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Coase's penguin, or, linux and “the nature of the firm”
Open accessAbstract
For decades our common understanding of the organization of economic production has been that individuals order their productive activities in one of two ways: either as employees in firms, following the directions of managers, or as individuals in markets, following price signals. This dichotomy was first identified in the early work of Ronald Coase and was developed most explicitly in the work of institutional economist Oliver Williamson. Recently, public attention has focused on a fifteen-year-old phenomenon called free software or open source software. This phenomenon involves thousands, or even tens of thousands, of computer programmers who collaborate on large- and small-scale projects without traditional firm-based or market-based ownership of the resulting product. This Article explains why free software is only one example of a much broader social-economic phenomenon emerging in the digitally networked environment, a third mode of production that the author calls "commons-based peer production."\n\nThe Article begins by demonstrating the widespread use of commons-based peer production on the Internet through a number of detailed examples, such as Wikipedia, Slashdot, the Open Directory Project, and Google. The Article uses these examples to reveal fundamental characteristics of commons-based peer production that distinguish it from the property- and contract-based modes of firms and markets. The central distinguishing characteristic is that groups of individuals successfully collaborate on large-scale projects following a diverse cluster of motivational drives and social signals rather than market prices or managerial commands. The Article then explains why this mode has systematic advantages over markets and managerial hierarchies in the digitally networked environment when the object of production is information or culture. First, peer production has an advantage in what the author calls "information opportunity cost," because it loses less information about who might be the best person for a given job. Second, there are substantial increasing allocation gains to be captured from allowing large clusters of potential contributors to interact with large clusters of information resources in search of new projects and opportunities for collaboration. The Article concludes with an overview of how these models use a variety of technological, social, and formal strategies to overcome the collective action problems usually solved in managerial and market-based systems by property, contract, and managerial commands.
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In the citing paper
“Social psychology incentives may also be unusually strong for groups such as teenagers (Benkler, 2002).”
From Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm (2006) · cites this paper as Benkler, 2002
In the citing paper
“Platforms organize distributed production (Benkler, 2002) and collaborative consumption (Botsman & Roger, 2010) without direct control over the value creation process.”
From Evaluative infrastructures: Accounting for platform organization (2017) · cites this paper as Benkler, 2002
In the citing paper
“These include, first, the emergence of knowledge, creativity, and human ingenuity as the key resource in economic production over the past decades (Benkler 2002).”
From Evaluative infrastructures: Accounting for platform organization (2017) · cites this paper as Benkler 2002
In the citing paper
“This is the layer most fully explained by commons-based peer production (Benkler, 2002): benchmarks and libraries are produced by loosely coordinated contributors, are non-rival in use, and are nonetheless subtractable in maintenance, because an unmaintained benchmark becomes contaminated and an unmaintained library bit-rots.”
From Commons-Governed Artificial Intelligence: A Taxonomy of Collective Governance (2026) · cites this paper as Benkler, 2002
In the citing paper
“Laterally, we separate a knowledge and evaluation layer from the model layer, comprising the benchmarks, leaderboards, documentation standards, and open toolchains that are produced by peer production and that determine what counts as progress.”
From Commons-Governed Artificial Intelligence: A Taxonomy of Collective Governance (2026) · cites this paper as Benkler, 2002
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Cited by
The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom
Benkler, Y. (2017) · Yale University Press eBooks · doi:10.12987/9780300127232 · Cited by 3,680
Self-citationCrowdsourcing user studies with Mechanical Turk
Kittur, A., Chi, E. H., & Suh, B. (2008) · Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/1357054.1357127 · Cited by 1,923
The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-0999 · Cited by 1,903
Self-citationChesbrough, H. W., & Appleyard, M. M. (2007) · California Management Review · doi:10.2307/41166416 · Cited by 1,417
The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources
Raustiala, K., & Victor, D. G. (2004) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818304582036 · Cited by 1,417
Metadata
- Authors
- Benkler, Y.
- Corresponding author
- Benkler, Yochai
- ORCID
- Benkler, Yochai
- Venue
- The Yale Law Journal
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2002-12
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 369
- ISSN
- 0044-0094 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1896125358
- Cited by
- 1,572
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 66 · 2022: 55 · 2021: 58 · 2020: 113 · 2019: 58 · 2018: 67 · 2017: 83 · 2016: 79 · 2015: 66 · 2014: 80 · 2013: 74 · 2012: 91
- FWCI
- 89.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- nrs.harvard.edu
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- The Yale Law Journal (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- bepress Legal Repository (submittedVersion)
- Digital Library Of The Commons Repository (Indiana University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Open Source Software Innovations
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Keywords
- commons-based peer production, free software, open source software, nature of the firm, Coase theorem, Oliver Williamson, collective action problems, online collaboration, Wikipedia, Slashdot, Open Directory Project, Google, information products
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- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Coase's penguin, or, linux and “the nature of the firm”. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1562247
- The paper
- Benkler, Y. (2002). Coase's penguin, or, linux and “the nature of the firm”. The Yale Law Journal. https://doi.org/10.2307/1562247
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.