The DOI matches its Crossref record; 89 of the 89 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory
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Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Self-citationSeparation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Self-citationThe Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment
Miller, M. H. (1958) · American Economic Review · Cited by 14,574
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1996) · Firms, Organizations and Contracts · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198774358.003.0005 · Cited by 9,565
The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment
Terra, P. R. (2008) · Revista de Administração e Contabilidade da Unisinos · doi:10.4013/base.20082.07 · Cited by 8,615
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Kline, J. V., Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1933) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1115736 · Cited by 7,361
CORPORATE INCOME TAXES AND THE COST OF CAPITAL: A CORRECTION
Modigliani, F., & Merton, H. M. (1963) · Cited by 5,898
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. A. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466922 · Cited by 5,791
Cited by
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
Self-citationManagerial discretion and optimal financing policies
Stulz, R. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90011-n · Cited by 3,675
Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2001) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.12.2.99.10114 · Cited by 2,332
Corporate finance and corporate governance
WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04592.x · Cited by 2,266
Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences
Jensen, M. C. (1988) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.2.1.21 · Cited by 1,319
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Metadata
- Authors
- Jensen, M. C., & Smith, Jr.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2000
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1827033679
- Cited by
- 284
- References
- 89
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.