Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
PreprintCited by 7

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

International AI Institutions: A Literature Review of Models, Examples, and Proposals

Maas, Matthijs M., Villalobos Ruiz, José Jaime·2023

Abstract

The question of how to ensure adequate international governance of artificial intelligence (AI) has come to the center of global attention. This literature review examines the range of institutional models that have been proposed as the basis for new international organizations focused on AI. It reviews and discusses these proposals for new international AI institutions, under a taxonomy of seven distinct institutional models that have been offered by scholars and practitioners. The models we include in this review are: (1) scientific consensus-building; (2) political consensus-building and norm-setting; (3) coordination of policy and regulation; (4) enforcement of standards or restrictions; (5) stabilization and emergency response; (6) international joint research; and (7) distribution of benefits or access. For each model, we provide (i) a description of the model’s functions and types; (ii) the most common examples of each model; (iii) some examples that are somewhat underexplored in the literature but that show promise; (iv) a review of proposals for the application of that model to the international regulation of AI; and (v) critiques of the model both generally and in its potential application to AI. In sum, we review more than thirty-three commonly invoked examples of these institutional models, twenty-two rarely-explored but promising alternate institutional examples, and forty-eight proposals for new AI institutions. Finally, we sketch five pathways for further research.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2139/ssrn.4579773

Cites

5 of 5 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 5 references

Research works printed but not linked: 187

  1. Kristen E Eichensehr, 2015, Cyberwar & International Law Step Zero, Texas International Law Journal, 50, 357
  2. Rebecca Crootof, 2019, Jurisprudential Space Junk: Treaties and New Technologies, Resolving Conflicts in the Law, 106
  3. Jos� Villalobos, 2023, For an argument suggesting that many types of existential risk, including transformative AI, already do receive considerable normative coverage under international law
  4. See For Example Siegmann, 2022, The Brussels Effect and Artificial Intelligence: How EU Regulation Will Impact the Global AI Market'. Centre for the Governance of AI
  5. Henry ; Josephson, 2020, For a general account of how states can aim to pursue the global regulation of digital technologies from a domestic regulatory perspective, Global Regulations for a Digital Economy: Between New and Old Challenges'. Global Policy, 11, 515
  6. Andre Barbe, 2020, Preserving the Chokepoints: Reducing the Risks of Offshoring Among U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Firms'. Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Multilateral Controls on Hardware Chokepoints'. Center for Security and Emerging Technology
  7. Sophie-Charlotte Fischer, 2021, AI Policy Levers: A Review of the U.S. Government's Tools to Shape AI Research, Development, and Deployment'. Centre for the Governance of AI
  8. Ben Shneiderman, 2023, Do We Need a National Algorithms Safety Board?, Text. The Hill (blog)
  9. Anton Korinek, 2021, Why We Need a New Agency to Regulate Advanced Artificial Intelligence: Lessons on AI Control from the Facebook Files, Brookings (blog)
  10. ' ; Ai Governance, 2020, Should Artificial Intelligence, 11, 545
  11. Huw Roberts, 2023, Opinion-A New International AI Body Is No Panacea'. E-International Relations (blog), 11
  12. Bryant Smith, 2020, New Technologies and Old Treaties', AJIL Unbound, 114, 152, 10.1017/aju.2020.28 · DOI
  13. Rumtin Sepasspour, 2023, A Reality Check and a Way Forward for the Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
  14. Thorsten Jelinek, 2020, Policy Brief: The Creation of a G20 Coordinating Committee for the Governance of Artificial Intelligence, AI and Ethics
  15. Martina Kunz, 2022, AI and International Organizations
  16. Eugenio V Garcia, 2020, Multilateralism and Artificial Intelligence: What Role for the United Nations?, The Global Politics of Artificial Intelligence, 18
  17. See Kunz, 2020, See also 18 Though for a contrary review of existing norms, arguing that transformative AI is mostly uncovered by existing regimes in international law
  18. B�r�nice Boutin, 2023, State Responsibility in Relation to Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence, Leiden Journal of International Law, 36, 133, 10.1017/S0922156522000607 · DOI
  19. Thomas Burri, 2017, International Law and Artificial Intelligence, German Yearbook of International Law, 60, 91, 10.3790/gyil.60.1.91 · DOI
  20. Silja ; V�neky, 2019, See also Chinen, Mark. The International Governance of Artificial Intelligence, International Trade Law Meets Data Ethics: A Brave New World'. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 68
  21. Sam Altman, 2023, Governance of Superintelligence'. OpenAI, 22
  22. Lewis Ho, 2023, International Institutions for Advanced AI'. arXiv
  23. Cai), 2023, Revised Zero Draft [Framework] Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law'. Council of Europe, 1680aa193f.; Guterres, Ant�nio
  24. 2021, National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. 'Final Report'. National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence
  25. Kiran Stacey, 2023, UK Should Play Leading Role on Global AI Guidelines, Sunak to Tell Biden'. The Guardian, 31 May 2023, sec, International Community Must Urgently Confront New Reality of Generative
  26. Gillian K Hadfield, 2023, Regulatory Markets: The Future of AI Governance
  27. See For, International AI governance cannot be achieved by copy-pasting existing models, but rather by using these historical examples to employ a multi-pronged approach
  28. 2020, Governance Be Centralised?: Design Lessons from History, Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, 228
  29. Jean-Fr�d�ric Morin, 2019, How Informality Can Address Emerging Issues: Making the Most of the G7, Global Policy, 10, 267, 10.1111/1758-5899.12668 · DOI
  30. Cihon, 2020, Fragmentation and the Future: Investigating Architectures for International AI Governance, Global Policy, 11, 545, 10.1111/1758-5899.12890 · DOI
  31. We thank Harry Law for this observation. See also the discussion of research Direction 4, Part II
  32. Maria J Debre, 2023, Are International Organisations in Decline? An Absolute and Relative Perspective on Institutional Change', Global Policy, 14, 16, 10.1111/1758-5899.13170 · DOI
  33. Curtis Bradley, 2023, The Rise of Nonbinding International Agreements: An Empirical, Comparative, and Normative Analysis, The University of Chicago Law Review, 90
  34. Kristen E Eichensehr, 2015, lobal governance solutions [...] must take one of two approaches: (a) International actors can attempt to create an encompassing regime that can address all dimensions of the problem, or (b) international actors can accept that policy solutions will be crafted, coordinated, and implemented within a larger regime complex. [...] although the first option might be more efficient and effective, it is rarely the solution adopted"). For a discussion of seven global trends that have driven regime complexity and fragmentation in global governance broadly (institutional density, accretion, state power shifts, state preference changes, modernity, demands for representation and voice, and preference for local governance responses), and how these might apply in the context of global AI governance, see: Maas, Matthijs M, Artificial Intelligence Governance Under Change: Foundations, Facets, Frameworks'. University of Copenhagen, 50, 286
  35. Geoff Mulgan, 2023, The Case for a Global AI Observatory (GAIO)'. Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
  36. Bak-Coleman, Create an IPCC-like Body to Harness Benefits and Combat Harms of Digital Tech
  37. Ian Bremmer, 2023, The AI Power Paradox, Foreign Affairs
  38. Others Ho, International Institutions for Advanced AI
  39. Nicolas Miailhe, 2018, AI & Global Governance: Why We Need an Intergovernmental Panel for Artificial Intelligence, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research
  40. Luke Kemp, 2019, UN High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation: A Proposal for International AI Governance'. Centre for the Study of Existential Risk and Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence
  41. Tom Simonite, 2018, Canada, France Plan Global Panel to Study the Effects of AI
  42. 2023, The Committee for Environmental Protection, Antarctic Treaty, 28
  43. See Also Harding, 2020, Lessons from History: What Can Past Technological Breakthroughs Teach the AI Community Today
  44. Jacob Turner, 2018, Robot Rules: Regulating Artificial Intelligence, 240
  45. Carlos Gutierrez, 2020, Lessons for Artificial Intelligence from Historical Uses of Soft Law Governance', JURIMETRICS, 61
  46. See Also Stevens, 2020, 62 Take for instance the OECD's AI Policy Observatory: OECD. 'The OECD Artificial Intelligence Policy Observatory
  47. Jean-Fr�d�ric Morin, 2019, For a general discussion of the 'breadth vs. depth dilemma', see also Cihon and others, Fragmentation and the Future: Investigating Architectures for International AI Governance, 10, 549
  48. Cihon, 2020, Fragmentation and the Future: Investigating Architectures for International AI Governance, Global Policy, 11, 545, 10.1111/1758-5899.12890 · DOI
  49. Olivia J Erd�lyi, 2018, Regulating Artificial Intelligence: Proposal for a Global Solution, Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI / ACM Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 39, 95
  50. International Institutions for Advanced AI
  51. Arindrajit Maas ; Basu, 2020, Artificial Intelligence Governance Under Change: Foundations, Facets, Frameworks'. pg. 308
  52. 2023, Working Group IV: Electronic Commerce
  53. Claudio Feij�o, 2020, Harnessing Artificial Intelligence (AI) to Increase Wellbeing for All: The Case for a New Technology Diplomacy, Telecommunications Policy, 44
  54. Huw Roberts, 2023, But for a critical response see Chalmers, Alex, and Nathan Benaich, Financial Times
  55. Cihon, 2020, Fragmentation and the Future: Investigating Architectures for International AI Governance, Global Policy, 11, 545, 10.1111/1758-5899.12890 · DOI
  56. Jacob Turner, 2018, Robot Rules: Regulating Artificial Intelligence
  57. Claudio Feij�o, 2020, Harnessing Artificial Intelligence (AI) to Increase Wellbeing for All: The Case for a New Technology Diplomacy, Telecommunications Policy, 44
  58. 2023, The Economist. 'The World Needs an International Agency for Artificial Intelligence, Say Two AI Experts'. The Economist
  59. 2021, National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. 'Final Report'. National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence
  60. Luke Kemp, 2019, UN High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation: A Proposal for International AI Governance'. Centre for the Study of Existential Risk and Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence
  61. Others Ho, International Institutions for Advanced AI', p. 2; see also the reference to the IAEA in Chowdhury, Rumman
  62. Wired, 2023, as well as: Trager, Robert and others, 29
  63. Claudio Feij�o, 2020, Harnessing Artificial Intelligence (AI) to Increase Wellbeing for All: The Case for a New Technology Diplomacy, Telecommunications Policy, 44
  64. Cihon, 2020, Fragmentation and the Future: Investigating Architectures for International AI Governance, International Governance of Artificial Intelligence, 11, 545
  65. Rumtin Sepasspour, 2023, A Reality Check and a Way Forward for the Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
  66. See Also Stix, 2022, Foundations for the Future: Institution Building for the Purpose of Artificial Intelligence Governance, AI and Ethics, 2, 463, 10.1007/s43681-021-00093-w · DOI
  67. 2018, For instance, it has been argued that this was one factor that may have derailed the progress of the Nuclear Security Summits. Stover, Dawn, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (blog)
  68. Rumman Chowdhury, 2023, AI Desperately Needs Global Oversight
  69. Amy Webb, 2019, The Big Nine: How the Tech Titans and their Thinking Machines Could Warp Humanity' (Public Affairs
  70. Stix, Foundations for the Future: Institution Building for the Purpose of Artificial Intelligence Governance'. 92 Trager and others, International Governance of Civilian AI
  71. Others Ho, International Institutions for Advanced AI
  72. Cihon, 2020, Fragmentation and the Future: Investigating Architectures for International AI Governance, Global Policy, 11, 545, 10.1111/1758-5899.12890 · DOI
  73. Rumtin Sepasspour, 2023, A Reality Check and a Way Forward for the Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
  74. Paul Nemitz, 2021, Fundamentals of International Law on AI, Remaking the World: Toward an Era of Global Enlightenment
  75. Andrew J, 2020, Monitoring and verification arrangements can come in a range of forms. For instance, some institutional agreements enable bilateral "open monitoring" (e.g., enable intrusive inspections); others provide for "closed monitoring, American Political Science Review, 114, 342
  76. Nora Ingersleben-Seip, 2023, Competition and Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence Standard Setting: Explaining Emergent Patterns, Review of Policy Research, 40, 781, 10.1111/ropr.12538 · DOI
  77. Others Ho, International Institutions for Advanced AI, 10
  78. J G Castel, 2016, The Road to Artificial Superintelligence -Has International Law a Role to Play?, Canadian Journal of Law & Technology, 14
  79. Luke Kemp, 2019, UN High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation: A Proposal for International AI Governance'. Centre for the Study of Existential Risk and Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence
  80. For invocations of the IAEA and NPT examples to AI governance, see also: 'Secretary-General Ant�nio Guterres remarks to the Security Council on, Artificial Intelligence
  81. Sam Altman, 2023, Secretary-General Urges Security Council to Ensure Transparency, Accountability, Oversight, in First Debate on Artificial Intelligence, Governance of Superintelligence
  82. Anand Openai ; Ramamoorthy, 2018, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NPT) is also discussed by Robichaud, Carl, Regulating Artificial Intelligence and the Limits of the Law, 1
  83. Michael C Horowitz, 2020, unilateral, bilateral, and/or multilateral actions that states can take to build trust and prevent inadvertent military conflict. [...] generally involve using transparency, notification, and monitoring to attempt to mitigate the risk of conflict, Center for a New American Security
  84. Anand Ramamoorthy, 2018, Beyond MAD?: The Race for Artificial General Intelligence, ITU JOURNAL: ICT DISCOVERIES, 1
  85. Alexey Turchin, 2019, Global Solutions vs. Local Solutions for the AI Safety Problem, Big Data and Cognitive Computing, 3
  86. Kaj Sotala, 2013, For an older review of even earlier proposals, some of which envisioned global regulation and/or monitoring and enforcement, Physica Scripta, 90
  87. See Also Whitfield, 2020, Effective, Timely and Global: The Urgent Need for Good Global Governance of AI'. World Federalist Movement and Institute for Global Policy
  88. Waqar H Zaidi, 2021, Conclusion: Science, Technology, and Internationalism into the Cold War and Beyond', In Technological Internationalism and World Order, 239, 10.1017/9781108872416.009 · DOI
  89. Daniel Dewey, 2015, Long-Term Strategies for Ending Existential Risk from Fast Takeoff'. In Risks of Artificial Intelligence
  90. Marius Hobbhahn, 2022, What Success Looks Like'. Effective Altruism Forum
  91. Maas, 2013, Artificial Intelligence Governance Under Change: Foundations, Facets, Frameworks'. Ftn 242. Law, Va. Envtl. LJ, 31
  92. Gutierrez, Multilateral Coordination for the Proactive Governance of Artificial Intelligence Systems
  93. Oliver Guest, 2023, Prospects for AI safety agreements between countries' (Rethink Priorities
  94. Holden Karnofsky, 2022, Nearcast-Based "Deployment Problem, Analysis'. LessWrong
  95. Sam Altman, Governance of Superintelligence
  96. Others Ho, International Institutions for Advanced AI, 9
  97. As discussed in Model 3, above
  98. Whitfield, Effective Timely and Global: The Urgent Need for Good Global Governance of AI
  99. Reinmar Nindler, 2019, The United Nation's Capability to Manage Existential Risks with a Focus on Artificial Intelligence, International Community Law Review, 21, 5, 10.1163/18719732-12341388 · DOI
  100. Ibid, 2022, Autonomous Weapon Systems & Military AI: Cause Area Report'. Founders Pledge
  101. Sarah Shoker, 2023, Confidence-Building Measures for Artificial Intelligence: Workshop Proceedings
  102. Avital Balwit, 2023, How We Can Regulate AI, Asterisk
  103. Mary Robinson, 2023, The Elders Urge Global Co-Operation to Manage Risks and Share Benefits of AI
  104. Pauseai, 2023, PauseAI Proposal, 28
  105. Fli ' Fli On, 2023, A Statement on AI Risk" and Next Steps'. Future of Life Institute (blog), 30
  106. Richard Jordan, International Governance of Artificial Intelligence
  107. Simon Chesterman, 2021, Weapons of Mass Disruption: Artificial Intelligence and International Law, Regulating Artificial Intelligence and the Limits of the Law
  108. John Stewart, 2023, Why the IAEA Model May Not Be Best for Regulating Artificial Intelligence, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (blog)
  109. See Kaushik, 2023, Panic about Overhyped AI Risk Could Lead to the Wrong Kind of Regulation, Wall Street Journal
  110. Ian Bremmer, 2023, The AI Power Paradox, Foreign Affairs
  111. Andrew Imbrie, 2019, AI Safety, Security, and Stability Among Great Powers: Options, Challenges, and Lessons Learned for Pragmatic Engagement, CSET Policy Brief. Center for Security and Emerging Technology
  112. Christian Ruhl, 2022, Autonomous Weapon Systems & Military AI: Cause Area Report'. Founders Pledge, 39
  113. Michael C Horowitz, 2021, How Joe Biden Can Use Confidence-Building Measures for Military Uses of AI, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 77, 33, 10.1080/00963402.2020.1860331 · DOI
  114. Michael C Horowitz, 2021, AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures, Center for a New American Security
  115. Michael C Horowitz, 2021, AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures, Center for a New American Security
  116. Ai ' Horowitz, 2020, The Future of Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence: A Role for Confidence-Building Measures?, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 77, 33
  117. examples: Examples of institutions involved in stability management include the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an entity "composed of central bankers, ministries of finance, and supervisory and regulatory authorities from around the world
  118. Carlos I Gutierrez, 2023, Multilateral Coordination for the Proactive Governance of Artificial Intelligence Systems, Future of Life Institute
  119. See Also Whitfield, Effective Timely and Global: The Urgent Need for Good Global Governance of AI
  120. Ian Bremmer, 2023, The AI Power Paradox, Foreign Affairs
  121. Eliezer Yudkowsky, 2017, There's No Fire Alarm for Artificial General Intelligence, Machine Intelligence Research Institute (blog)
  122. Jeremy Howard, 2023, AI Safety and the Age of Disenlightenment'. fast.ai
  123. Harry Law, 2023, An IAEA for AI? The Early History of the International, Atomic Energy Agency'. Harry Law
  124. Rumtin Sepasspour, 2023, A Reality Check and a Way Forward for the Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
  125. Bill Drexel, 2023, Every Country Is on Its Own on AI: Why AI Regulation Can't Follow in the Footsteps of International Nuclear Controls, Foreign Policy (blog)
  126. Gary ; Marcus, 2017, Two Models of AI Oversight -and How Things Could Go Deeply Wrong, Communications of the ACM
  127. Ian Bremmer, 2023, The AI Power Paradox, Foreign Affairs
  128. Eleonore Pauwels, 2019, The new geopolitics of converging risks: the UN and prevention in the era of AI
  129. Robert Neufville, 2021, Collective Action on Artificial Intelligence: A Primer and Review, Technology in Society, 66
  130. Others Ho, International Institutions for Advanced AI, 13
  131. Note, 2023, these proposals are distinct from (past) calls for individual states to accelerate AI research and/or undertake some sort of large-scale AI research project or sprint, POLITICO, 8
  132. John O Mcginnis, 2010, Accelerating AI', Northwestern University Law Review, 104
  133. Maas Levin, 2020, Roadmap to a Roadmap: How Could We Tell When AGI Is a "Manhattan Project, Global Policy, 12, 66
  134. Waqar Zaidi, 2015, Long-Term Strategies for Ending Existential Risk from Fast Takeoff'. In Risks of Artificial Intelligence, International Control of Powerful Technology: Lessons from the Baruch Plan'. Center for the Governance of AI, Future of Humanity Institute
  135. Richard Jordan, International Governance of Artificial Intelligence
  136. John-Clark Levin, 2016, Roadmap to a Roadmap: How Could We Tell When AGI Is a "Manhattan Project" Away?, For a draft study on the lessons from CERN for international institutions for AI, see also Frazier, 14
  137. P Slusallek, 2018, Artificial Intelligence and Digital Reality: Do We Need a CERN for AI? the OECD Forum Network, DFK
  138. Luke Kemp, 2019, UN High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation: A Proposal for International AI Governance'. Centre for the Study of Existential Risk and Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence
  139. J G Castel, 2016, The Road to Artificial Superintelligence -Has International Law a Role to Play?, Canadian Journal of Law & Technology, 14, 11
  140. Sophie-Charlotte Fischer, 2019, A Politically Neutral Hub for Basic AI Research, Policy Perspectives. Zurich: CSS
  141. Daniel Zhang, Enhancing International Cooperation in AI Research: The Case for a Multilateral AI Research Institute
  142. Anand Ramamoorthy, 2018, Beyond MAD?: The Race for Artificial General Intelligence, ITU JOURNAL: ICT DISCOVERIES, 1
  143. Others Ho, International Institutions for Advanced AI
  144. Cameron F Kerry, 2019, UN High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation: A Proposal for International AI Governance'. Centre for the Study of Existential Risk and Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence
  145. Charlotte Stix, 2019, An Infrastructural Framework to Achieve a European Artificial Intelligence Megaproject
  146. Andrea Miotti, 2023, We Can Prevent AI Disaster Like We Prevented Nuclear Catastrophe, Financial Times
  147. Daniel Dewey, 2015, Long-Term Strategies for Ending Existential Risk from Fast Takeoff'. In Risks of Artificial Intelligence
  148. Michael Veale, 2023, At the Tensions of South and North: Critical Roles of Global South Stakeholders in AI Governance, Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, 19, 1434
  149. Eugenio V Garcia, 2022, The Technological Leap of AI and the Global South: Deepening Asymmetries and the Future of International Security'. SSRN Scholarly Paper, International Institutions for Advanced AI
  150. 2022, To some extent, an effective technology-sharing or access-providing function may be key even for other institutional models that are focused on nonproliferation, insofar as they provide incentives for participation and support different stakeholders (from diplomats to national exports) to come together around a shared mission
  151. Sumaya Adan, Crucial Features of Fair and Equitable Benefit sharing model for Transformative Artificial Intelligence
  152. Mary Robinson, 2023, The Elders Urge Global Co-Operation to Manage Risks and Share Benefits of AI
  153. Others Ho, International Institutions for Advanced AI
  154. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2021, To Reform or to Replace? : Institutional Succession in International Organizations
  155. Ranjit Lall, 2017, Beyond Institutional Design: Explaining the Performance of International Organizations, International Organization, 71, 245, 10.1017/S0020818317000066 · DOI
  156. Zolt�n I B�z�s, 2017, Evading International Law: How Agents Comply with the Letter of the Law but Violate Its Purpose, European Journal of International Relations, 23, 857, 10.1177/1354066116679242 · DOI
  157. Steven J Hoffman, 2022, International Treaties Have Mostly Failed to Produce Their Intended Effects, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119
  158. Magnus Lundgren, 2023, When Are International Organizations Responsive to Policy Problems?, International Studies Quarterly, 67
  159. David Coen, 2022, Making Global Public Policy Work: A Survey of International Organization Effectiveness, Global Policy, 13, 656, 10.1111/1758-5899.13125 · DOI
  160. Carmen Wunderlich, 2003, WMD Compliance and Enforcement in a Changing Global Context'. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Chicago Journal of International Law, 4
  161. 2012, For discussion of the conditions under which states may choose to establish treaty bodies rather than full-fledged intergovernmental organizations, as well as design options for treaty bodies, see also: Ulfstein, Geir
  162. Thomas Sommerer, 2022, Decision-Making in International Organizations: Institutional Design and Performance, The Review of International Organizations, 17, 815, 10.1007/s11558-021-09445-x · DOI
  163. Geir Ulfstein, 2011, Reflections on Institutional Design -Especially Treaty Bodies'. Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations
  164. Anne Aaken, 2013, See generally Trachtman, Joel P. The Future of International Law: Global Government, ASIL Studies in International Legal Theory, 7, 1
  165. Robert Howse, 2010, Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters, Global Policy, 1, 93
  166. Dinah L Shelton, 2003, Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199270989.001.0001 · DOI
  167. Jeffrey M Kaplow, 2022, State Compliance and the Track Record of International Security Institutions: Evidence from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, Journal of Global Security Studies, 7
  168. Eric Neumayer, 2005, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49, 925, 10.1177/0022002705281667 · DOI
  169. Oona Hathaway, 2005, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, University of Chicago Law Review, 72
  170. Oona A Hathaway, 2019, International Law and Its Transformation through the Outlawry of War, International Affairs, 95, 45, 10.1093/ia/iiy240 · DOI
  171. Elias G Carayannis, 2022, Optimising Peace through a Universal Global Peace Treaty to Constrain the Risk of War from a Militarised Artificial Superintelligence, AI & SOCIETY
  172. Thomas Metzinger, 2021, Artificial Suffering: An Argument for a Global Moratorium on Synthetic Phenomenology', Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness, 1
  173. Daniel Dewey, 2015, Long-Term Strategies for Ending Existential Risk from Fast Takeoff'. In Risks of Artificial Intelligence
  174. Guglielmo Verdirame, 2020, For China, a Legal Reckoning Is Coming'. UnHerd
  175. Grant Wilson, 2013, Minimizing Global Catastrophic and Existential Risks from Emerging Technologies through International Law, Va. Envtl. LJ, 31
  176. Bonnie Docherty, 2020, The Need for and Elements of a New Treaty on Fully Autonomous Weapons, Human Rights Watch
  177. 2023, At a high level, these functions can be principles and guidelines; goals, metrics and targets; data collection and reporting; research and development; forecasting and horizon-scanning; forums and convening; norms and standards; rules; laws and legal conventions; funding; capacity-building, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
  178. Olivia J Erd�lyi, Regulating Artificial Intelligence: Proposal for a Global Solution, Pg, 14
  179. 2023, The Christchurch Call. 'Home'. Christchurch Call
  180. Kevin Veale, 2020, Conclusion: The Christchurch Call to Action Summit and What Follows'. In Gaming the Dynamics of Online Harassment, 147
  181. ; Maas, Artificial Intelligence Governance Under Change, Two New Democratic Coalitions on 5G and AI Technologies, 308
  182. Jean-Fr�d�ric Morin, 2019, How Informality Can Address Emerging Issues: Making the Most of the G7, Global Policy, 10, 267, 10.1111/1758-5899.12668 · DOI
  183. Charlotte Siegmann, 2022, The Brussels Effect and Artificial Intelligence: How EU Regulation Will Impact the Global AI Market'. Centre for the Governance of AI
  184. Luke Kemp, 2019, UN High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation: A Proposal for International AI Governance'. Centre for the Study of Existential Risk and Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence
  185. See Robinson, 2023, AI is like� A literature review of AI metaphors and why they matter for policy, AI Foundations Report, 2
  186. Matthijs Maas, 2023, Concepts in advanced AI governance: A literature review of key terms and definitions, AI Foundations Report, 3
  187. Matthijs Maas, 2023, Advanced AI governance: A literature review, AI Foundations Report, 4

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Maas, M. M., & Villalobos Ruiz, J. J.
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2023
Cited by
7
References
5
Type
Preprint

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: International AI Institutions: A Literature Review of Models, Examples, and Proposals. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2139/ssrn.4579773
The paper
Maas, M. M., & Villalobos Ruiz, J. J. (2023). International AI Institutions: A Literature Review of Models, Examples, and Proposals. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4579773

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.