“Bickel et al. (1999) found that current cigarette smokers, who discounted delayed monetary rewards more steeply than nonsmokers, tended to discount hypothetical amounts of cigarettes even more steeply than money”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bickel et al. (1999)
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ AbstractBickel et al. (1999) found steeper discounting by current smokers than by those who had never smoked cigarettes.
“although Bickel et al. (1999) found steeper discounting by current smokers than by those who had never smoked cigarettes”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bickel et al. (1999)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ AbstractGiven that larger delayed amounts are discounted less steeply than smaller amounts, it would seem to follow that low-income individuals would discount a given amount less steeply than high-income individuals.
“Given that larger delayed amounts are discounted less steeply than smaller amounts (e.g., Green et al., 1997), it would seem to follow that low-income individuals would discount a given amount less steeply than high-income individuals.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Green et al., 1997
Not checked in the free run.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The same nominal amount of money would be worth more to a low-income individual than to a high-income individual.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractPetry (2001b) reported that individuals with a primary diagnosis of pathological gambling with a history of substance abuse discounted delayed rewards more steeply than pathological gamblers without a history of substance abuse, who in turn showed steeper discounting than controls.
“individuals with a primary diagnosis of pathological gambling with a history of substance abuse discounted delayed rewards more steeply than pathological gamblers without a history of substance abuse, who in turn, showed steeper discounting than controls (Petry, 2001b).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petry, 2001b
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractMadden et al. (1997) found that people addicted to heroin, who were more impulsive than controls with respect to monetary rewards, tended to discount hypothetical delayed amounts of heroin even more steeply than they discounted money.
“Madden et al. (1997) found that people addicted to heroin, who were more impulsive than controls with respect to monetary rewards, tended to discount hypothetical delayed amounts of heroin even more steeply than they discounted money”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Madden et al. (1997)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ AbstractPetry's (2001a) finding that currently abstinent alcoholics show rates of discounting intermediate between currently drinking alcoholics and nonalcoholic controls is consistent with the idea that discounting rates may predict success at giving up cigarettes and alcohol.
“Petry’s (2001 a) finding that currently abstinent alcoholics show rates of discounting intermediate between those of currently drinking alcoholics and nonalcoholic controls is also consistent with the idea that discounting rates may predict success at giving up cigarettes and alcohol”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petry (2001 a)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractPathological gambling is typically associated with financial problems as well as with other psychiatric disorders.
“pathological gambling is typically associated with financial problems as well as with other psychiatric disorders (e.g., Ibáñez et al., 2001 ).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ibáñez et al., 2001
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ AbstractMitchell (1999) observed no differences between smokers and nonsmokers in the discounting of probabilistic rewards.
“Interestingly, Mitchell (1999) observed no differences between smokers and nonsmokers in the discounting of probabilistic rewards”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mitchell (1999)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractIn Du et al. (2002), the Chinese discounted delayed rewards more steeply than the Japanese, but the Japanese discounted probabilistic rewards more steeply than the Chinese.
“More relevant to the question of whether a single process is involved in both, the Chinese discounted delayed rewards more steeply than the Japanese, but the Japanese discounted probabilistic rewards more steeply than the Chinese.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Du et al., 2002
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractPetry and Casarella (1999) reported that substance abusers who were also problem gamblers discounted delayed monetary rewards more steeply than those with only substance abuse problems, who in turn showed steeper temporal discounting than those with neither substance abuse nor gambling problems.
“They reported that substance abusers who were also problem gamblers discounted delayed monetary rewards more steeply than those who had only substance abuse problems, who in turn, showed steeper temporal discounting than those with neither substance abuse nor gambling problems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petry and Casarella (1999)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ AbstractReynolds et al. (2004) found that smokers discounted probabilistic rewards more steeply than nonsmokers.
“although Reynolds et al. (2004) did find that smokers discounted probabilistic rewards more steeply than nonsmokers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reynolds et al. (2004)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractHolt, Green, and Myerson (2003) reported no statistically significant differences in temporal discounting between college students categorized as gamblers and nongamblers on the SOGS, although group differences in probability discounting were observed.
“Holt, Green, and Myerson (2003), however, reported no statistically significant differences in temporal discounting between college students categorized as gamblers and nongamblers on the basis of their scores on the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & Bloom, 1987), although group differences in probability discounting were observed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Holt, Green, and Myerson (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Lesieur & Bloom, 1987
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractMadden et al. (1997) obtained significant correlations between EPQ Impulsivity scores and behavioral discounting measures: for hypothetical monetary rewards, correlations between k-parameter values and Impulsivity scores were .40 for the addiction group and .39 for the control group.
“For hypothetical monetary rewards, the correlations between k-parameter values and Impulsivity scores were .40 for the addiction group and .39 for the control group.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Madden et al. (1997)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractMurphy et al. (2001) found that gains were discounted more steeply than losses, and this difference was observed at the individual level as well as at the group level.
“Gains were discounted more steeply than losses, and this difference was observed at the individual level as well as at the group level”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Murphy et al. (2001)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ AbstractThe sample sizes in studies involving individuals addicted to heroin tended to be larger than those involving smokers and drinkers.
“the sample sizes in the studies involving individuals addicted to heroin tended to be larger than those involving smokers and drinkers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractPetry (2001a) found a significant correlation between a psychometric measure of impulsivity and k-parameter values when hypothetical delayed monetary rewards were studied but not when hypothetical delayed alcohol rewards were studied.
“Petry (2001a) found a significant correlation between a psychometric measure of impulsivity (Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, & Allsopp, 1985) and k-parameter values when hypothetical delayed monetary rewards were studied but not when hypothetical delayed alcohol rewards were studied.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Petry (2001a)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, & Allsopp, 1985
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ AbstractChapman (1996; Chapman & Elstein, 1995) reported that discount rates for delayed health and monetary outcomes are poorly correlated, providing further evidence against a unitary impulsivity construct.
“In addition, Chapman (1996 ; Chapman & Elstein, 1995) has reported that discount rates for delayed health and monetary outcomes are poorly correlated, providing further evidence against a unitary impulsivity construct.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Chapman (1996 ; Chapman & Elstein, 1995)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ AbstractHolt et al. (2003) found that gamblers discounted probabilistic rewards less steeply than nongamblers, suggesting that gamblers are impulsive in the sense that they are less affected by risk than nongamblers.
“Gamblers discounted probabilistic rewards less steeply than nongamblers, suggesting that gamblers are impulsive in the sense that they are less affected by risk than nongamblers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Holt et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ AbstractIf temporal and probability discounting both reflect impulsivity, then a negative correlation is predicted.
“If temporal and probability discounting both reflect impulsivity, then a negative correlation is predicted.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ AbstractMitchell (1999) reported that smokers were significantly more impulsive than individuals who had never smoked on 19 of 28 personality measures linked to impulsivity.
“Mitchell (1999) reported that smokers were significantly more impulsive than individuals who had never smoked on 19 of 28 personality measures that have been linked to impulsivity in the literature.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mitchell (1999)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Premisecitation§ AbstractOdum and Rainaud (2003) found that using participants who reported no problems with food, alcohol, or money, there was no difference in the rates at which hypothetical amounts of food and alcohol were discounted, although both types of reward were discounted more steeply than money.
“Odum and Rainaud found that there was no difference in the rates at which hypothetical amounts of food and alcohol were discounted, although both types of reward were discounted more steeply than money.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Odum and Rainaud (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ AbstractThe finding that alcoholics discount alcohol more steeply than money is similar to findings with heroin and cigarette smokers and provides further evidence that abused substances are discounted more steeply than money, at least by substance abusers.
“This finding is similar to that observed with participants addicted to heroin (Madden et al., 1997) and cigarette smoking participants (Bickel et al., 1999), and it provides further evidence that abused substances are discounted more steeply than money, at least by the substance abusers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Madden et al., 1997
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Bickel et al., 1999
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractHolt et al. (2003) found that both gambling and nongambling groups discounted large delayed amounts more steeply than small delayed amounts, whereas both groups discounted large probabilistic amounts less steeply than small probabilistic amounts.
“Both groups discounted large delayed amounts more steeply than small delayed amounts, whereas both groups discounted large probabilistic amounts less steeply than small probabilistic amounts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Holt et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractPetry (2001a) found that both alcoholics and nonalcoholics discounted alcohol more steeply than money.
“alcoholics and nonalcoholics both discounted alcohol more steeply than money.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petry (2001a)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ ConclusionWith probabilistic rewards, amount did not affect the value of the discount rate parameter h but was directly related to the value of the exponent.
“whereas with probabilistic rewards, amount did not affect the value of the discount rate parameter h but was directly related to the value of the exponent (Myerson et al., 2003).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Myerson et al., 2003
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ ConclusionAlthough individuals generally prefer larger to smaller, sooner to later, and certain to probabilistic rewards, these basic facts are not sufficient to predict choice when these attributes are combined.
“For example, although individuals generally prefer larger to smaller, sooner to later, and certain to probabilistic rewards, these basic facts are not sufficient to predict choice when these attributes are combined.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ ConclusionThe prediction that the exponent should not be influenced by amount was confirmed for delayed rewards, but it was not supported in the case of probabilistic rewards where larger amounts were associated with larger exponents.
“Although this prediction was confirmed for delayed rewards, it was not supported in the case of probabilistic rewards where larger amounts were associated with larger exponents (Myerson et al., 2003).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Myerson et al., 2003
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractThe difference between discounting rates for gains and losses depends on the amounts involved and does so in opposite ways for the two types of discounting.
“Estle et al. ’s (2003) finding that the difference between discounting rates for gains and losses depends on the amounts involved and does so in opposite ways for the two types of discounting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Estle et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ ConclusionThese and other dissociations are inconsistent with the claim that one type of discounting is more fundamental, and they imply that there may be at least two distinct discounting processes.
“These and other dissociations are inconsistent with the claim that one type of discounting is more fundamental, and they imply that there may be at least two distinct discounting processes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Inflation appears to affect how steeply delayed rewards are discounted but does not affect the discounting of probabilistic rewards.
- Rests on an assumption: Amount of reward has opposite effects on the rates of temporal and probability discounting.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ ConclusionIn the present case, temporal and probability discounting data were both analyzed using discounting functions of the same mathematical form, and the different patterns of results obtained strongly suggest that different processes are involved.
“In the present case, temporal and probability discounting data were both analyzed using discounting functions of the same mathematical form, and the different patterns of results obtained strongly suggest that different processes are involved.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ ConclusionThe findings provide some support for the mathematical model proposed by Myerson and Green (1995), but the model does not predict the entire pattern of results.
“These findings provide some support for the mathematical model proposed by Myerson and Green (1995), but the model does not predict the entire pattern of results.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Myerson and Green (1995)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractChapman (1996) failed to observe a sign by magnitude interaction, although magnitude and sign effects were observed for both delayed health and money outcomes.
“In contrast, Chapman (1996), in a study examining discounting of hypothetical gains and losses of health and money outcomes, failed to observe a sign by magnitude interaction, although magnitude and sign effects were observed for both delayed health and money outcomes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Chapman (1996)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AbstractBaker et al. (2003) reported that discounting of delayed gains is more affected by magnitude than is discounting of delayed losses, such that the difference between discounting rates for gains and losses was lower at higher amounts.
“Baker et al. (2003) also have reported that discounting of delayed gains is more affected by magnitude than is discounting of delayed losses, such that the difference between discounting rates for gains and losses was lower at higher amounts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Baker et al. (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ ConclusionNeither the Myerson and Green (1995) nor the Prelec and Loewenstein model can account for the pattern of results in both the delayed and probabilistic domains.
“Thus, neither the Myerson and Green (1995) nor the Prelec and Loewenstein model can account for the pattern of results in both the delayed and probabilistic domains.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Myerson and Green (1995)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Prelec and Loewenstein
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ ConclusionThe pattern of domain differences revealed by the discounting framework illustrates the value of this approach in uncovering important empirical constraints that must be taken into account by future theoretical models.
“Nevertheless, the pattern of domain differences revealed by the discounting framework illustrates the value of this approach in uncovering important empirical constraints that must be taken into account by future theoretical models.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ AbstractIf the gain-loss asymmetry increases with amount in one choice domain, then it would be predicted that the asymmetry would also increase with amount in the other domain.
“Thus, if the gain-loss asymmetry increases with amount in one choice domain (e.g., probability discounting), then it would be predicted that the asymmetry would also increase with amount in the other domain (e.g., temporal discounting).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ ConclusionThe finding that temporal and probability discounting functions have the same mathematical form suggests that there may be similarities in the underlying decision-making processes, and could even indicate that the same process is involved in the discounting of both delayed and probabilistic rewards.
“The finding that temporal and probability discounting functions have the same mathematical form suggests that there may be similarities in the underlying decision-making processes—and could even indicate that the same process is involved in the discounting of both delayed and probabilistic rewards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ ConclusionWith delayed rewards, amount was inversely related to the value of the discount rate parameter k but had no effect on the value of the exponent s.
“Recall that with delayed rewards, amount was inversely related to the value of the discount rate parameter k but had no effect on the value of the exponent s (e.g., Myerson & Green, 1995)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Myerson & Green, 1995
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ ConclusionThe exponents for temporal and probability discounting may well differ, but within each choice domain, the exponent should not be influenced by the amount of the reward.
“Therefore, the exponents for temporal and probability discounting may well differ, but within each choice domain, the exponent should not be influenced by the amount of the reward.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ ConclusionThe finding that for delayed rewards, exponents are independent of amount as well as the finding that the exponents for delayed and probabilistic rewards are different are both consistent with the view that the process of estimating the subjective value of a delayed reward involves fundamental psychophysical scaling processes and that such scaling is captured by the exponent parameter.
“That is, the finding that for delayed rewards, exponents are independent of amount as well as the finding that the exponents for delayed and probabilistic rewards are different (Myerson et al., 2003) are both consistent with the view that the process of estimating the subjective value of a delayed reward involves fundamental psychophysical scaling processes and that such scaling is captured by the”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Myerson et al., 2003
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ ConclusionSuch findings raise the possibility that differences in impulsivity may underlie these behavioral problems and that assessment based on behavioral discounting measures may be able to predict who is at risk and who is most likely to benefit from interventions.
“Such findings raise the possibility that differences in impulsivity may underlie these behavioral problems and that assessment based on behavioral discounting measures may be able to predict who is at risk and who is most likely to benefit from interventions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Groups of individuals with certain kinds of behavioral problems (e.g., substance abusers) discount delayed rewards more steeply than controls.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ AbstractBecause the value function describes the effect of amount on the value of both delayed and probabilistic outcomes, changes in amount will have similar effects on both temporal and probability discounting.
“Because the value function describes the effect of amount on the value of both delayed and probabilistic outcomes, this implies that changes in amount will have similar effects on both temporal and probability discounting.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Prospect theory locates the source of gain-loss asymmetries in the value function.
The authors state this as an assumption.
The subjective value of a reward is increasingly discounted from its nominal amount as the delay until or the odds against receiving the reward increase, and individuals choose the reward with the higher discounted subjective value.
“This perspective assumes that the subjective value of a reward is increasingly discounted from its nominal amount as the delay until or the odds against receiving the reward increase and that individuals choose the reward with the higher (discounted) subjective value (e.g., Ainslie, 1992; Green & Myerson, 1993; Kagel, Battalio, & Green, 1995; Loewenstein & Elster, 1992; Rachlin, 1989).”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Value is directly proportional to rate of reward.
“if one assumes that value is directly proportional to rate of reward (Rachlin, 1971), then discounting will have the form of Equation 2.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Even an immediate reward involves some minimal delay, m, such that t = D + m, where D is the stated or programmed delay.
“We assume first, that V = bA/t, where b is the proportionality constant and; is the actual delay, and second, that even an immediate reward involves some minimal delay, m, such that t = D + m, where D is the stated or programmed delay.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The perceived rate equals the perceived amount divided by the perceived delay, where the perceived magnitude of each variable (amount and delay) is a power function of the actual magnitude.
“Myerson and Green (1995), therefore, assumed that the perceived rate would be equal to the perceived amount divided by the perceived delay, where the perceived magnitude of each variable (amount and delay) would be a power function of the actual magnitude.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Individuals making choices involving delayed rewards are actually evaluating rates of reward.
“Because this derivation is based on the assumption that individuals making choices involving delayed rewards are actually evaluating rates of reward”
The paper relies on this without support.
The same value function applies in both temporal and probability discounting.
“Because the same value function applies in both temporal and probability discounting”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The same nominal amount of money would be worth more to a low-income individual than to a high-income individual.
“It might be assumed that the same nominal amount would be worth more to a low-income individual.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Prospect theory locates the source of gain-loss asymmetries in the value function.
“prospect theory locates the source of gain-loss asymmetries in the value function”
The paper relies on this without support.
There is no evidence as to whether negative outcomes are discounted less steeply than positive outcomes when both are present in the same choice situation.
“There is no evidence, however, as to whether negative outcomes are discounted less steeply than positive outcomes when both are present in the same choice situation.”
The paper relies on this without support.
One such anomaly is the reversal in preference that may occur when the point in time at which choices between smaller, sooner and larger, later rewards is varied.
“One such anomaly is the reversal in preference that may occur when the point in time at which choices between smaller, sooner and larger, later rewards is varied.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The other anomaly is the observation that preference may reverse when the probabilities of smaller, more certain and larger, less certain rewards are both reduced.
“The other anomaly is the observation that preference may reverse when the probabilities of smaller, more certain and larger, less certain rewards are both reduced.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Inflation appears to affect how steeply delayed rewards are discounted but does not affect the discounting of probabilistic rewards.
“For example, inflation appears to affect how steeply delayed rewards are discounted but does not affect the discounting of probabilistic rewards.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Amount of reward has opposite effects on the rates of temporal and probability discounting.
“More striking, amount of reward has opposite effects on the rates of temporal and probability discounting.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Groups of individuals with certain kinds of behavioral problems (e.g., substance abusers) discount delayed rewards more steeply than controls.
“A number of studies have shown that groups of individuals with certain kinds of behavioral problems (e.g., substance abusers) discount delayed rewards more steeply than controls.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Cross-species research shows that the value of a commodity declines according to a hyperbolic or hyperboloid discounting function.
“These decades of cross-species research reveal that the value of a commodity declines according to a hyperbolic (or hyperboloid) discounting function like the ones shown in Figure 1 (Green & Myerson, 2004; Mazur, 1987; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991).”
From Changing Delay Discounting and Impulsive Choice: Implications for Addictions, Prevention, and Human Health (2019) · cites this paper as Green & Myerson, 2004
Populations with impulse control problems consistently demonstrate higher discounting rates compared to healthy controls.
“Populations with impulse control problems consistently demonstrate higher discounting rates compared to healthy controls (see Green et al, 2004; Reynolds, 2006b for reviews)”
From DAT1 and COMT effects on delay discounting and trait impulsivity in male adolescents with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder and healthy controls (2010) · cites this paper as Green et al, 2004
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524 · see citing works
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D. J., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,700 · see citing works
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 17,604 · see citing works
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467 · see citing works
(2000) · PubMed · Cited by 13,173 · see citing works
Obesity : Preventing and managing the global epidemic
Akram, D. S., Astrup, A. V., Atinmo, T., Boissin, J.-L., Bray, G. A., Carroll, K. N., Chitson, P., Chen, C., Dietz, W. H., Hill, J. O., et al. (2000) · Research at the University of Copenhagen (University of Copenhagen) · Cited by 12,945 · see citing works
Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs.
Tsoukias, A., Keeney, R. L., & Raiffa, H. (1994) · Journal of the Operational Research Society · doi:10.2307/2584151 · Cited by 8,414 · see citing works
Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting
Laibson, D. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555253 · Cited by 6,122 · see citing works
Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., & O’Donoghue, T. (2002) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205102320161311 · Cited by 6,106 · see citing works
Decisions with Multiple Objectives
Keeney, R. L., & Raiffa, H. (1993) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174084 · Cited by 4,449 · see citing works
Allais, M. (1953) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907921 · Cited by 4,170 · see citing works
The Handbook of experimental economics
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-1645 · Cited by 3,780 · see citing works
Delay of gratification in children.
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. L. (1989) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.2658056 · Cited by 3,397 · see citing works
Stevens, S. S. (1957) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0046162 · Cited by 3,388 · see citing works
A revised version of the Psychoticism scale
Eysenck, S. B. G., Eysenck, H. J., & Barrett, P. (1985) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/0191-8869(85)90026-1 · Cited by 3,094 · see citing works
(1987) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/ajp.144.9.1184 · Cited by 2,948 · see citing works
Specious reward: A behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse control.
Ainslie, G. (1975) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0076860 · Cited by 2,708 · see citing works
Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency
Thaler, R. (1981) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(81)90067-7 · Cited by 2,394 · see citing works
Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation
Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (1992) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118482 · Cited by 2,305 · see citing works
An adjusting procedure for studying delayed reinforcement.
Mazur, J. E. (1987) · doi:10.4324/9781315825502-11 · Cited by 2,189 · see citing works
Heroin addicts have higher discount rates for delayed rewards than non-drug-using controls.
Kirby, K. N., Petry, N. M., & Bickel, W. K. (1999) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.128.1.78 · Cited by 2,171 · see citing works
Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk
Starmer, C. (2000) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.38.2.332 · Cited by 1,852 · see citing works
Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Trade-Offs
Keeney, R. L., Raiffa, H., & Rajala, D. W. (1979) · IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics · doi:10.1109/tsmc.1979.4310245 · Cited by 1,789 · see citing works
Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience
Koopmans, T. C. (1960) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907722 · Cited by 1,568 · see citing works
The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework
Camerer, C. F., Hogarth, R. M., Budescu, D. V., & Eckel, C. C. (1999) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1406-8_2 · Cited by 1,549 · see citing works
AREA UNDER THE CURVE AS A MEASURE OF DISCOUNTING
Myerson, J., Green, L., & Warusawitharana, M. (2001) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.2001.76-235 · Cited by 1,507 · see citing works
Self-citationImpulsivity and cigarette smoking: delay discounting in current, never, and ex-smokers
Bickel, W. K., Odum, A. L., & Madden, G. J. (1999) · Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1007/pl00005490 · Cited by 1,433 · see citing works
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY AND DELAY
Rachlin, H., Raineri, A., & Cross, D. (1991) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.1991.55-233 · Cited by 1,341 · see citing works
Advances in Personality Assessment
(2013) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315827612 · Cited by 1,243 · see citing works
COMMITMENT, CHOICE AND SELF‐CONTROL<sup>1</sup>
Rachlin, H., & Green, L. (1972) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.1972.17-15 · Cited by 1,204 · see citing works
Self-citationDiscounting of Delayed Rewards: A Life-Span Comparison
Green, L., Fry, A. F., & Myerson, J. (1994) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1994.tb00610.x · Cited by 1,165 · see citing works
Self-citationAge norms for impulsiveness, venturesomeness and empathy in adults
Eysenck, S. B. G., Pearson, P. R., Easting, G., & Allsopp, J. F. (1985) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/0191-8869(85)90011-x · Cited by 1,163 · see citing works
Toward a behavioral economic understanding of drug dependence: delay discounting processes
Bickel, W. K., & Marsch, L. A. (2001) · Addiction · doi:10.1046/j.1360-0443.2001.961736.x · Cited by 1,117 · see citing works
Camerer, C. (2020) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvzsmff5.12 · Cited by 1,013 · see citing works
The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation
Angeletos, G.-M., Laibson, D., Repetto, A., Tobacman, J., & Weinberg, S. (2001) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.3.47 · Cited by 1,001 · see citing works
WITHIN‐SUBJECT COMPARISON OF REAL AND HYPOTHETICAL MONEY REWARDS IN DELAY DISCOUNTING
Johnson, M. W., & Bickel, W. K. (2002) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.2002.77-129 · Cited by 991 · see citing works
Discount rates inferred from decisions: an experimental study
Benzion, U., Israel, H., Rapoport, A., & Yagil, J. (1987) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.35.3.270 · Cited by 967 · see citing works
Ainslie, G. W. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139164191 · Cited by 958 · see citing works
Impulsiveness and Venturesomeness: Their Position in a Dimensional System of Personality Description
Eysenck, S. B. G., & Eysenck, H. J. (1978) · Psychological Reports · doi:10.2466/pr0.1978.43.3f.1247 · Cited by 955 · see citing works
Shiller, R. J., & Thaler, R. H. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2329014 · Cited by 925 · see citing works
Dimensions of sensation seeking.
Zuckerman, M. (1971) · Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0030478 · Cited by 922 · see citing works
Delay-discounting probabilistic rewards: Rates decrease as amounts increase
Kirby, K. N., & Maraković, N. N. (1996) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03210748 · Cited by 916 · see citing works
Madden, G. J., Petry, N. M., Badger, G. J., & Bickel, W. K. (1997) · Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1037/1064-1297.5.3.256 · Cited by 911 · see citing works
Measures of impulsivity in cigarette smokers and non-smokers
Mitchell, S. H. (1999) · Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1007/pl00005491 · Cited by 911 · see citing works
How persuasive is a good fit? A comment on theory testing.
Roberts, S., & Pashler, H. (2000) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.107.2.358 · Cited by 879 · see citing works
The place of impulsiveness in a dimensional system of personality description
Eysenck, S. B. G., & Eysenck, H. J. (1977) · British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-8260.1977.tb01003.x · Cited by 876 · see citing works
Picoeconomics: The Strategic Interaction of Successive Motivational States within the Person
Ainslie, G. W. (1992) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 855 · see citing works
DISCOUNTING OF DELAYED REWARDS: MODELS OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICE
Myerson, J., & Green, L. (1995) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.1995.64-263 · Cited by 843 · see citing works
Self-citationResearch on self-control: An integrating framework
Logue, A. W. (1988) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00053978 · Cited by 792 · see citing works
DELAY OR PROBABILITY DISCOUNTING IN A MODEL OF IMPULSIVE BEHAVIOR: EFFECT OF ALCOHOL
Richards, J. B., Zhang, L., Mitchell, S. H., & de Wit, H. (1999) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.1999.71-121 · Cited by 792 · see citing works
The Predictive Utility of Generalized Expected Utility Theories
Harless, D. W., & Camerer, C. F. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951749 · Cited by 770 · see citing works
Petry, N. M. (2001) · Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1007/s002130000638 · Cited by 761 · see citing works
Bidding on the future: Evidence against normative discounting of delayed rewards.
Kirby, K. N. (1997) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.126.1.54 · Cited by 750 · see citing works
Delay discounting of real and hypothetical rewards.
Madden, G. J., Begotka, A. M., Raiff, B. R., & Kastern, L. L. (2003) · Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1037/1064-1297.11.2.139 · Cited by 660 · see citing works
Impulsivity and rapid discounting of delayed hypothetical rewards in cocaine-dependent individuals.
Coffey, S., Gudleski, G., Saladin, M., & Brady, K. (2003) · Experimental and clinical psychopharmacology · doi:10.1037//1064-1297.11.1.18 · Cited by 655 · see citing works
Impulsivity and rapid discounting of delayed hypothetical rewards in cocaine-dependent individuals.
Coffey, S. F., Gudleski, G. D., Saladin, M. E., & Brady, K. T. (2003) · Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1037/1064-1297.11.1.18 · Cited by 625 · see citing works
Hyperbolic temporal discounting in social drinkers and problem drinkers.
Vuchinich, R. E., & Simpson, C. A. (1998) · Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1037/1064-1297.6.3.292 · Cited by 624 · see citing works
Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice
Loewenstein, G., & Thaler, R. H. (1989) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.3.4.181 · Cited by 622 · see citing works
Decision Making Over Time and Under Uncertainty: A Common Approach
Prelec, D., & Loewenstein, G. F. (1991) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.37.7.770 · Cited by 611 · see citing works
Loewenstein, G. F., & Elster, J. (1992) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 603 · see citing works
Baker, F., Johnson, M. W., & Bickel, W. K. (2003) · Journal of Abnormal Psychology · doi:10.1037/0021-843x.112.3.382 · Cited by 602 · see citing works
Preference Reversals Due to Myopic Discounting of Delayed Reward
Kirby, K. N., & Herrnstein, R. J. (1995) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1995.tb00311.x · Cited by 591 · see citing works
Pathological gambling severity is associated with impulsivity in a delay discounting procedure.
Alessi, S. M., & Petry, N. (2003) · Behavioural Processes · doi:10.1016/s0376-6357(03)00150-5 · Cited by 549 · see citing works
Temporal discounting and utility for health and money.
Chapman, G. B. (1996) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1037//0278-7393.22.3.771 · Cited by 537 · see citing works
Camerer, C. (1995) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-010 · Cited by 522 · see citing works
Advances in Personality Assessment
(2013) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315827483 · Cited by 521 · see citing works
Cross-Cultural Comparisons of Discounting Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards
Du, W., Green, L., & Myerson, J. (2002) · The Psychological Record · doi:10.1007/bf03395199 · Cited by 514 · see citing works
Self-citationRate of temporal discounting decreases with amount of reward
Green, L., Myerson, J., & McFadden, E. (1997) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/bf03211314 · Cited by 508 · see citing works
Self-citationTemporal discounting in choice between delayed rewards: The role of age and income.
Green, L., Myerson, J., Lichtman, D., Rosen, S., & Fry, A. F. (1996) · Psychology and Aging · doi:10.1037//0882-7974.11.1.79 · Cited by 505 · see citing works
Self-citationTemporal discounting in choice between delayed rewards: The role of age and income.
Green, L., Myerson, J., Lichtman, D., Rosen, S., & Fry, A. (1996) · Psychology and Aging · doi:10.1037/0882-7974.11.1.79 · Cited by 505 · see citing works
Self-citationPetry, N. (2001) · Journal of Abnormal Psychology · doi:10.1037/0021-843x.110.3.482 · Cited by 501 · see citing works
Delay discounting and probability discounting as related to cigarette smoking status in adults
Reynolds, B., Richards, J. B., Horn, K., & Karraker, K. (2004) · Behavioural Processes · doi:10.1016/s0376-6357(03)00109-8 · Cited by 495 · see citing works
DETERMINATION OF DISCOUNT FUNCTIONS IN RATS WITH AN ADJUSTING‐AMOUNT PROCEDURE
Richards, J. B., Mitchell, S. H., de Wit, H., & Seiden, L. S. (1997) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.1997.67-353 · Cited by 493 · see citing works
Modeling Myopic Decisions: Evidence for Hyperbolic Delay-Discounting within Subjects and Amounts
Kirby, K. N., & Maraković, N. N. (1995) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1006/obhd.1995.1086 · Cited by 468 · see citing works
Excessive discounting of delayed rewards in substance abusers with gambling problems
Petry, N. M., & Casarella, T. (1999) · Drug and Alcohol Dependence · doi:10.1016/s0376-8716(99)00010-1 · Cited by 432 · see citing works
Petry, N. M. (2001) · Journal of Abnormal Psychology · doi:10.1037//0021-843x.110.3.482 · Cited by 429 · see citing works
Chapman, G. B., & Elstein, A. S. (1995) · Medical Decision Making · doi:10.1177/0272989x9501500408 · Cited by 421 · see citing works
Temporal discounting and preference reversals in choice between delayed outcomes
Green, L., Fristoe, N. M., & Myerson, J. (1994) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03213979 · Cited by 418 · see citing works
Self-citationSelf-control: Beyond commitment.
Rachlin, H. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00037602 · Cited by 391 · see citing works
Preference reversal and delayed reinforcement
Ainslie, G. W., & Herrnstein, R. J. (1981) · Animal Learning & Behavior · doi:10.3758/bf03209777 · Cited by 382 · see citing works
The effect of delay and of intervening events on reinforcement value.
Commons, M. L. (1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 361 · see citing works
Cognition and behavior in studies of choice.
Rachlin, H. C., Logue, A. W., Gibbon, J., & Frankel, M. E. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.1.33 · Cited by 341 · see citing works
Preference reversal and self control: choice as a function of reward amount and delay
Green, L., Fisher, E. B., Perlow, S., & Sherman, L. (1981) · Cited by 335 · see citing works
Self-citationHolt (2003) · doi:10.1016/s0376-6357(03)00141-4 · Cited by 333 · see citing works
Amount of reward has opposite effects on the discounting of delayed and probabilistic outcomes.
Green, L., Myerson, J., & Ostaszewski, P. (1999) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1037//0278-7393.25.2.418 · Cited by 312 · see citing works
Self-citationImpulsivity, personality disorders and pathological gambling severity
Steel, Z., & Blaszczynski, A. (1998) · Addiction · doi:10.1046/j.1360-0443.1998.93689511.x · Cited by 304 · see citing works
Exponential versus hyperbolic discounting of delayed outcomes: Risk and waiting time.
GREEN, L., & MYERSON, J. (1996) · American Zoologist · doi:10.1093/icb/36.4.496 · Cited by 294 · see citing works
Self-citationGiordano, L., Bickel, W., Loewenstein, G., Jacobs, E., Marsch, L., & Badger, G. (2002) · Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1007/s00213-002-1159-2 · Cited by 294 · see citing works
ON THE TAUTOLOGY OF THE MATCHING LAW1
Rachlin, H. C. (1971) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.1971.15-249 · Cited by 271 · see citing works
Stationary Utility and Time Perspective
Koopmans, T. C., Diamond, P. A., & Williamson, R. E. (1964) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913736 · Cited by 271 · see citing works
Delay discounting is associated with substance use in college students
Kollins, S. H. (2002) · Addictive Behaviors · doi:10.1016/s0306-4603(02)00220-4 · Cited by 267 · see citing works
Discounting delayed and probabilistic rewards: Processes and traits
Myerson, J., Green, L., Hanson, J. S., Holt, D. D., & Estle, S. J. (2003) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0167-4870(03)00005-9 · Cited by 259 · see citing works
Self-citationGreen, L., Myerson, J., & Ostaszewski, P. (1999) · Behavioural Processes · doi:10.1016/s0376-6357(99)00021-2 · Cited by 258 · see citing works
Self-citationDISCOUNTING OF DELAYED FOOD REWARDS IN PIGEONS AND RATS: IS THERE A MAGNITUDE EFFECT?
Green, L., Myerson, J., Holt, D. D., Slevin, J. R., & Estle, S. J. (2004) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.2004.81-39 · Cited by 257 · see citing works
Self-citationConstruct validity for the Sensation-Seeking Scale.
Zuckerman, M., & Link, K. E. (1968) · Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0026047 · Cited by 256 · see citing works
When foragers discount the future: constraint or adaptation?
Kagel, J. H., Green, L., & Caraco, T. B. (1986) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1016/0003-3472(86)90032-1 · Cited by 253 · see citing works
Self-citationDiscounting of delayed hypothetical money, alcohol, and food
Odum, A. L., & Rainaud, C. P. (2003) · Behavioural Processes · doi:10.1016/s0376-6357(03)00145-1 · Cited by 250 · see citing works
Psychiatric Comorbidity in Pathological Gamblers Seeking Treatment
Ibáñez, Á., Blanco, C., Donahue, E., Lesieur, H. R., de Castro, I. P., Fernández‐Piqueras, J., & Sáiz-Ruiz, J. (2001) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/ajp.158.10.1733 · Cited by 250 · see citing works
Judgment, decision, and choice: a cognitive/behavioral synthesis
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-6564 · Cited by 242 · see citing works
The effect of temporal constraints on the value of money and other commodities
Raineri, A., & Rachlin, H. C. (1993) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.3960060202 · Cited by 226 · see citing works
Economic Choice Theory: An Experimental Analysis of Animal Behavior
Kagel, J. H., Battalio, R. C., & Green, L. (1995) · Cited by 213 · see citing works
Self-citationNeedle sharing in opioid-dependent outpatients: psychological processes underlying risk
Odum, A. L., Madden, G. J., Badger, G. J., & Bickel, W. K. (2000) · Drug and Alcohol Dependence · doi:10.1016/s0376-8716(00)00111-3 · Cited by 213 · see citing works
Discounting of delayed rewards in substance abusers: relationship to antisocial personality disorder
Petry, N. (2002) · Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1007/s00213-002-1115-1 · Cited by 202 · see citing works
Reliability of a Measure of Temporal Discounting
Simpson, C. A., & Vuchinich, R. E. (2000) · The Psychological Record · doi:10.1007/bf03395339 · Cited by 181 · see citing works
Kagel, J. H., Battalio, R. C., & Green, L. (1995) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511664854 · Cited by 166 · see citing works
Self-citationAdjusting delay to reinforcement: Comparing choice in pigeons and humans.
Rodríguez, M., & Logue, A. W. (1988) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Animal Behavior Processes · doi:10.1037//0097-7403.14.1.105 · Cited by 158 · see citing works
Resolving the contradictions of addiction
Heyman, G. M. (1996) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00042990 · Cited by 152 · see citing works
PREFERENCE REVERSALS WITH FOOD AND WATER REINFORCERS IN RATS
Green, L., & Estle, S. J. (2003) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.2003.79-233 · Cited by 151 · see citing works
Self-citationPersonality characteristics of the personality disordered
(1996) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/0191-8869(96)87710-5 · Cited by 150 · see citing works
Adjusting delay to reinforcement: Comparing choice in pigeons and humans.
Rodriguez, M. L., & Logue, A. W. (1988) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Animal Behavior Processes · doi:10.1037/0097-7403.14.1.105 · Cited by 129 · see citing works
Effects of inflation on the subjective value of delayed and probabilistic rewards
Ostaszewski, P., Green, L., & Myerson, J. (1998) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03212959 · Cited by 125 · see citing works
Self-citationA discounting model for decisions with delayed positive or negative outcomes.
Stevenson, M. K. (1986) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.115.2.131 · Cited by 121 · see citing works
Value for the future and preventive health behavior.
Chapman, G. B., Brewer, N. T., Coups, E. J., Brownlee, S., Leventhal, H., & Levanthal, E. A. (2001) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Applied · doi:10.1037/1076-898x.7.3.235 · Cited by 118 · see citing works
DELAYED REWARD AND COST DISCOUNTING
Murphy, J. G., Vuchinich, R. E., & Simpson, C. A. (2001) · OpenSIUC (Southern Illinois University Carbondale) · Cited by 111 · see citing works
Fehr, E. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415269a · Cited by 111 · see citing works
Measurement, scaling, and psychophysics.
Luce, R. D., & Krumhansl, C. L. (1988) · Cited by 106 · see citing works
The relation between temperament and rate of temporal discounting
Ostaszewski, P. (1996) · European Journal of Personality · doi:10.1002/(sici)1099-0984(199609)10:3 · Cited by 94 · see citing works
THE MATCHING LAW AND AMOUNT‐DEPENDENT EXPONENTIAL DISCOUNTING AS ACCOUNTS OF SELF‐CONTROL CHOICE
Grace, R. C. (1999) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.1999.71-27 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
Psychiatric Comorbidity in Pathological Gamblers Seeking Treatment
Ibáñez, Á. (2001) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.158.10.1733 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
Personality continuity and the changes of adult life.
Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (2004) · American Psychological Association eBooks · doi:10.1037/10067-002 · Cited by 81 · see citing works
PROBABILITY AND DELAY IN COMMITMENT
Rachlin, H. C., Castrogiovanni, A., & Cross, D. V. (1987) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.1987.48-347 · Cited by 80 · see citing works
Concave utility, transaction costs, and risk in measuring discounting of delayed rewards.
Kirby, K. N., & Santiesteban, M. (2003) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.29.1.66 · Cited by 79 · see citing works
ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SELF CONTROL
Green, L., & Myerson, J. (1993) · Behavior and philosophy · Cited by 76 · see citing works
Self-citationThe adult years: Continuity and change.
(1989) · American Psychological Association eBooks · doi:10.1037/10067-000 · Cited by 72 · see citing works
Schoenfelder, T., & Hantula, D. A. (2003) · Journal of Vocational Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0001-8791(02)00032-5 · Cited by 61 · see citing works
Higher-Education Administrators: When the Future Does Not Make a Difference
Logue, A., & Anderson, Y. (2001) · Psychology Science · doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00351 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
Etiologic Aspects of Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Pattison, Ε. M. (1984) · Journal of Studies on Alcohol · doi:10.15288/jsa.1984.45.554 · Cited by 49 · see citing works
Rodgers, J. L., & Rowe, D. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.3.599 · Cited by 47 · see citing works
Ostaszewski, P. (1997) · European Psychologist · doi:10.1027/1016-9040.2.1.35 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
Etiologic Aspects of Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Gottheil, E., & Druley, K. A. (1982) · Cited by 30 · see citing works
TRADE‐OFFS IN CHOICE BETWEEN RISK AND DELAY DEPEND ON MONETARY AMOUNTS
Christensen, J., Parker, S., Silberberg, A. M., et al. (1998) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.1998.69-123 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
Luce, L. (1988) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2107471 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
Lotteries and the Time Horizon
Rachlin, H. C., Siegel, E., & Cross, D. V. (1994) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1994.tb00291.x · Cited by 24 · see citing works
Lyons, C. A., & Ghezzi, P. M. (1995) · Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis · doi:10.1901/jaba.1995.28-127 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Green, R. (1993) · Self & Society · doi:10.1080/03060497.1993.11085356 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework
Camerer, C. F., & Hogarth, R. M. (1999) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1023/a:1007850605129
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Ainslie, 1983, The motives of the will., 119
- Barratt, 1985, Impulsiveness defined within a systems model of personality., Vol. 5, 113
- Barratt, 1995, Impulsiveness., 91
- Houston, 1982, Some learning rules for acquiring information., 140
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The neural correlates of subjective value during intertemporal choice
Kable, J. W., & Glimcher, P. W. (2007) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn2007 · Cited by 1,916 · see citing works
Inhibition and impulsivity: behavioral and neural basis of response control
Bari, A., & Robbins, T. W. (2013) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2013.06.005 · Cited by 1,921 · see citing works
Nigg, J. T. (2017) · Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry · doi:10.1111/jcpp.12675 · Cited by 1,518 · see citing works
The future of memory: remembering, imagining, and the brain
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., Hassabis, D., Martin, V. C., Spreng, R. N., & Szpunar, K. K. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.11.001 · Cited by 1,398 · see citing works
Delayed reward discounting and addictive behavior: a meta-analysis
MacKillop, J., Amlung, M. T., Few, L. R., Ray, L. A., Sweet, L. H., & Munafò, M. R. (2011) · Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1007/s00213-011-2229-0 · Cited by 1,021 · see citing works
Peters, J., & Büchel, C. (2010) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.026 · Cited by 871 · see citing works
Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., Delton, A. W., & Robertson, T. E. (2011) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0022403 · Cited by 790 · see citing works
“…as temporal discounting, intertemporal choice, or delay of gratification, involves choosing between a smaller, immediate reward and a larger, delayed reward (for recent evolutionary applications, see Adams & Nettle, 2009; Daly & Wilson, 2005; for a general overview, see Green & Myerson, 2004).”
Lateral prefrontal cortex and self-control in intertemporal choice
Figner, B., Knoch, D., Johnson, E. J., Krosch, A. R., Lisanby, S. H., Fehr, E., & Weber, E. U. (2010) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.2516 · Cited by 706 · see citing works
A review of delay-discounting research with humans: relations to drug use and gambling
Reynolds, B. (2006) · Behavioural Pharmacology · doi:10.1097/fbp.0b013e3280115f99 · Cited by 711 · see citing works
The neural mechanisms of inter-temporal decision-making: understanding variability
Peters, J., & Büchel, C. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.03.002 · Cited by 693 · see citing works
Bickel, W. K., Jarmolowicz, D. P., Mueller, E. T., Koffarnus, M. N., & Gatchalian, K. M. (2012) · Pharmacology & Therapeutics · doi:10.1016/j.pharmthera.2012.02.004 · Cited by 604 · see citing works
Hariri, A. R., Brown, S. M., Williamson, D. E., Flory, J. D., de Wit, H., & Manuck, S. B. (2006) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3446-06.2006 · Cited by 557 · see citing works
Personality Psychology and Economics
Almlund, M., Duckworth, A. L., Heckman, J., & Kautz, T. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w16822 · Cited by 540 · see citing works
One-year temporal stability of delay-discount rates
Kirby, K. N. (2009) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/pbr.16.3.457 · Cited by 487 · see citing works
Ventral striatal activation during reward anticipation correlates with impulsivity in alcoholics
Beck, A., Schlagenhauf, F., Wüstenberg, T., Hein, J., Kienast, T., Kahnt, T., Schmack, K., Hägele, C., Knutson, B., Heinz, A., et al. (2009) · Biological Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.04.035 · Cited by 461 · see citing works
McKay, R. T., & Dennett, D. C. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09990975 · Cited by 474 · see citing works
A neural mechanism mediating the impact of episodic prospection on farsighted decisions
Benoit, R. G., Gilbert, S. J., & Burgess, P. W. (2011) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.6559-10.2011 · Cited by 422 · see citing works
Plichta, M. M., & Scheres, A. (2014) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.07.012 · Cited by 424 · see citing works
Adaptive constructive processes and the future of memory
Schacter, D. L. (2012) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/a0029869 · Cited by 417 · see citing works
Exploring the gap between consumers’ green rhetoric and purchasing behaviour
Johnstone, M.-L., & Tan, L. P. (2015) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2316-3 · Cited by 413 · see citing works
Neural representations of subjective reward value
Peters, J., & Büchel, C. (2010) · Behavioural Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2010.04.031 · Cited by 405 · see citing works
Peters, J., & Büchel, C. (2009) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3489-09.2009 · Cited by 400 · see citing works
Rung, J. M., & Madden, G. J. (2018) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000462 · Cited by 358 · see citing works
The anatomy of choice: active inference and agency
Friston, K., Schwartenbeck, P., FitzGerald, T., Moutoussis, M., Behrens, T., & Dolan, R. J. (2013) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00598 · Cited by 340 · see citing works
Behavioral components of impulsivity.
Stahl, C., Voss, A., Schmitz, F., Nuszbaum, M., Tüscher, O., Lieb, K., & Klauer, K. C. (2014) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0033981 · Cited by 319 · see citing works
Kable, J. W., & Glimcher, P. W. (2010) · Journal of Neurophysiology · doi:10.1152/jn.00177.2009 · Cited by 316 · see citing works
The neurobiology of individual differences in complex behavioral traits
Hariri, A. R. (2009) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.051508.135335 · Cited by 273 · see citing works
Unstuck in time: episodic future thinking reduces delay discounting and cigarette smoking
Stein, J. S., Wilson, A. G., Koffarnus, M. N., Daniel, T. O., Epstein, L. H., & Bickel, W. K. (2016) · Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1007/s00213-016-4410-y · Cited by 267 · see citing works
Bikinis Instigate Generalized Impatience in Intertemporal Choice
Van den Bergh, B., Dewitte, S., & Warlop, L. (2008) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/525505 · Cited by 269 · see citing works
Romer, D., Duckworth, A. L., Sznitman, S., & Park, S. (2010) · Prevention Science · doi:10.1007/s11121-010-0171-8 · Cited by 264 · see citing works
Dopamine prediction error responses integrate subjective value from different reward dimensions
Lak, A., Stauffer, W. R., & Schultz, W. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1321596111 · Cited by 257 · see citing works
Michalczuk, R., Bowden-Jones, H., Verdejo-Garcia, A., & Clark, L. (2011) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s003329171100095x · Cited by 248 · see citing works
Lower Ventral Striatal Activation During Reward Anticipation in Adolescent Smokers
Peters, J., Bromberg, U., Schneider, S., Brassen, S., Menz, M., Banaschewski, T., Conrod, P. J., Flor, H., Gallinat, J., Garavan, H., et al. (2011) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.2010.10071024 · Cited by 218 · see citing works
Overlapping neural systems represent cognitive effort and reward anticipation
Vassena, E., Silvetti, M., Boehler, C. N., Achten, E., Fias, W., & Verguts, T. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091008 · Cited by 200 · see citing works
Schacter, D. L., Benoit, R. G., De Brigard, F., & Szpunar, K. K. (2015) · Neurobiology of Learning and Memory · doi:10.1016/j.nlm.2013.12.008 · Cited by 211 · see citing works
LINEAR-NONLINEAR-POISSON MODELS OF PRIMATE CHOICE DYNAMICS
Corrado, G. S., Sugrue, L. P., Seung, H. S., & Newsome, W. T. (2005) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1901/jeab.2005.23-05 · Cited by 206 · see citing works
Internet’s Dirty Secret: Assessing the Impact of Online Intermediaries on HIV Transmission1
Chan, J., & Ghose, A. (2014) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.25300/misq/2014/38.4.01 · Cited by 178 · see citing works
Bickel, W. K., Yi, R., Kowal, B. P., & Gatchalian, K. M. (2008) · Drug and Alcohol Dependence · doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2008.03.009 · Cited by 186 · see citing works
Paloyelis, Y., Asherson, P., Mehta, M. A., Faraone, S. V., & Kuntsi, J. (2010) · Neuropsychopharmacology · doi:10.1038/npp.2010.124 · Cited by 180 · see citing works
Impulsivity, risk taking, and timing
Baumann, A. A., & Odum, A. L. (2012) · Behavioural Processes · doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.04.005 · Cited by 174 · see citing works
Steel, P., Svartdal, F., Thundiyil, T., & Brothen, T. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00327 · Cited by 165 · see citing works
Climate Change: What Psychology Can Offer in Terms of Insights and Solutions
Van Lange, P. A. M., Joireman, J., & Milinski, M. (2018) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721417753945 · Cited by 166 · see citing works
Neural mechanism of intertemporal choice: From discounting future gains to future losses
Xu, L., Liang, Z.-Y., Wang, K., Li, S., & Jiang, T. (2009) · Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2008.12.061 · Cited by 161 · see citing works
Delay discounting of reward in ADHD: application in young children
Wilson, V. B., Mitchell, S. H., Musser, E. D., Schmitt, C. F., & Nigg, J. T. (2011) · Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry · doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.2010.02347.x · Cited by 158 · see citing works
Maglio, S. J., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2013) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/a0030258 · Cited by 157 · see citing works
Dennhardt, A. A., & Murphy, J. G. (2011) · Psychology of Addictive Behaviors · doi:10.1037/a0025807 · Cited by 157 · see citing works
Reynolds, B., Patak, M., Shroff, P., Penfold, R. B., Melanko, S., & Duhig, A. M. (2007) · Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1037/1064-1297.15.3.264 · Cited by 155 · see citing works
Temporal reward discounting and ADHD: task and symptom specific effects
Scheres, A., Lee, A., & Sumiya, M. (2008) · Journal of Neural Transmission · doi:10.1007/s00702-007-0813-6 · Cited by 154 · see citing works
TOWARDS A GENERAL MODEL OF TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING
van den Bos, W., & McClure, S. M. (2013) · Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1002/jeab.6 · Cited by 149 · see citing works
Shiels, K., Hawk, L. W., Reynolds, B., Mazzullo, R. J., Rhodes, J. D., Pelham, W. E., Waxmonsky, J. G., & Gangloff, B. P. (2009) · Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1037/a0017259 · Cited by 146 · see citing works
Palombo, D. J., Keane, M. M., & Verfaellie, M. (2015) · Hippocampus · doi:10.1002/hipo.22376 · Cited by 145 · see citing works
Phasic Nucleus Accumbens Dopamine Encodes Risk-Based Decision-Making Behavior
Sugam, J. A., Day, J. J., Wightman, R. M., & Carelli, R. M. (2012) · Biological Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2011.09.029 · Cited by 142 · see citing works
Cognitive bias and how to improve sustainable decision making
Korteling, J. E. (., Paradies, G. L., & Sassen-van Meer, J. P. (2023) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1129835 · Cited by 143 · see citing works
Dark control: The default mode network as a reinforcement learning agent
Dohmatob, E., Dumas, G., & Bzdok, D. (2020) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/hbm.25019 · Cited by 121 · see citing works
Behavioral trainings and manipulations to reduce delay discounting: A systematic review
Scholten, H., Scheres, A., de Water, E., Graf, U., Granic, I., & Luijten, M. (2019) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/s13423-019-01629-2 · Cited by 135 · see citing works
Functional neuroimaging of intertemporal choice models: a review
Carter, R. M., Meyer, J. R., & Huettel, S. A. (2010) · Journal of Neuroscience Psychology and Economics · doi:10.1037/a0018046 · Cited by 124 · see citing works
Ventromedial prefrontal damage causes a pervasive impairment of episodic memory and future thinking
Bertossi, E., Tesini, C., Cappelli, A., & Ciaramelli, E. (2016) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2016.01.034 · Cited by 101 · see citing works
Kwan, D., Craver, C. F., Green, L., Myerson, J., Gao, F., Black, S. E., & Rosenbaum, R. S. (2015) · Hippocampus · doi:10.1002/hipo.22431 · Cited by 99 · see citing works
Self-citationLong-term risk preference and suboptimal decision making following adolescent alcohol use
Nasrallah, N. A., Yang, T. W. H., & Bernstein, I. L. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0906629106 · Cited by 94 · see citing works
Relation Between Time Perspective and Delay Discounting: A Literature Review
Teuscher, U., & Mitchell, S. H. (2011) · The Psychological Record · doi:10.1007/bf03395780 · Cited by 91 · see citing works
de Water, E., Cillessen, A. H. N., & Scheres, A. (2014) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/cdev.12245 · Cited by 80 · see citing works
Are ADHD Symptoms Associated With Delay Aversion or Choice Impulsivity? A General Population Study
Paloyelis, Y., Asherson, P., & Kuntsi, J. (2009) · Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry · doi:10.1097/chi.0b013e3181ab8c97 · Cited by 82 · see citing works
Harden, K. P., Kretsch, N., Mann, F. D., Herzhoff, K., Tackett, J. L., Steinberg, L., & Tucker-Drob, E. M. (2017) · Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1016/j.dcn.2016.12.007 · Cited by 77 · see citing works
Explaining the relationship between religiousness and substance use: Self-control matters.
DeWall, C. N., Pond, R. S., Carter, E. C., McCullough, M. E., Lambert, N. M., Fincham, F. D., & Nezlek, J. B. (2014) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0036853 · Cited by 68 · see citing works
Wu, H., Gui, D., Lin, W., Gu, R., Zhu, X., & Liu, X. (2016) · Brain and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2016.06.005 · Cited by 67 · see citing works
Petry, N. M. (2012) · Journal of Abnormal Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0024782 · Cited by 67 · see citing works
Rung, J. M., Peck, S., Hinnenkamp, J. E., Preston, E., & Madden, G. J. (2019) · Perspectives on Behavior Science · doi:10.1007/s40614-019-00200-7 · Cited by 65 · see citing works
Texting while driving as impulsive choice: A behavioral economic analysis
Hayashi, Y., Russo, C. T., & Wirth, O. (2015) · Accident Analysis & Prevention · doi:10.1016/j.aap.2015.07.025 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
Scheres, A., Tontsch, C., Thoeny, A. L., & Sumiya, M. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00711 · Cited by 62 · see citing works
Fields, S., Leraas, K., Collins, C., & Reynolds, B. (2009) · Behavioural Pharmacology · doi:10.1097/fbp.0b013e328330dcff · Cited by 57 · see citing works
Drechsler, R., Rizzo, P., & Steinhausen, H.-C. (2010) · Child Neuropsychology · doi:10.1080/09297040903190774 · Cited by 56 · see citing works
Effects of α-2A adrenergic receptor agonist on time and risk preference in primates
Kim, S., Bobeica, I., Gamo, N. J., Arnsten, A. F. T., & Lee, D. (2012) · Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1007/s00213-011-2520-0 · Cited by 47 · see citing works
Scheres, A., Sumiya, M., & Thoeny, A. L. (2010) · International Journal of Methods in Psychiatric Research · doi:10.1002/mpr.309 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Determinants of choice, and vulnerability and recovery in addiction
Lamb, R. J., Maguire, D. R., Ginsburg, B. C., Pinkston, J. W., & France, C. P. (2016) · Behavioural Processes · doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2016.04.001 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
Delay discounting by the children of smokers and nonsmokers
Reynolds, B., Leraas, K., Collins, C., & Melanko, S. (2009) · Drug and Alcohol Dependence · doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2008.07.015 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
Lempert, K. M., Mechanic-Hamilton, D. J., Xie, L., Wisse, L. E. M., de Flores, R., Wang, J., Das, S. R., Yushkevich, P. A., Wolk, D. A., & Kable, J. W. (2020) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2020.107549 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
The evolutionary psychology of climate change behaviors: Insights and applications
Palomo-Vélez, G., & van Vugt, M. (2021) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.03.006 · Cited by 39 · see citing works
Ahmed, S. H. (2018) · Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.pbb.2017.07.005 · Cited by 39 · see citing works
Victims' Time Discounting 2.5 Years after the Wenchuan Earthquake: An ERP Study
Li, J.-Z., Gui, D.-Y., Feng, C.-L., Wang, W.-Z., Du, B.-Q., Gan, T., & Luo, Y.-J. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040316 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
Valuation of uncertain and delayed rewards in primate prefrontal cortex
Kim, S., Hwang, J., Seo, H., & Lee, D. (2009) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2009.03.010 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
A comparison of delay discounting among substance users with and without suicide attempt history
Liu, R. T., Vassileva, J., Gonzalez, R., & Martin, E. M. (2012) · Psychology of Addictive Behaviors · doi:10.1037/a0027384 · Cited by 30 · see citing works
Decision making: effects of methylphenidate on temporal discounting in nonhuman primates
Rajala, A. Z., Jenison, R. L., & Populin, L. C. (2015) · Journal of Neurophysiology · doi:10.1152/jn.00278.2015 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
On several factors that control rates of discounting
Weatherly, J. N. (2014) · Behavioural Processes · doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2014.01.020 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
Encouraging pro-environmental behaviors through children-based appeals: a kin selection perspective
Palomo-Vélez, G., Buczny, J., & Van Vugt, M. (2020) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su12020748 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
A COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTS OF BRIEF RULES, A TIMER, AND PREFERRED TOYS ON SELF‐CONTROL
Newquist, M. H., Dozier, C. L., & Neidert, P. L. (2012) · Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis · doi:10.1901/jaba.2012.45-497 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
Now or not-now? The influence of alexithymia on intertemporal decision-making
Scarpazza, C., Sellitto, M., & di Pellegrino, G. (2017) · Brain and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2017.03.001 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Kim, W. Y., Cho, B. R., Kwak, M. J., & Kim, J.-H. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-06408-4 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
The Economics of Losing a Loved One: Delayed Reward Discounting in Prolonged Grief
Maccallum, F., & Bonanno, G. A. (2016) · Clinical Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/2167702615605827 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Cross-national harmonization of neurocognitive assessment across five sites in a global study.
Batistuzzo, M. C., Sheshachala, K., Alschuler, D. M., Hezel, D. M., Lewis-Fernández, R., de Joode, N. T., Vriend, C., Lempert, K. M., Narayan, M., Marincowitz, C., et al. (2023) · Neuropsychology · doi:10.1037/neu0000838 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
- Authors
- Green, L., & Myerson, J.
- Affiliations
- Washington University in St. Louis (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2004
- Volume
- 130
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 769-792
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- PMC
- PMC1382186
- OpenAlex
- W1994077204
- Semantic Scholar
- 5cd41d64265acb80c97db49684e1811561631c98
- Cited by
- 1,676
- References
- 136
- Citations by year
- 2026: 51 · 2025: 74 · 2024: 73 · 2023: 64 · 2022: 68 · 2021: 95 · 2020: 141 · 2019: 94 · 2018: 86 · 2017: 113 · 2016: 108 · 2015: 109 · 2014: 94 · 2013: 92 · 2012: 86
- FWCI
- 1.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of Mental Health (R01MH055308, MH55308)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- delay discounting, probabilistic discounting, expected delay, hyperbolic discounting, individual differences, decision making under uncertainty
- MeSH terms
- Choice Behavior, Humans, Reward, Time Factors, Models, Statistical
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review