The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms
Dellarocas, C. (2003) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.49.10.1407.17308 · Cited by 3,433
The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., & Lockwood, K. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-4309-2 · Cited by 1,118
A computational model of trust and reputation
Mui, L., Mohtashemi, M., & Halberstadt, A. (2003) · Proceedings of the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences · doi:10.1109/hicss.2002.994181 · Cited by 890
The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms
Friedman*, E. J., & Resnick, P. (2001) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00173.x · Cited by 536
THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY*
CABRAL, L., & HORTAÇSU, A. (2010) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00405.x · Cited by 505
Metadata
- Authors
- Bajari, P., & Hortacsu, A.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2000
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1604910656
- Cited by
- 372
- References
- 26
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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