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PreprintCited by 90Open Source Software InnovationsDigital Platforms and EconomicsSoftware Engineering Techniques and Practices

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Collaboration, Peer Review and Open Source Software

Open access
Johnson, Justin·2004·Information Economics and Policy

Abstract

Open source software development may be superior to proprietary development because the open source organizational form naturally minimizes transactions costs associated with privately distributed information, thereby avoiding certain agency problems. This manifests itself in the ability of open source communities to encourage collaborative sharing of ideas and critical peer review. When these activities are important, the open source organizational form endogenously may do better than a proprietary organizational form. The desire to improve quality by circumventing such agency concerns may induce the founder of a software project to choose the open source form even though doing so foregoes potential profits, and this effect is magnified when there is an existing competing closed source project. The types of software best suited to open source development are identified.

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Johnson, J.
Affiliations
Cornell University (US)
Corresponding author
Johnson, Justin
Venue
Information Economics and Policy
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2004
Volume
18
Issue
4
Pages
477-497
ISSN
0167-6245 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3123489069
Cited by
90
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 5
FWCI
14.84
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Information Economics and Policy (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Open Source Software Innovations
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Software Engineering Techniques and Practices
Keywords
open source software, peer review, software maintainability, transaction costs, proprietary software, open source communities

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Collaboration, Peer Review and Open Source Software. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2139/ssrn.535022
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Johnson, J. (2004). Collaboration, Peer Review and Open Source Software. Information Economics and Policy. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.535022

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