The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State
Open accessAbstract
The current age of globalization can be distinguished from the previous one (from 1870 to 1914) by the much higher mobility of capital than labor (in the previous age, before immigration restrictions, labor was at least as mobile as capital). This increased mobility is the result of technological changes (the ability to move funds electronically) and the relaxation of exchange controls. The mobility of capital is linked to tax competition, in which sovereign countries lower their tax rates on income earned by foreigners within their borders in order to attract both portfolio and direct investment. Tax competition, in turn, threatens to undermine the individual and corporate income taxes, which traditionally have been the main source of revenue (in terms of percentage of total revenue collected) for modern welfare states. The response of developed countries has been first, to shift the tax burden from (mobile) capital to (less mobile) labor, and second, when further increased taxation of labor becomes politically and economically difficult, to cut the social safety net. Thus, globalization and tax competition lead to a fiscal crisis for countries that wish to continue to provide social insurance to their citizens at the same time that demographic factors and the increased income inequality, job insecurity, and income volatility that result from globalization render such social insurance more necessary. The result is increasing pressure to limit globalization (e.g., by re-introducing exchange controls) which risks reducing world welfare. This article argues that if both globalization and social insurance are to be maintained, it is necessary to cut the intermediate link by limiting tax competition in a way that is congruent with maintaining the ability of democratic states to determine the desirable size of their government.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Has Globalization Gone Too Far?
Rodrik, D. (1998) · Challenge · doi:10.1080/05775132.1998.11472025 · Cited by 2,464
The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty
Vandevelde, K. J. (1998) · American Journal of International Law · doi:10.2307/2998126 · Cited by 159
(1988) · Physics Bulletin · doi:10.1088/0031-9112/39/6/021 · Cited by 47
Manager-Shareholder Alignment, Shareholder Dividend Tax Policy, and Corporate Tax AvoidancePreprint
Amiram, D., Bauer, A. M., & Frank, M. M. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2111467 · Cited by 8
Jelsma, P. L. (1986) · Stanford Law Review · doi:10.2307/1228844 · Cited by 2
Cited by
Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. (2011) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00950.x · Cited by 2,131
Scherer, A. G., Palazzo, G., & Baumann, D. (2006) · Business Ethics Quarterly · doi:10.5840/beq200616446 · Cited by 570
Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries
Kleven, H. J., Kreiner, C. T., & Saez, E. (2016) · Economica · doi:10.1111/ecca.12182 · Cited by 340
The Social Irresponsibility of Corporate Tax Avoidance: Taking CSR to the bottom line
Christensen, J., & Murphy, R. (2004) · Development · doi:10.1057/palgrave.development.1100066 · Cited by 305
Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance
(2007) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-70818-6 · Cited by 269
Metadata
- Authors
- Avi-Yonah, R. S.
- Venue
- Harvard Law Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2000-05
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1573
- ISSN
- 0017-811X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125782685
- Cited by
- 426
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 17.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1342445
- The paper
- Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2000). Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State. Harvard Law Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/1342445
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.