CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 800Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsDeath Anxiety and Social ExclusionEvolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

The influence of mortality and socioeconomic status on risk and delayed rewards: A life history theory approach.

Open access
Griskevicius, Vladas, Tybur, Joshua M., Delton, Andrew W., Robertson, Theresa E.·2011·Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
DOI 10.1037/a0022403PMC PMC3298774
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

Why do some people take risks and live for the present, whereas others avoid risks and save for the future? The evolutionary framework of life history theory predicts that preferences for risk and delay in gratification should be influenced by mortality and resource scarcity. A series of experiments examined how mortality cues influenced decisions involving risk preference (e.g., $10 for sure vs. 50% chance of $20) and temporal discounting (e.g., $5 now vs. $10 later). The effect of mortality depended critically on whether people grew up in a relatively resource-scarce or resource-plentiful environment. For individuals who grew up relatively poor, mortality cues led them to value the present and gamble for big immediate rewards. Conversely, for individuals who grew up relatively wealthy, mortality cues led them to value the future and avoid risky gambles. Overall, mortality cues appear to propel individuals toward diverging life history strategies as a function of childhood socioeconomic status, suggesting important implications for how environmental factors influence economic decisions and risky behaviors.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Across three experiments, mortality cues shifted financial risk and delayed-reward preferences in opposite directions depending on childhood socioeconomic status (SES). People from relatively resource-scarce childhoods became more present-oriented and risk-taking after mortality cues, whereas those from relatively resource-plentiful childhoods became more future-oriented and risk-averse.

Key findings

  • In Experiment 1, mortality cues interacted with childhood SES on risk taking, \(F(1, 93) = 6.86, p = .01\); at 1 SD below the childhood-SES mean, mortality increased risk taking, \(t(93) = 2.60, p < .05, \eta^2 = .07\), while at 1 SD above the mean there was a nonsignificant trend toward less risk taking, \(t(93) = 1.10, p = .27, \eta^2 = .01\). Current/expected SES did not significantly interact with prime, \(F(1, 93) = 2.30, p = .14\).
  • In Experiment 2, mortality cues again interacted with childhood SES for risk, \(F(1, 67) = 13.86, p < .001, \eta^2 = .17\): lower childhood SES participants took more risk after mortality cues, \(t(67) = 3.57, p < .01, \eta^2 = .14\), and higher childhood SES participants took less risk, \(t(67) = 2.84, p < .01, \eta^2 = .10\). For time preference, the interaction was \(F(1, 67) = 3.2, p = .048, \eta^2 = .046\); lower childhood SES participants preferred the present, \(t(67) = 1.62, p = .06, \eta^2 = .04\), and higher childhood SES participants preferred the future, \(t(67) = 1.71, p = .05, \eta^2 = .04\).
  • In Experiment 3, using childhood family income, mortality cues interacted with childhood SES on time preference, \(F(1, 40) = 7.55, p = .005\); at 1 SD above the mean, mortality increased future valuation, \(t(40) = 2.55, p = .023, \eta^2 = .12\), while at 1 SD below the mean there was a marginally significant increase in valuing the present, \(t(40) = 1.46, p = .08, \eta^2 = .04\).
  • Overall, the authors conclude that mortality cues can propel individuals toward diverging life-history strategies as a function of childhood SES, with implications for economic decisions and risky behavior.

Methods

  • Three experiments with university students: Experiment 1 had 97 participants (67 male, 30 female); Experiment 2 had 71 participants (36 male, 35 female; mean age = 20.8 years); Experiment 3 had 44 participants (mean age = 20.3 years). Participants were seated at computers and randomly assigned to mortality-prime or control conditions using a fictitious news article.
  • Dependent measures involved dichotomous financial choices assessing risk preference and temporal discounting. Childhood SES was measured with subjective items in Experiments 1 and 2 and with recalled household family income in Experiment 3; Experiment 1 also measured current/future SES.
  • Analyses used general linear models/ANOVA to test Prime × Childhood SES interactions, followed by simple-effects tests at ±1 SD of childhood SES. Experiment 2 used directed tests allocating .04 of alpha to the predicted direction and .01 to the unpredicted direction.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the sample had a relatively limited range of SES, which may have reduced power to detect the interaction and means the low-SES participants were relatively affluent compared with the full global and historical range; effects might be stronger at SES extremes.
  • The paper states that future research is needed on the psychological and physiological mechanisms, critical periods in childhood, distinctions between extrinsic and intrinsic mortality, and whether findings generalize to other types of risk and more diverse populations.
  • Evident from the text: all samples were university students, the financial choices were hypothetical lab measures rather than actual financial behavior, Experiment 3 had a small sample (\(N = 44\)), and several simple effects were marginal (\(p = .06\) or \(p = .08\)).

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/a0022403

Cites

85 of 85 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

13 tests recomputed · 0 with the reported and recomputed p on opposite sides of .05

Claims the paper makes

0 of 50 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingown data

    For individuals who grew up relatively poor, mortality cues led them to value the present and gamble for big immediate rewards.

    “For individuals who grew up relatively poor, mortality cues led them to value the present and gamble for big immediate rewards.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data

    In Experiment 1, women took less risk than men.

    “A main effect of participant sex emerged, whereby women took less risk than men (p = .029).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Findingown data

    In Experiment 1, the effects of prime and SES on risk were indistinguishable across male and female participants.

    “An analysis of potential interactions did not reveal a three-way interaction with participant sex, prime, and either type of SES or a two-way interaction with participant sex and prime or with participant sex and either type of SES (ps > .20).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Findingown data

    For individuals who grew up relatively wealthy, mortality cues led them to value the future and avoid risky gambles.

    “Conversely, for individuals who grew up relatively wealthy, mortality cues led them to value the future and avoid risky gambles.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data

    The effect of mortality cues on risk and delay in gratification depended critically on whether people grew up in a relatively resource-scarce or resource-plentiful environment.

    “The effect of mortality depended critically on whether people grew up in a relatively resource-scarce or resource-plentiful environment.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 12
  • May combine two claims. 23

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    The pattern for risk preferences in the control conditions was often the reverse, albeit not significantly so, of that in the mortality conditions.

    “It is also important to note that the pattern for risk preferences in the control conditions was often the reverse (albeit not significantly so) of that in the mortality conditions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In Experiment 2, for time preference, mortality cues had a different effect as a function of childhood SES: mortality cues led people with higher SES childhoods to value the future and led those with lower SES childhoods to value the present.

    “For time preference, mortality cues also had a different effect as a function of childhood SES: Mortality cues led people with higher SES childhoods to value the future and led those with lower SES childhoods to value the present.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In Experiment 1, individuals who grew up with relatively more resources responded to mortality cues by preferring lower risk but lower yield rewards, although a test of this simple effect did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

    “In contrast, individuals who grew up with relatively more resources responded to mortality cues by preferring lower risk but lower yield rewards (although a test of this simple effect did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in this study).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingreasoning

    For people who grew up in relatively resource-plentiful environments, mortality cues led them to take less risk and value the future more.

    “For people who grew up in relatively resource-plentiful environments, mortality cues led them to take less risk and value the future more.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingreasoning

    For people who grew up in relatively resource-scarce environments, mortality cues led them to prefer more risk and value the present.

    “Conversely, mortality cues led people who grew up in relatively resource-scarce environments to prefer more risk and value the present.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In Experiment 2, for risk, findings replicated the pattern found in Experiment 1: mortality cues led people who grew up in resource-plentiful environments to take fewer risks and led those who grew up in resource-scarce environments to take more risk.

    “For risk, findings replicated the pattern found in the first study: Mortality cues led people who grew up in resource-plentiful environments to take fewer risks and led those who grew up in resource-scarce environments to take more risk.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Across 170 nations, variation in life expectancy accounted for 74% of the variation in age at first birth, with shorter life expectancy predicting earlier age at first birth.

    “In a study examining the association between life expectancy at birth (an indicator of mortality) and age at first birth in 170 nations, variation in life expectancy accounted for 74% of the variation in age at first birth, with shorter life expectancy predicting earlier age at first birth (Low, Hazel, Parker, & Welch, 2008).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Low, Hazel, Parker, & Welch, 2008

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Slow and fast life history strategies are linked to specific preferences for risk: a slower strategy is associated with preference for less risk, and a faster strategy with preference for more risk.

    “Thus, we propose that slow and fast life history strategies are linked to specific preferences for risk: Whereas a slower strategy should be associated with preference for less risk, a faster strategy should be associated with preference for more risk.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites E. Hill, Ross, & Low, 1997

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The psychology and behavior associated with different life history strategies might be dormant in benign environments but may be especially likely to emerge in conditions that suggest environmental unpredictability and harshness.

    “This suggests that the psychology and behavior associated with different life history strategies might be dormant in benign environments but may be especially likely to emerge in conditions that suggest environmental unpredictability and harshness.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Humans generally have a slow life history strategy characterized by a long developmental period, heavy investment in a few offspring, and a long expected life span, but show variation in strategies.

    “Although people generally having a slow life history strategy characterized by a long developmental period, heavy investment in a few offspring, and a long expected life span (Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000), some individuals reach sexual maturity and become sexually active earlier, whereas others delay reproduction and invest more in embodied capital (Ellis, 2004).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Ellis, 2004

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    Species that typically live under high environmental unpredictability and harshness evolve a relatively fast strategy, whereas species under more predictable conditions may invest more heavily in somatic effort.

    “For example, members of species that typically live under conditions of high environmental unpredictability and harshness (e.g., seasonal hurricane threat that may kill large proportions of the population) do not gain much from high investment in somatic effort, as that investment could be wiped out by forces outside that organism's control. Instead, such species evolve a relatively fast strategy”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductown data

    The childhood and current SES factors were moderately correlated (r = .41) but empirically distinct.

    “Although the factors were moderately correlated (r = .41), they were nevertheless empirically distinct.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductcitation

    Pilot testing revealed that the two articles elicited the same amount of general arousal, but the mortality prime led participants to view the world as more uncertain and more unsafe.

    “Pilot testing revealed that the two articles elicited the same amount of general arousal, but the mortality prime led participants to view the world as more uncertain and more unsafe (for additional details, see Griskevicius et al., 2010).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Griskevicius et al., 2010

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Responses to stress are moderated by a person's genotype.

    “Indeed, research shows that responses to stress are moderated by a person's genotype (Caspi et al., 2003).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Caspi et al., 2003

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    The pattern of results in Experiment 3 converged with Experiment 2: individuals adopting a slower life history strategy responded to mortality cues by valuing the future, whereas individuals adopting a faster strategy responded by valuing the present.

    “The pattern of results in Experiment 3—with additional measures of time preference and a different measure of childhood SES—converged with the results found in Experiment 2: Individuals adopting a slower life history strategy responded to cues of mortality by valuing the future, whereas individuals adopting a faster strategy responded by valuing the present.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Life history strategy is sensitized by events experienced during childhood.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductcitation

    Directed tests allocate .04 of a total alpha level of .05 to the predicted direction of a test statistic and .01 to the unpredicted direction.

    “Directed tests allocate .04 of a total alpha level of .05 to the predicted direction of a test statistic and .01 to the unpredicted direction (see, e.g., Gangestad, Garver-Apgar, & Simpson, 2007).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Braver, 1975

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Rice & Gaines, 1994

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Nettle's state-dependent risk model suggests that individuals in a good state are prepared to take relatively large risks.

    “This model suggests that individuals in a good state are prepared to take relatively large risks, in line with what we found for people with higher SES childhood when there was no immediate threat.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Nettle, 2009

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Individuals who grew up in higher SES environments should typically perceive cues to danger as indicating intrinsic mortality, whereas those who grew up in lower SES environments should perceive the same danger cues as indicative of extrinsic mortality.

    “Thus, we suggest that individuals who grew up in higher SES environments should typically perceive cues to danger as indicating intrinsic mortality, whereas those who grew up in lower SES environments should perceive the same danger cues as indicative of extrinsic mortality.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Life history strategy is sensitized by events experienced during childhood.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductnone given

    The order of the two risk question types was randomized.

    “The order of the two questions was randomized.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductown data

    A suspicion probe during survey development showed that participants believed the cover story and made no connections between the financial questions and news articles.

    “A suspicion probe during survey development showed that participants believed this cover story, and they made no connections between the financial questions and news articles.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductown data

    Composite reliabilities were α = .87 for childhood SES and α = .70 for current SES.

    “Thus, we created a composite for childhood SES (α = .87) and a composite for current SES (α = .70), analyzing each one separately.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    When a person's state becomes dire, such as a low-SES childhood combined with prevalent mortality threat, there is an abrupt shift toward being totally risk prone.

    “However, when a person's state becomes dire, such as a low-SES childhood combined with prevalent mortality threat, there is an abrupt shift toward being totally risk prone (Nettle, 2009).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Nettle, 2009

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Life history theory predicts that a preference for the future should be associated with a slower life history strategy, and a preference for the present should be associated with a faster strategy.

    “Life history theory predicts that a preference for the future should be associated with a slower life history strategy; organisms with slow life histories “expect” that they will be alive in the future and thus can benefit by waiting for a larger but delayed reward. Conversely, a preference for the present should be associated with a faster strategy”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Kaplan et al., 2000

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductnone given

    The order of whether participants first answered the risk items or the time items was randomized.

    “The order of whether participants first answered the risk items or the time items was randomized.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductown data

    A principal-axis factor analysis of the six SES items yielded two factors with eigenvalues above 1.0 (3.34 and 1.07), with the three childhood SES items loading on the first factor (47% of item variance) and the three current SES items loading on the second factor (27% of item variance).

    “A principal-axis factor analysis of the six SES items yielded two factors with eigenvalues above 1.0 (3.34 and 1.07).”
    • Also stated in: § Method · plain
      “The first rotated factor consisted of the three childhood SES items, and it accounted for 47% of item variance. The second rotated factor consisted of the three current SES items, and it accounted for 27% of item variance.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Psychologies associated with different life history strategies might lay dormant in benign ecological conditions but might become enacted in critical conditions suggesting ecological harshness and unpredictability.

    “This possible mechanism suggests that psychologies associated with different life history strategies might lay “dormant” in benign ecological conditions but might become enacted in critical conditions suggesting ecological harshness and unpredictability.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Life history strategy is sensitized by events experienced during childhood.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Differential sensitization in childhood ought to affect how individuals respond to certain ecological variables later in life.

    “This differential sensitization in childhood ought to affect how individuals respond to certain ecological variables later in life.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Life history strategy is sensitized by events experienced during childhood.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The prevalence of extrinsic mortality is linked to faster life history strategies, whereas the prevalence of intrinsic mortality is linked to the adoption of slower strategies.

    “Whereas the prevalence of extrinsic mortality is linked to faster life history strategies, the prevalence of intrinsic mortality is linked to the adoption of slower strategies (Ellis et al., 2009).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ellis et al., 2009

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The pattern for resource-scarce environments is consistent with a fast life history strategy, which entails taking risks for big immediate payoffs and preferring certain rewards now over larger later rewards.

    “This specific pattern is consistent with a fast life history strategy, which entails taking risks for big immediate payoffs and preferring to get any kind of certain reward now rather than a potentially larger reward later.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Life history strategy is sensitized by events experienced during childhood.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductown data

    The time preference items showed highly similar patterns and were combined into a time preference index with high internal consistency (α = .90).

    “As expected, all of the items showed highly similar patterns, and thus they were combined into a time preference index (α = .90).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Life history strategies are important not only for directing reproductive decisions but also for behaviors such as financial decision making and desire for immediate versus delayed rewards.

    “This work substantially extends previous work by demonstrating that life history strategies are not only important for directing reproductive decisions (e.g., when to reproduce) but are also important for behaviors such as financial decision making and desire for immediate versus delayed rewards.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Life history strategy is sensitized by events experienced during childhood.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductreasoning

    The restriction of range may have reduced power to detect a significant interaction between childhood SES and mortality cues.

    “For example, this restriction may have actually reduced our power to detect a significant interaction between childhood SES and mortality cues, because our low-SES participants developed in conditions that were relatively affluent compared to the full range of economic conditions worldwide and historically.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
32 of 32

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Life history strategy is sensitized by events experienced during childhood.

    “Throughout this paper, we have assumed that life history strategy is sensitized by events experienced during childhood.”
1 of 1

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Scarcity is cognitively taxing and may undermine an individual's ability to regulate unintended prejudices.

    “Our findings also dovetail with recent evidence that scarcity is cognitively taxing (28)(29)(30) and thus may undermine an individual's ability to regulate unintended prejudices.”

    From Economic scarcity alters the perception of race (2014) · cites this paper as [28]

Statistics that don’t add up

Each reported p-value recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom.

  • Inconsistent p-value: t(40) = 2.55, p = .023

    Minor

    The paper reports p = .023 here; recomputing from the test statistic and its degrees of freedom gives p = .015 (two-tailed). The check cannot tell whether the statistic or the p-value is the misprint.

    Reported p = .023 · recomputed p = .015

  • Inconsistent p-value: F(1, 93) = 2.30, p = .14

    Minor

    The paper reports p = .14 here; recomputing from the test statistic and its degrees of freedom gives p = .133. The check cannot tell whether the statistic or the p-value is the misprint.

    Reported p = .14 · recomputed p = .133

2 of 2

Statistics recomputed

Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.

  • Doesn’t add upF(1, 93) = 2.3reported p = .14 · recomputed p = .133

    “F(1, 93) = 2.30, p = .14”

  • Doesn’t add upt(40) = 2.55reported p = .023 · recomputed p = .015

    “t(40) = 2.55, p = .023”

  • Not confirmedF(1, 67) = 3.2reported p = .048 · recomputed p = .078

    “F(1, 67) = 3.2, p = .048”

  • ConsistentF(1, 93) = 6.86reported p = .01 · recomputed p = .010

    “F(1, 93) = 6.86, p = .01”

  • Consistentt(93) = 2.6reported p < .05 · recomputed p = .011

    “t(93) = 2.60, p < .05”

  • Consistentt(93) = 1.1reported p = .27 · recomputed p = .274

    “t(93) = 1.10, p = .27”

  • ConsistentF(1, 67) = 13.86reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F(1, 67) = 13.86, p < .001”

  • Consistentt(67) = 3.57reported p < .01 · recomputed p < .001

    “t(67) = 3.57, p < .01”

  • Consistentt(67) = 2.84reported p < .01 · recomputed p = .006

    “t(67) = 2.84, p < .01”

  • Consistentt(67) = 1.62reported p = .06 · recomputed p = .110

    “t(67) = 1.62, p = .06”

    The paper states a one-tailed test

  • Consistentt(67) = 1.71reported p = .05 · recomputed p = .092

    “t(67) = 1.71, p = .05”

    The paper states a one-tailed test

  • ConsistentF(1, 40) = 7.55reported p = .005 · recomputed p = .009

    “F(1, 40) = 7.55, p = .005”

    The paper states a one-tailed test

  • Consistentt(40) = 1.46reported p = .08 · recomputed p = .152

    “t(40) = 1.46, p = .08”

    The paper states a one-tailed test

13 of 13

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Self-check results appear here once an independent check has confirmed them.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Charnov EL Life history invariants 1993 Oxford University Press Oxford, England
  2. Horn HS Rubenstein DI Krebs JR Davies NB Behavioral adaptations and life history. Behavioural ecology: An evolutionary approach 1984 279 300 Blackwell Oxford, England 2nd ed.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., Delton, A. W., & Robertson, T. E.
Affiliations
  • University of Minnesota (US)
  • University of New Mexico (US)
  • University of California, Santa Barbara (US)
Corresponding author
Griskevicius, Vladas
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Publisher
American Psychological Association (APA)
Published
2011
Volume
100
Issue
6
Pages
1015-1026
ISSN
  • 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1315
DOI
10.1037/a0022403
PMC
PMC3298774
OpenAlex
W2172137497
Semantic Scholar
926b6e5ff6f663ec9ac18e79730426d0a165d7ac
Cited by
790
References
85
Citations by year
2026: 51 · 2025: 60 · 2024: 64 · 2023: 49 · 2022: 84 · 2021: 62 · 2020: 67 · 2019: 52 · 2018: 54 · 2017: 71 · 2016: 51 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 34 · 2013: 26 · 2012: 19
FWCI
15.86
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • VU Research Portal (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation (0843764)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Death Anxiety and Social Exclusion
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
risk preferences, delay discounting, life history theory, socioeconomic status, child poverty, resource constraints, risky decision making, evolutionary psychology
MeSH terms
Adult, Arousal, Attitude to Death, Child, Cues, Decision Making, Female, Gambling, Humans, Individuality, Internal-External Control, Life Change Events, Life Expectancy, Male, Motivation, Personality Development, Poverty, Sex Factors, Social Class, Social Environment, Young Adult

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-10.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-10.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review