Cited by 140Misinformation and Its ImpactsSpam and Phishing DetectionComplex Network Analysis Techniques

Uncovering Coordinated Networks on Social Media: Methods and Case Studies

Open access
Pacheco, Diogo, Hui, Pik-Mai, Torres-Lugo, Christopher, Truong, Bao Tran, Flammini, Alessandro, Menczer, Filippo·2021·Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media

Abstract

Coordinated campaigns are used to influence and manipulate social media platforms and their users, a critical challenge to the free exchange of information online. Here we introduce a general, unsupervised network-based methodology to uncover groups of accounts that are likely coordinated. The proposed method constructs coordination networks based on arbitrary behavioral traces shared among accounts. We present five case studies of influence campaigns, four of which in the diverse contexts of U.S. elections, Hong Kong protests, the Syrian civil war, and cryptocurrency manipulation. In each of these cases, we detect networks of coordinated Twitter accounts by examining their identities, images, hashtag sequences, retweets, or temporal patterns. The proposed approach proves to be broadly applicable to uncover different kinds of coordination across information warfare scenarios.

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  • The unsupervised bot detection approach typically requires calculating similarity of different accounts and clustering them into groups.

    “This unsupervised approach typically requires calculating the similarity of different accounts and subsequently clustering them into groups (Pacheco et al., 2021).”

    From Anatomy of an AI-powered malicious social botnet (2024) · cites this paper as Pacheco et al., 2021

    The Related Work section describes unsupervised detection of coordinated accounts using similarities between pairs of accounts and clustering or community detection. The method summary likewise specifies a similarity measure followed by extraction of coordinated groups. The paper does not present this as a general requirement of bot detection: its method detects coordination among human-controlled accounts as well as bots. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Popularity metrics can be gamed with inauthentic behavior, including bots, organized trolls, and fake-account networks.

    “Popularity metrics can also be gamed with inauthentic behavior, including bots, organized trolls, and fake-account networks (Pacheco et al., 2021; Sen et al., 2018).”

    From Social Drivers and Algorithmic Mechanisms on Digital Media. (2024) · cites this paper as Pacheco et al., 2021

    The Introduction (page unavailable) describes fake accounts and social bots used to amplify misleading narratives. Case Study 4: Co-Retweets (page unavailable) calls coordinated retweeting a form of manipulation. These passages support inauthentic amplification, but do not specifically establish that popularity metrics are gamed or identify organized trolls as an example. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Coordination in account activity does not necessarily coincide with automation.

    “While coordination in account activity does not necessarily coincide with automation [36,37], accounts created on similar dates and following users successively are more likely to be automated [3,48].”
  • The BLOC model was compared to three baseline methods that make different assumptions about the behavioral traits shared among coordinated accounts: hashtag sequences (Hash), activity (Activity), and co-retweet (CoRT).

    “We compared the BLOC model to three baseline methods, which make different assumptions about the behavioral traits that may be shared among coordinated accounts [6]: hashtag sequences (Hash), activity (Activity), and co-retweet (CoRT).”
  • Coordination detection methods typically extract account features designed to target specific suspicious behavioral patterns.

    “These methods typically extract account features designed to target specific suspicious behavioral patterns [6].”

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 31

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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Pacheco, D., Hui, P.-M., Torres-Lugo, C., Truong, B. T., Flammini, A., & Menczer, F.
Affiliations
  • University of Exeter (GB)
  • Indiana University Bloomington (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media
Published
2021-05-22
Volume
15
Pages
455-466
ISSN
  • 2162-3449 (ISSN-L)
  • 2334-0770
OpenAlex
W3151343903
Cited by
140
References
10
Citations by year
2026: 26 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 2
FWCI
56.65
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (1735095)
  • John S. and James L. Knight Foundation
  • Craig Newmark Philanthropies
  • Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (W911NF-17-C0094)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Spam and Phishing Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Network Analysis Techniques
Keywords
social media manipulation, information warfare, Twitter, retweets, election interference, Hong Kong protests, Syrian civil war

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