The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Price Cycles in Markets with Customer Recognition
Abstract
Given that having bought earlier from a firm reveals something about the customers, the firms can try to use this piece of information by better fitting their market practices with respect to their previous customers. I consider an infinitely lived monopolist selling to a market where demand is composed of overlapping generations of forward-looking consumers. The monopolist can price differently to its previous customers than to its new customers. The new customers can either have chosen not to buy the product in the previous period or be new in the market. The main result is that, without full market coverage, the equilibrium involves cycles in the price being offered to the new customers. The monopolist is worse off than if it could not recognize its previous customers. The impact of durable goods, long-term contracts, and age recognition is also considered.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Theory of Industrial Organization
Jean Tirole, Z. (1988) · MIT Press Books · Cited by 8,651
Bulow, J. I. (1982) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261058 · Cited by 886
The Value of Purchase History Data in Target Marketing
Rossi, P. E., McCulloch, R. E., & Allenby, G. M. (1996) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.15.4.321 · Cited by 754
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (2000) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696352 · Cited by 629
Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Stokey, N. L. (1979) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1883163 · Cited by 589
Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
Freixas, X., Guesnerie, R., & Tirole, J. (1985) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297615 · Cited by 517
Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
Hart, O. D., & Tirole, J. (1988) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297403 · Cited by 425
Chen, Y. (1997) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00877.x · Cited by 386
Dynamic Competition with Customer Recognition
Villas-Boas, J. M. (1999) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556067 · Cited by 381
Self-citationAdvance‐Purchase Discounts and Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets
Dana, Jr. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250014 · Cited by 377
Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist
Conlisk, J., Gerstner, E., & Sobel, J. (1984) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885961 · Cited by 342
A Multistage Model of Bargaining
Sobel, J., & Takahashi, I. (1983) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297673 · Cited by 316
Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1998) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555887 · Cited by 309
Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination
Armstrong, M. (2013) · Advances in Economics and Econometrics · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139052276.006 · Cited by 267
Research Note Consumer Addressability and Customized Pricing
Chen, Y., & Iyer, G. (2002) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.21.2.197.153 · Cited by 252
Sobel, J. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297428 · Cited by 248
Pay to Switch or Pay to Stay: Preference‐Based Price Discrimination in Markets with Switching Costs
Shaffer, G., & Zhang, Z. J. (2000) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00397.x · Cited by 237
Internet Shopping Agents: Virtual Co-Location and Competition
Iyer, G., & Pazgal, A. (2003) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.22.1.85.12842 · Cited by 235
Dealer Price Discrimination in New Car Purchases: Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
Goldberg, P. K. (1996) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262035 · Cited by 195
Two Kinds of Consumer Switching Costs
Nilssen, T. (1992) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555907 · Cited by 171
Durable Goods Monopoly with Entry of New Consumers
Sobel, J. (1991) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938375 · Cited by 166
The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry
Ellison, G., & Fudenberg, D. (2000) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2601040 · Cited by 158
Conditioning Prices on Purchase HistoryPreprint
Acquisti, A., & Varian, H. R. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.336684 · Cited by 80
Cited by
Goldfarb, A., & Tucker, C. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20171452 · Cited by 2,744
Acquisti, A., Taylor, C., & Wagman, L. (2016) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.54.2.442 · Cited by 1,283
Conditioning prices on purchase history
Acquisti, A., & Varian, H. R. (2005) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1040.0103 · Cited by 689
Iyer, G., Soberman, D., & Villas-Boas, J. M. (2005) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1050.0117 · Cited by 518
Self-citationThe Value of Personal Information in Online Markets with Endogenous Privacy
Montes, R., Sand-Zantman, W., & Valletti, T. (2019) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2989 · Cited by 280
Metadata
- Authors
- Villas-Boas, J. M.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 486
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2087803934
- Cited by
- 259
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 22.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.