Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
Grilli, Vittorio, Masciandaro, Donato, Tabellini, Guido, Malinvaud, Edmond, Pagano, Marco·1991·Economic Policy
DOI 10.2307/1344630
Cited by (1,000)
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