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Stability of Groups with Costly Beliefs and Practices

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Wildman, Wesley J., Sosis, Richard · 2011 · Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
Cited by 52

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Costly signaling theory has been employed to explain the persistence of costly displays in a wide array of species, including humans. Henrich (2009) builds on earlier signaling models to develop a cultural evolutionary model of costly displays. Significantly, Henrich's model shows that there can be a stable equilibrium for an entire population committed to costly displays, persisting alongside a no-cost stable equilibrium for the entire population. Here we generalize Henrich's result to the more realistic situation of a population peppered with subgroups committed to high-cost beliefs and practices. The investigative tool is an agent-based model in which agents have cognitive capacities similar to those presupposed in Henrich's population-level cultural evolutionary model, and agents perform similar fitness calculations. Unlike in Henrich's model, which has no group differentiation within the population, our model agents use fitness calculations to determine whether to join or leave high-cost groups. According to our model, high-cost groups achieve long-term stability within a larger population under a wide range of circumstances, a finding that extends Henrich's result in a more realistic direction. The most important emergent pathway to costly group stability is the simultaneous presence of high charisma and consistency of the group leader and high cost of the group. These findings have strategic implications both for leading groups committed to costly beliefs and practices and for controlling their size and influence within wider cultural settings.

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Metadata

Authors
Wildman, W. J., & Sosis, R.
Venue
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
Published
2011
Volume
14
Issue
3
ISSN
1460-7425 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2100508216
Cited by
52
References
10
FWCI
5.36
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
gold

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Stability of Groups with Costly Beliefs and Practices. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.18564/jasss.1781
The paper
Wildman, W. J., & Sosis, R. (2011). Stability of Groups with Costly Beliefs and Practices. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation. https://doi.org/10.18564/jasss.1781

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