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Collaboration, Peer Review and Open Source Software
Open accessAbstract
Open source software development may be superior to proprietary development because the open source organizational form naturally minimizes transactions costs associated with privately distributed information, thereby avoiding certain agency problems. This manifests itself in the ability of open source communities to encourage collaborative sharing of ideas and critical peer review. When these activities are important, the open source organizational form endogenously may do better than a proprietary organizational form. The desire to improve quality by circumventing such agency concerns may induce the founder of a software project to choose the open source form even though doing so foregoes potential profits, and this effect is magnified when there is an existing competing closed source project. The types of software best suited to open source development are identified.
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“Johnson (2004) argues that open source peer reviewers may collude to hide flaws in each others' code.”
From Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm (2006) · cites this paper as Johnson (2004)
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Cited by
Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm
Maurer, S., & Scotchmer, S. (2006) · NBER Working Paper No. 12148 · doi:10.3386/w12148 · Cited by 81
Metadata
- Authors
- Johnson, J.
- Affiliations
- Cornell University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Johnson, Justin
- Venue
- Information Economics and Policy
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 477-497
- ISSN
- 0167-6245 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123489069
- Cited by
- 90
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 14.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Information Economics and Policy (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Open Source Software Innovations
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Software Engineering Techniques and Practices
- Keywords
- open source software, peer review, software maintainability, transaction costs, proprietary software, open source communities
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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