Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
PreprintCited by 164

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies

Open access
Chari, V. V., Jones, Larry E., Marimon, Ramon · 1997

Abstract

In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress.Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative.We develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes but the benefits from this spending are concentrated.While the model generates splitticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president's powers are limited.Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system, and our model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.21034/wp.582

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 1 references

Cited by

See all 164

Metadata

Authors
Chari, V. V., Jones, L. E., & Marimon, R.
Published
1997-06-01
OpenAlex
W1512045278
Cited by
164
References
1
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
gold

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.21034/wp.582
The paper
Chari, V. V., Jones, L. E., & Marimon, R. (1997). The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies. https://doi.org/10.21034/wp.582

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.