The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Service Quality in the Gig Economy: Empirical Evidence about Driving Quality at Uber
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A score can only be applied if an added value is given, if data utilization is comprehensible, or at least drivers cannot be disadvantaged.
“Such a score can only be applied if an added value is given, if the utilization of the data is comprehensible, or at least drivers can not be disadvantaged. (Athey et al., 2019; Bossauer et al., 2020).”
From Trust-Building in Peer-to-Peer Carsharing: Design Case Study for Algorithm-Based Reputation Systems (2024) · cites this paper as Athey et al., 2019
Citations
Cites
Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts
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Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets
Tadelis, S. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015325 · Cited by 524
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Trust-Building in Peer-to-Peer Carsharing: Design Case Study for Algorithm-Based Reputation Systems
Neifer, T., Bossauer, P., Pakusch, C., Boehm, L., & Lawo, D. (2024) · Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) · doi:10.1007/s10606-022-09461-4 · Cited by 6
“(Athey et al., 2019; Bossauer et al., 2020).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Athey, S., Castillo, J. C., & Chandar, B.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Corresponding author
- Castillo, Juan Camilo
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2019
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3004313241
- Cited by
- 17
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2024: 5 · 2023: 6 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 2
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Digital Economy and Work Transformation
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Sharing Economy and Platforms
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Keywords
- gig economy, service quality, ride-hailing, Uber, online marketplaces, quality control mechanisms, nudging, incentives, driver behavior, telemetry data, randomized experiments
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