Politics, Investor Protection and Competition
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
External finance is critical for less established entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection can hinder competition. We model how lobbying by incumbents may reduce access to finance in countries where politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and industries, we find that (i) the number of producers and entry rates are positively correlated with investor protection in financially dependent sectors, and (ii) countries with more accountable political institutions have better investor protection.
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Cites
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399436 · Cited by 3,956 · cited 1×
“We will also consider freedom of the press, which is a qualitative measure of the independence of the press produced by Freedom House; state ownership of the press, which is a more objective measure of press independence from Djankov et al. (2003); and the degree of education, as measured by the number of years of sch…”
Finance and the sources of growth
Beck, T., Levine, R., & Loayza, N. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00072-6 · Cited by 3,711
The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00125-9 · Cited by 3,327
Does financial liberalization spur growth?
BEKAERT, G., HARVEY, C., & LUNDBLAD, C. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.007 · Cited by 2,012
The institutional environment for economic growth
Henisz, W. J. (2000) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/1468-0343.00066 · Cited by 1,651
Entrepreneurship and bank credit availability
Black, S. E., & Strahan, P. E. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00513 · Cited by 1,140
Investor protection and equity markets
Shleifer, A., & Wolfenzon, D. (2002) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00149-6 · Cited by 1,077
Johnson, S., McMillan, J., & Woodruff, C. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024539 · Cited by 980
Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition and Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets
CETORELLI, N., & STRAHAN, P. E. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00841.x · Cited by 920
Radio's Impact on Public Spending
Stromberg, D. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839560 · Cited by 729
Cited by
Nonlinearity in the financial development–income inequality nexus
Kim, D.-H., & Lin, S.-C. (2011) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2011.07.002 · Cited by 209
The political economy of financial development
Girma, S., & Shortland, A. (2007) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpm040 · Cited by 203
Income inequality, poverty, and the liquidity of stock markets
Blau, B. M. (2018) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.10.006 · Cited by 49
Metadata
- Authors
- Perotti, E. C., & Volpin, P. F.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W7213239597
- Cited by
- 52
- References
- 12
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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