CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 56Global Public Health Policies and EpidemiologySmoking Behavior and CessationPublic Health Policies and Education

Project Cerberus: Tobacco Industry Strategy to Create an Alternative to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

Open access
Mamudu, Hadii M., Hammond, Ross, Glantz, Stanton A.·2008·American Journal of Public Health
DOI 10.2105/ajph.2007.129478PMC PMC2509616
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

Between 1999 and 2001, British American Tobacco, Philip Morris, and Japan Tobacco International executed Project Cerberus to develop a global voluntary regulatory regime as an alternative to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). They aimed to develop a global voluntary regulatory code to be overseen by an independent audit body and to focus attention on youth smoking prevention. The International Tobacco Products Marketing Standards announced in September 2001, however, did not have the independent audit body. Although the companies did not stop the FCTC, they continue to promote the International Tobacco Products Marketing Standards youth smoking prevention as an alternative to the FCTC. Public health civil society groups should help policymakers and governments understand the importance of not working with the tobacco industry.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2105/ajph.2007.129478

Cites

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • A New Zealand delegate indicated that the NGOs were very influential particularly with respect to developing countries, where the governments themselves are not experts in the field of tobacco control.

    “Echoing the feelings of all the interviewees, a New Zealand delegate indicated that the NGOs were very influential particularly with respect to developing countries, where the governments themselves are not experts in the field of tobacco control26.”

    From Civil society and the negotiation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2009) · cites this paper as [26]

    The Conclusion (page unavailable) says civil society gained momentum and goodwill during FCTC negotiations, offering limited support for a broad claim about NGO influence. It does not report a New Zealand delegate’s statement, interviews, or the specific claim that NGOs were especially influential in developing countries because governments lacked tobacco-control expertise. (LLM, conf=0.72)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • A New Zealand delegate reported that some countries initially dismissed the awards, but later became more cognisant of them when some of the delegates used the awards to criticise others.

    “A New Zealand delegate reported that some countries initially dismissed the awards, but later became more cognisant of them when some of the delegates used the awards to criticise others26.”

    From Civil society and the negotiation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2009) · cites this paper as [26]

    The Results passages describe Project Cerberus and tobacco-industry efforts around the FCTC, but do not address awards or a New Zealand delegate’s account of how countries reacted to them. Searches for “awards” and “New Zealand” found no passage in our copy that speaks to the claim. (LLM, conf=0.76)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

No references could be resolved yet.

Research works printed but not linked: 40

  1. [1]Daube M. Voluntary agreements: designed to fail. Tob Control. 1993;2:183–184. [Google Scholar]
  2. [2]Saloojee Y, Dagli E. Tobacco industry tactics for resisting public policy on health. Bull World Health Organ. 2000;78:902–910. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  3. [3]Landman A, Ling PM, Glantz SA. Tobacco industry youth smoking prevention programs: protecting the industry and hurting tobacco control. Am J Public Health. 2002;92:917–930. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  4. [7]Mandel LL, Bialous SA, Glantz SA. Avoiding “truth”: tobacco industry promotion of life skills training. J Adolesc Health. 2006;39:868–879. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  5. [8]Tsoukalas TH, Glantz SA. Development and destruction of the first state funded anti-smoking campaign in the USA. Tob Control. 2003;12:214–220. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  6. [9]Richards JW Jr, Tye JB, Fischer PM. The tobacco industry’s code of advertising in the United States: myth and reality. Tob Control. 1996;5:295–311. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  7. [10]Pollay RW. Promises, promises: self-regulation of US cigarette broadcast advertising in the 1960s. Tob Control. 1994;3:134–144. [Google Scholar]
  8. [11]Mindell JS. The UK Voluntary Agreement on Tobacco Advertising: a comatose policy. Tob Control. 1993;2:209–214. [Google Scholar]
  9. [12]Carter SM. From legitimate consumer to public relations pawns: the tobacco industry and young Australians. Tob Control. 2003;12(suppl III):iii71–iii78. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  10. [13]Chapman S. A David and Goliath story: tobacco advertising and self-regulation in Australia. Br Med J. 1980;281:1187–1190. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  11. [14]Honjo K, Kawachi I. Effects of market liberalisation on smoking in Japan. Tob Control. 2000;9: 193–200. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  12. [15]Lambert A, Sargent JD, Glantz SA, Ling PM. How Philip Morris unlocked the Japanese cigarette market: lessons for global tobacco control. Tob Control. 2004; 13:379–387. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  13. [16]Assunta M, Chapman S. Industry sponsored youth smoking prevention programme in Malaysia: a case study in duplicity. Tob Control. 2004;13(suppl 2): ii37–ii42. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  14. [17]Alechnowicz K, Chapman S. The Philippine tobacco industry: “the strongest tobacco lobby in Asia.” Tob Control. 2004;13:71–78. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  15. [18]Knight J, Chapman S. “A phony way to show sincerity, as we all know”: tobacco industry lobbying against tobacco control in Hong Kong. Tob Control. 2004;13(suppl 2):ii13–ii21. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  16. [19]Bornhäuser A, McCarthy J, Glantz SA. Germany tobacco industry’s successful efforts to maintain scientific and political respectability to prevent regulation of secondhand smoke. Tob Control. 2006;15:e1. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  17. [20]MacKenzie R, Collin J, Sopharo C, Sopheap Y. “Almost a role model of what we would like everywhere”: British America Tobacco in Cambodia. Tob Control. 2004;13(suppl 2):ii112–ii117. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  18. [21]Assunta M, Chapman S. “The world’s most hostile environment”: how the tobacco industry circumvented Singapore’s advertising ban. Tob Control. 2004; 13(suppl 2):ii51–ii57. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  19. [23]Sebrié EM, Glantz SA. Attempts to undermine tobacco control: tobacco industry “youth smoking prevention” programs to undermine meaningful tobacco control in Latin America. Am J Public Health. 2007;97: 1357–1367. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  20. [24]Gilmore AB, McKee M. Tobacco and transition: an overview of industry investments, impact and influence in the former Soviet Union. Tob Control. 2004;13: 136–142. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  21. [32]Assunta M, Chapman S. Health treaty dilution: a case study of Japan’s influence on the language of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. J Epidemiol Community Health. 2006;60:751–756. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  22. [34]Mamudu HM, Hammond R, Glantz SA. Countering the World Bank report Curbing the Epidemic to obstruct the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Soc Sci Med. In press. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed]
  23. [35]Mamudu HM, Glantz S. Civil society and the negotiation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Global Public Health. In press. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed]
  24. [36]Carter SM. Mongoven, Biscoe & Duchin: destroying tobacco control activism from the inside. Tob Control. 2002;11:112–118. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  25. [42]Maxwell JW, Lyon TP, Hackett SC. Self-regulation and social welfare: the political economy of corporate environmentalism. J Law Econ. 2000;43:583–617. [Google Scholar]
  26. [43]Lutz S, Lyon TP, Maxwell JW. Quality leadership when regulatory standards are forthcoming. J Ind Econ. 2000;48:331–348. [Google Scholar]
  27. [44]Malone RE, Balbach ED. Tobacco industry documents: treasure trove or quagmire? Tob Control. 2000; 9:334–338. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  28. [124]British-American Tobacco Company Limited. Cross-regional CORA conference 29–30 June 2000. British American Tobacco. June 2000. Bates no. 760060173-760060181. Available at: http://bat.library.ucsf.edu//tid/iwk45a99. Accessed May 3, 2008.
  29. [146]Fowler J. Voluntary controls on tobacco advertising a failure, says WHO. Associated Press Worldstream. November 1, 2001. Available at: http://www.lexisnexis.com [password required]. Accessed August 14, 2007.
  30. [157]Action on Smoking and Health (UK). BAT admits breach of its marketing code; 2007. Available at: http://www.ash.org.uk/html/press/070509.html. Accessed July 20, 2007.
  31. [158]Francey N, Chapman S. “Operation Berkshire”: the international tobacco companies’ conspiracy. BMJ. 2000;321:371–374. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  32. [159]Ong EK, Glantz SA. Tobacco industry efforts subverting the International Agency for Research on Cancer’s second-hand smoke study. Lancet. 2000;355: 1253–1259. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  33. [163]Farrelly MC, Healton CG, Davis KC, Messeri P, Hersey JC, Haviland ML. Getting to the truth: evaluating national tobacco countermarketing campaigns. Am J Public Health. 2002;92:901–907. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  34. [164]Wakefield M, Terry-McElrath Y, Emery S, et al. Effect of televised, tobacco company–funded smoking prevention advertising on youth smoking-related beliefs, intentions, and behavior. Am J Public Health. 2006;96:2154–2160. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  35. [165]Hirschhorn N. Corporate social responsibility and the tobacco industry: hope or hype? Tob Control. 2004;13:447–453. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  36. [166]Biener L. Anti-tobacco advertisements by Massachusetts and Philip Morris: what teenagers think. Tob Control. 2002;11(suppl 2):ii43–ii46. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  37. [167]Committee on Reducing Tobacco Use, Board on Population Health and Public Health Practice, Institute of Medicine. Ending the Tobacco Problem: A Blueprint for the Nation. Washington, DC: National Academies Press; 2007.
  38. [168]Yach D, Wipfli H. A century of smoke. Ann Trop Med Parasitol. 2006;100:465–479. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  39. [169]Samet J, Wipfli H, Perez-Padilla R, Yach D. Mexico and the tobacco industry: doing the wrong thing for the right reason? BMJ. 2006;332:353–354. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  40. [170]Sebrie EM. Mexico: backroom deal blunts health warnings. Tob Control. 2006;15:348–349. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Mamudu, H. M., Hammond, R., & Glantz, S. A.
Affiliations
University of California, San Francisco (US)
ORCID
Venue
American Journal of Public Health
Publisher
American Public Health Association
Published
2008-09
Volume
98
Issue
9
Pages
1630-1642
ISSN
  • 0090-0036 (ISSN-L)
  • 1541-0048
DOI
10.2105/ajph.2007.129478
PMC
PMC2509616
OpenAlex
W2161015917
Cited by
56
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 10
FWCI
7.82
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • American Journal of Public Health (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
National Cancer Institute (R01CA087472, CA 87472)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Global Public Health Policies and Epidemiology
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Physiology › Smoking Behavior and Cessation
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › General Health Professions › Public Health Policies and Education
Keywords
tobacco industry, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, youth smoking prevention, Philip Morris, British American Tobacco, tobacco industry lobbying, civil society advocacy
MeSH terms
Smoking Prevention, Adolescent, Adult, United Kingdom, Humans, Interinstitutional Relations, International Cooperation, Japan, Politics, Public Health, Public Relations, Social Control, Informal, United States, World Health Organization, Guidelines as Topic, Tobacco Industry, Government Regulation, Voluntary Programs, Trust, Marketing

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review